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I would like to try presenting culture as a dialogue. This is 
like joining a powerful movement in the social sciences to 
turn action into speech and text, and I should say firmly 
where it is different: I am not taking the Habermasian view 
of the ideal society as dialogue, because I am not emphasiz-
ing possible harmony, but the contrary. The aspect of the 
cultural dialogue that needs to be understood is account-
ability. Think of culture as essentially a dialogue that allo-
cates praise and blame. Then focus particularly on the 
blame.  
 Intercultural dialogue is inherently agonistic; the out-
come will at any one point be a victory for one and defeat 
for another of the contestants; the contest is about the form 
of the life to be led in common. 
 (Mary Douglas 1997:129) 
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Preface 
 
The basic question that drove me towards writing this thesis was a curiosity 
about our high expectations of public debate as a means of solving controversies 
about biotechnology. Throughout the analytical process, however, it became ob-
vious to me that just like all the other productive practices of articulation, I, too, 
was producing something. I produced the actant ‘articulated collectives’ bound 
to the notion that whenever we make an argument about biotechnology, we are 
not just making a claim about the technology in question, but also about the or-
der of the world and the way this social and natural order is constructed, main-
tained and restored. The following pages are an effort to inscribe this actant in a 
credible way and provide the reader with reasons to accept it as a member of the 
academic environment. It must be admitted that so far this actant is rather weak. 
Inscribing it in a dissertation is only a first step, but I hope that it will find appli-
cations outside the local context in which it was created so that it might gain in 
stability and substance.  
 
For me, however, handing in the thesis is not a question of abandoning the ac-
tant in the text at the complete mercy of its readers. Since the fates of the actant 
and of the PhD student are inextricably linked to each other I cannot abandon it 
like an orphanaged child. Rather it is more like all the other children that we fos-
ter: they transform us for better and worse, but leaving them is impossible. The 
best we can hope for is that the sense of parental responsibility diminishes as 
their individuality grows. Until that happy day, however, I am prepared to assist 
the actant, just as it does assist me. For that reason I am grateful that the evalua-
tion committee, Alan Irwin, Torben Hviid Nielsen & Merle Jacob, has given me 
the opportunity to defend it as part of a PhD dissertation and hopefully to medi-
ate it into larger networks providing stability and substance, in short, the oppor-
tunity to make it more real. 
 
Viewed locally, the network in which the creation of the actant took place does 
not feel weak. I am indebted to my supervisors: Anker Brink Lund, who has 
guided me with humour and care since I was a masters student, and to Niels 
Åkerstrøm Andersen, who provided the necessary challenges for this disserta-
tion to take shape. They both offered indispensable points of reference when I 
lost sight of where I was going.  
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I would also like to thank colleagues at the two institutions where I have been 
working: The Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy at CBS and 
the Department of Health Services Research at the University  of Copenhagen. 
Particularly, I would like to thank a number of colleagues who at various times 
have read part of the thesis and provided me with useful comments: Bent Meier 
Sørensen, Thomas Basbøll, Steen Vallentin, Thomas Hellstrøm, Birgitte Munch, 
Dorthe Pedersen, Peter Kjær, Asmund Born, Søren Wenneberg and Mette Lolk 
at CBS and Mette Nordahl Svendsen, Lisa Dahlager, Klaus Høyer and Marga-
reta Bertilsson at the University of Copenhagen. 
 
Helene Gram and Mette Bøgelund did an excellent job with the establishment of 
the archive of newspaper articles, the quantitative coding of the articles as well 
as with search of literature and reference work. Working as a true public phi-
losopher, Thomas Basbøll‘s proof reading went far beyond the question of lan-
guage and taught me much about my own epistemological bearing. 
 
None of the work could have been done without the financial support from the 
Danish Medical Research Council, which funded the project through a generous 
grant to the research group ‘Molecular diagnostics and disease prevention’ 
headed by Lene Koch at the University of Copenhagen. I am greatly indebted to 
Lene, not only as a project manager, making me able to finish on time, but also 
as a joyful safe haven in the intermittent roughness of academic life. And, fi-
nally, I continue to be completely dependent on my husband, Lars Christiansen, 
and my children, who seems to be the universal stabilising force that continually 
transforms me into a relatively decent person, as wife, mother and friend. 
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Introduction 
Public debate about controversial science 
 
 
Biotechnology has been the centre of public controversy for some time, both in 
Denmark and internationally. The issues have proliferated in recent years, rang-
ing from the development of genetically engineered micro organisms, plants and 
livestock, over advances in reproductive technologies and research on embryos 
and stem cells, to gene therapy, the cloning of humans and genetically enhanced 
normality. Each scientific and technological development has brought, it seems, 
its own controversies. 
 
This is a thesis about some of them. It has been motivated by my curiosity about 
biotechnology and genetic research as themes in and of public debate, a curios-
ity which has been piqued by the intensity of interest in these issues, the many 
conflicts to which they give rise and, finally, the resolutions that are proposed. Is 
there something special about this theme that has kept it on the agenda for the 
past several decades? What are the core issues and how do we hope to address 
them? 
 
In answering these questions, I have followed Bauer and Gaskell in defining 
‘biotechnology’ as ‘the processes and products that have been developed on the 
basis of intervention at the level of the gene.’ (2002:3). While this definition is 
broad in scope, it has the virtue of centering my inquiry on a readily identifiable 
object of controversy, viz. the gene. My analyses suggest that controversies over 
this object, that is, ‘biotechnological’ controversies, intersect with fundamental 
political discussions in contemporary Danish society. They are best understood 
as disagreements about the regulation of science and technology in a complex 
and differentiated society as well as conflicts over basic conceptions of social 
order, that is, of social integration, differentiation and disintegration. The analy-
ses therefore constitute a case study of present day political and social order, 
where each controversy can be seen to support the integrational processes of so-
ciety while at the same time indicating loci of conflict. Conceptions of social 
order are embedded in and invoked by political controversies, and the disagree-
ments over biotechnology here presented can serve as an exemplar for case stud-
ies of such conceptions. 
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The problematisations of science 
Biotechnological controversies have been studied by international researchers 
using a broad range of methods, some of which I will survey in Chapter 1. The 
lodestar of these analyses seems to that the controversies exhibit central features 
of, and tensions within, the interface between science and other parts of society. 
For example, in their ongoing research under the banner of ‘Biotechnology and 
the European Public’, Bauer and Gaskell proceed from the assumption that ‘re-
sistance is not a problem residing in the public, rather it is a signal that some-
thing is going wrong with the technology; and that resistance acts as a catalyst 
for organisational and institutional learning’ (2002:1-2). The diagnoses, how-
ever, often differ on precisely this question. Where some point to a need to im-
prove the public understanding of science and the communication of scientific 
knowledge to lay audiences, others suggest a democratisation of science and 
technology itself, letting the public have greater influence on decision-making 
processes. 
  
The controversies, then, can be seen as empirical cases in the ongoing discussion 
of the changing role of science in society that is currently taking place within 
several branches of the social sciences. The general line of argument is set down 
by the observation that the social contract of science, which once granted scien-
tific freedom of research in exchange for the production of true and useful 
knowledge, is now changing. Science is losing its privileged status and has to be 
much more directly engaged with the rest of society. Ulrich Beck and other so-
ciologists have, for example, argued that science has to become both reflexive 
and responsible in the emerging ‘risk society’ (Franklin 1998; Beck 1992). Oth-
ers have argued that the forms of knowledge production have moved science 
‘into the agora’, the public sphere where the basic problem is one of creating 
socially robust knowledge (Nowotny et al. 2001).  
 
The social acceptability of science has become a problematic issue on the policy 
level as well, transforming both policy-analysis and policy-making itself 
(Weingart 1999). In an age of nuclear disasters, mad cow disease and genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), it is argued that science is losing the legitimacy 
and credibility it needs to inform public policy processes. Researchers and pol-
icy-makers alike are trying to understand and come to grips with this decline of 
trust in science and its public acceptance. Means to improve this state of affairs 
are actively being sought, including a variety of experiments in public consulta-
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tion and scientific accountability. Biotechnological controversies figure promi-
nently in these experiments with new models of public participation.  
 
The role of science and research in society, then, is being problematised both 
internally, which is to say, within the scientific community, and externally, in 
the policy apparatus of society in general. Internally, it is observed that science 
and research is part of a much larger social machine that makes demands and 
sets expectations of inquiry. Externally, it is noted that science and research is as 
much a source of social problems as it is a resource for their solution. Science 
itself, we might say, is becoming a social a problem, so that it is no longer ade-
quate to discuss science in terms of its technical issues alone. Rather, it is the 
fundamental conception of science as a social phenomenon, a social activity that 
is being questioned. Science is now construed as an area that is contested both 
from within and from without and defining the societal role of science seems to 
be an integrated part of the controversies. When I use the term ‘science’ in what 
follows it is therefore meant as a general designation for a rather nebulous phe-
nomenon, the definition of which is itself at issue, the struggles to define it 
themselves a part of the phenomenon designated. By contrast, I use the designa-
tion ‘technoscience’, drawn from the growing body of work known as science 
studies, as an analytical term for this heterogeneous network of social activities, 
which carry out research and create knowledge. 
 
Biotechnological controversies can be seen as producing as well as being pro-
duced by the problematisation of science. This thesis takes the view that public 
debate about biotechnology is an exemplary case of how science is constructed 
as a controversial social activity. This distinguishes it from a more normative 
perspective, one that, for example, uses biotechnology as evidence in an effort to 
draw science into question as a social activity (Habermas 2003; Beck 1992). In 
this thesis no effort is made to settle the question of whether biotechnology is a 
boon for society or burden on it. It will very likely turn out to be a bit of both. 
Furthermore, it is not my intention to use these controversies in a case for the 
democratisation of an otherwise maverick science. Instead, I see these contro-
versies over biotechnology as an occasion to study the problematisation of sci-
ence itself.  
 
Turning to the Danish context in particular, biotechnological controversies have 
been observable over the last quarter of a century. The introduction of foetal di-
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agnostics as a matter of routine examination in 1978 and the birth of the first 
IVF (in vitro fertilised) baby in 1981 are some of the health care related techno-
logical advances that became the object of public debate in the beginning of the 
1980’s (Koch & Zahle 1997; Koch 1994). Furthermore, agricultural and phar-
maceutical uses of biotechnology became the object of intense public debate fol-
lowing the introduction of GMOs by Danish pharmaceutical companies (Jelsøe 
et al. 1998). Since that time, biotechnology has frequently been the object of 
public controversy, debates which have been institutionalised in forums like the 
Danish Council of Ethics (from 1987) and the Danish Board of Technology 
(1986, with an organisational change in 1995) and the introduction of proce-
dures like consensus conferences1 and other public forums for debate. The latest 
example of an institution established specifically to engender and maintain pub-
lic debate about biotechnology is called BioTIK, a governmental cross-sectorial 
project with a budget of approximately 3,5 million Euro (26 million D.kr) to be 
administered over a five year period. The stated objective of this initiative is to 
encourage citizens to form opinions on biotechnology and to inspire public de-
bate.2 
 
Ethics as politics 
It is often claimed that public debate about these controversies is necessary be-
cause the controversies touch upon fundamental ethical questions. But whereas 
most observers agree that ethics is important in the development of biotechnol-
ogy, it is not so easy to define what is actually meant by this term. It is most of-
ten treated as a self-explicating concept and issues are simply referred to as eth-
ics or ethical problems. One example of this is the juridical foundation for the 
Council of Ethics, where it might be expected that the term ‘ethics’ be given an 
explicit definition. But this law only states that ‘the council should build upon 
the presumption that human life begins at the time of conception’, and that 
members should be appointed for their knowledge about ‘ethical, cultural and 
                                          
1 In Denmark consensus conferences have been organised by two different bodies. The first 
conference was conducted in 1983 and dealt with early detection of breast cancer. It was or-
ganised in collaboration between the Danish Institute for Health Services Research and the 
Danish Medical Research Council. In 1987 the Danish Board of Technology arranged their 
first consensus conference over the issue of gene technology in industry and agriculture. Al-
together more than 30 conferences have been conducted since then in Denmark, although the 
specific organisation of the conferences varies dependent on which one of these contexts they 
are organised in.  
2 http://www.biotik.dk/myndigheder/bioTIK/, 08.05.03. 
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societal questions which is of importance in the work of the council’.3 On this 
background the council has interpreted the scope of ethical deliberation very 
broadly (Koch & Zahle 1997). The rather limited constraints on the definition of 
ethics in the statute, has left members of the council free to decide how ethics 
should be conceived, and which kinds of principles should be included (in addi-
tion to the principle about the beginning of human life). In this context it is 
worth noting that many of the council’s reports include minority expressions of 
dissent based upon independent ethical views or foundations. In considerations 
of this council it is therefore useful to view ethics as a procedure for discussing 
biotechnology, which acknowledges that fundamental moral values can or 
should be drawn into particular decisions, though it makes no stipulations about 
the need to reach a common consensus.  
 
The idea that ethics is a procedure has also been developed in the BioTIK initia-
tive. In a small folder they present ‘Ethics – a tool for making the right choices 
on biotechnology’.4 Based upon an earlier expert report they present four basic 
principles of 1) Economic and qualitative benefits, 2) Autonomy, dignity, integ-
rity and vulnerability, 3) Just distribution of benefits and burdens and 4) Code-
termination and openness. These principles constitute the foundation for a set of 
ethical guidelines for assessing biotechnology, and should in this way be seen to 
be ‘the tool’ for making decisions. Compared to the conception of ethics that 
underpins the Council of Ethics, this construal of ethics is arguably rather tech-
nocratic. More important, however, is a possible inherent contradiction in these 
guidelines. On the one hand, they are interpreted as a tool for determining the 
‘right’ choices. On the other hand, they stress the importance of open debate and 
the respect of individual self-determination as well as the necessity of public 
decisions to ‘reflect the worries and wishes of the population’. This raises the 
question of what to do in those cases where the public or the individual citizen 
disagrees with the ethical guidelines that are arrived at. Another question, sug-
gested by the reporting history of the Council of Ethics, runs: How should we 
decide in those cases where the ethical guidelines themselves lead us to contra-
dictory answers? Do we expect continuous talk to be the solution? 
 
                                          
3 Act no. 353 from June 3 1987 on the establishment of an ethical council and the regulation 
of certain bio-medical research trials. The clause about the beginning of human life at concep-
tion was heavily debated. 
4 Beige folder from BioTIK, presenting the Danish action plan for biotechnology and ethics. 
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On the basis of these contradictions in the application of ‘ethics’, it may be plau-
sibly argued that the definition of ethics or ethical foundations is integrated in 
the controversies just like the definition of science. Rather than a stable set of 
propositions, to which it is possible to refer unambiguously in order to settle 
controversies, we can view the invocation of ethics as a signal of problematisa-
tion. When it is argued that a scientific development poses ethical questions it is 
indicated that it might be touching upon fundamental differences of opinions. 
Ethical problems can thus be seen as fundamental disagreements over the condi-
tions of human life, the exploitation of nature, and the relation between the indi-
vidual and society. What should be protected – the autonomy of the foetus or 
that of the woman? Which kinds of vulnerability is most precarious – a GMO-
free natural environment in Denmark or the problem of hunger in the third world 
that might be relieved by the introduction of GMOs? How do we best protect the 
dignity of cancer patients - by protecting them against experimental gene thera-
pies that might have no positive result, or by letting them decide for themselves?  
 
On the basis of these few examples, I want to argue that the ethics of biotech-
nology could just as well be regarded as politics. Not because ethical problema-
tisations of biotechnology are political in a party-political sense of embodying 
conflicting interests, but because they are political in a broad sense. Whenever 
we make a statement about the rightness of something, we disregard other 
claims to justice or ‘right’. When we defend an ‘ethical position’ about the pro-
tection of the human foetus, claiming, for example, that abortion should be ille-
gal, we are at the same time defending a position that somehow disregards the 
autonomy of the woman. Ethical opinions and guidelines are a matter of priori-
ties. The reason for considering this set of questions political is that continuous 
controversy surrounds them.5 Despite numerous efforts to reach closure they 
have continued to appear on the public agenda as problematic. 
 
Public debate as instrument for reaching closure 
It is characteristic of the Danish debate that the articulation of these controver-
sies has been accompanied by a call for public debate, which is thereby con-
strued as an important means to solve these controversies (Lund & Horst 1999). 
                                          
5 Politics in this context is not defined as the content of the discussions in the constitutionally 
defined political arenas. Rather the implicit definition of the political as problematisations in 
public of collective issues bears much resemblance to the discourse theoretical definition of 
politics as basic and overt antagonism formulated by Laclau and Mouffe (Andersen 2003).  
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This is an idea that is also present in the previously mentioned institutions of the 
Council of Ethics, the Board of Technology and the BioTIK initiative. It is im-
plied that through public deliberation it will be possible to identify acceptable as 
well as unacceptable uses of biotechnology. Public debate can in this view also 
be presented as a basis for policy recommendations.  
 
Through the last decade it has been common to regard these initiatives as part of 
an international trend towards strengthening the accountability of science (Joss 
1999; Durant 1999). But it can also be noted that the ideal of a deliberative, pub-
lic dialogue has played a major part in the Danish social movement of folk high 
schools and the theological tradition inspired by N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872) 
and, later, Hal Koch’s (1904-1963) notion of ‘democracy as dialogue’ (Lund & 
Horst 1999). What is implied in this tradition is that public debate is important 
in itself because it serves an edifying function (‘bildung’) forming an under-
standing of the individual and collective human condition. To take part in a so-
cial dialogue is not just important as a matter of voicing one’s preferences, but 
as a process of deliberation that shapes interpretations of the world. As a collec-
tive process, this deliberation also serves the end of integration, since citizens 
are supposed to form shared and common interpretations. This notion of integra-
tion through public debate can therefore be observed as an instrument of societal 
self-reflection. Public debate is seen as the mechanism through which society as 
a whole can reflect on itself and decide whether a given social trend is desirable 
or not.  
 
The conception of deliberation as a feature of the public sphere that can turn par-
ticularities into mutually binding interpretations has been thoroughly discussed 
by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1991; Habermas 1990). In chapter 1, I will re-
turn to a discussion of the way this Habermasian ideal has been developed in the 
context of science and technology studies. The important point, here, is that the 
ideal has been a productive force in the Danish context in social movements of 
folk high schools etc. And the notion of public debate as the instrument for 
reaching closure in the form of legitimate political regulation is a common ideal 
in Danish controversies about biotechnology.  
 
There are, however, also some peculiarities in the way this ideal is invoked in 
actual public debate. An earlier analysis of the controversies over foetal diagnos-
tics (Horst 1996) revealed that the demands for more public debate were an in-
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tegral part of the arguments in the controversies. Even when the debate was 
prominent both on the political and the mass media agendas, actors continued to 
issue demands for ‘more public debate’. Moreover, as the example of BioTIK 
demonstrates, public debate is sometimes presented as a phenomenon in need of 
artificial life-support in order to function properly. Rather than emerging be-
cause members of the public find an issue worthwhile discussing, the debate is 
orchestrated, because the public apparently needs to be ‘inspired’ to debate and 
form opinions on the issues of biotechnology and genetics.  
 
It is therefore possible to identify a paradoxical situation in these calls for public 
debate. The more public debate there is, the more it is in demand. And the more 
it is praised for its bottom-up qualities, the more it is orchestrated as a top-down 
process. The continuous presence of demands for public debate might indicate 
limits in the ability to reach legitimate closure through societal self-reflection in 
the public sphere. This paradox, however, is made less visible by the continuing 
demands for more public debate, which can be seen to be a way of preserving 
the ideal of public debate as such. In these demands, the inherent argument 
seems to be that it is not because public debate does not work as an instrument 
for closure that controversies persist; it is rather because we have not had 
enough public debate yet that the issues remain open. Although public debate 
appears to be valued as a democratic institution of legitimacy, however, there is 
no unanimous agreement on the specific definition of public debate or criteria 
for its social performance. It is not just a medium through which controversies 
unfold – rather it is explicitly thematised in the controversies as an instrument 
that should be applied in particular ways.  
 
The identification of this paradox in the demands for public debate indicates a 
need to look at the concept of public debate in much the same way as the con-
cept of science, that is, as a concept being problematised and negotiated as part 
and parcel of the issues being debated. On this account it is not the intention to 
analyse controversies in order to be able to judge the societal function of public 
debate. Whether the controversies concerning biotechnology signal a real need 
for more or less public debate in order to secure legitimacy is not the issue in 
this thesis, just as I will not discuss whether the notion of deliberation in the 
public sphere is normatively right or wrong. Rather I propose to look at these 
problematisations of public debate analytically and see how the ideal of public 
debate emerges as a means of integration and societal reflection, and discuss 
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whether this emergence is at the same time an indication of possible limits to the 
realisation of this ideal?  
 
Consequently this dissertation will argue that the controversies about biotech-
nology are political because they have been continuously on the agenda of pub-
lic debate, despite numerous efforts to reach closure in terms of legislation and 
non-statutory regulation as well as different participatory methods. The analyses 
are designed as an exploratory study of the thesis, that the concepts of science, 
ethics and public debate are debated because the controversies touch upon basic 
political opinions about the constitution of society. These concepts do not desig-
nate external mediators to which it is possible to turn in order to settle contro-
versies. Rather they are part of what the political controversy is about. We do 
not just disagree about genetic technology, but also about the societal role of 
science, ethics and public debate.  
 
Under these circumstances, a study of public debate is a study of the discursive 
conditions for the possibilities of regulating a controversial area of present soci-
ety. Similar to the broad definition of politics adopted earlier, I employ the term 
regulation as an open term analogous to the use of governance within political 
theory. But rather than a policy-study of the actual formulation of regulation of 
biotechnology, the present dissertation is a sociological study of the discursive 
conditions of possibility for regulation in present Danish society. On this back-
ground I have chosen to study mass mediated debate, since it must be expected 
to convey a diverse set of opinions and arguments at the same time as it makes it 
possible to study public opinion formation as a dynamic process. Rather than a 
study of policy documents or interviews with key figures in the policy process, 
where the possibilities of regulation are already to a certain extent negotiated 
and delimited according to certain viewpoints, the mass mediated debate must 
be expected to provide access to a more diverse set of opinions, although this 
analytical strategy also has some problems, to which I will return to later. These 
considerations made me conduct an exploratory study from this problem state-
ment: 
 
The objective is to study mass mediated controversies about bio-
technology as political controversies, by analysing how different 
arguments construct the relations between particular definitions 
of problems and their solutions, hereby pointing to the discursive 
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conditions for the possibility of regulating biotechnology in pre-
sent Danish society. 
 
In the following section, I will clarify the analytical strategy behind this formu-
lation of the problems as well as define the central concepts employed in this 
problem statement. 
 
 
Conceptual clarification and analytical strategy 
The term controversy is originally adopted from a tradition within the theory of 
science that focuses on scientific controversies as a particular object for the 
study of science as a social activity (Brante 1990; Brante & Elzinga 1988; Eng-
elhardt & Caplan 1987). Here, controversy is defined as an explicit dispute be-
tween different parties interacting with each other. In order to study controver-
sies, it is therefore necessary to define a set of actors and a core of the disputes 
coherently. Reviewing the public controversies concerning biotechnology in 
Denmark, however, I have found it difficult to establish this kind of identifica-
tion as the basis for an analysis. It seemed more appropriate to regard the de-
bates about biotechnology as an ongoing problematisation with an unlimited set 
of actors and with unlimited possibilities of association to other themes and is-
sues. Rather than establishing a particular controversy with a particular set of 
actors as the object of analysis, I chose an analytical strategy that could make 
the identification of controversies the outcome of the analyses rather than its 
point of departure.  
 
Networks of articulation 
The basis for this analytical strategy is that controversies unfold in a medium of 
public articulation. The term public articulation designates a particular concep-
tualisation of public opinion formation as an ongoing, unlimited, and flexible 
production of articulation in a public space. In Chapter 2 I will present a theo-
retical framework for this understanding based on a relational ontology inspired 
by Bruno Latour. Central to this framework is that public opinion formation is 
defined as a continuous process of translation, inscription and association. In-
stead of speaking of public opinion as a particular form (as the outcome of some 
sort), public articulation is defined as a medium. It is a continuous production of 
propositions articulated in public, that is, in some sort of collective of other ac-
tors. In this process of articulation, relations between different propositions are 
 10  
 
established continuously, but they are not the ‘substance’ of public opinion. 
Rather they are relations establishing a network of articulation that exists as long 
as it is being reproduced.  
 
The example of human cloning can perhaps clarify this notion of networks of 
articulation. In 1987, on the background of distinct public articulations of this 
technique as an illegitimate and unacceptable way of reproduction, it became 
illegal to clone humans in Denmark6. Since the end of the 1990’s, however, new 
articulations of the technique of human cloning have emerged and some articu-
lations now distinguish between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. The term 
reproductive cloning designates the use of the cloning technique that is still ar-
ticulated as unacceptable – the production of human babies. But the term thera-
peutic cloning designates a different use of the cloning technique – the produc-
tion of human cells, but not a human foetus. And several of these articulations 
recommend new research with therapeutic cloning, because it might lead to new 
possibilities of therapy and treatment of diseases. In order to be able to actually 
conduct this research, however, it is necessary for the statutory regulation to be 
changed. And one of the necessary conditions for this change is probably articu-
lation of general public acceptability.  
 
This is the present situation in which we can say that there are competing net-
works of articulations of human cloning. New networks might be established in 
which the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning is employed 
in a way that makes it possible to associate therapeutic cloning with treatment 
and care, rather than the manufacture of babies. And the more articulations that 
employ this distinction the stronger it becomes, so that eventually it might be-
come stronger than the alliance around the previous articulation: Cloning as 
such is unacceptable. 
 
In this way, public articulation of propositions can be seen as a continuous proc-
ess of creation of relations, in which phenomena are connected to each other, 
establishing stronger or weaker alliances. This production is contingent, because 
relations could always have been established differently. But it is not arbitrary. It 
is always taking place in a pre-negotiated context of earlier connections (Lund 
1997). It is not easy to create alliances with an articulation of cloning as the pre-
                                          
6 Act no. 353 from June 3 1987 on the establishment of an ethical council and the regulation 
of certain bio-medical research trials 
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ferred way of human reproduction. It appears to be rather difficult to disconnect 
the previous network of articulation around cloning, which apparently includes 
notions of God’s creation, the autonomous subject and Frankenstein’s monster.  
 
Arguments 
This processual perspective on public opinion formation as a continuous articu-
lation of propositions in public does not view public opinion as an outcome of 
controversies that can be analysed in order to explain the beginning and the end 
of controversies. Instead, public opinion formation must be viewed as an ongo-
ing production of articulation that is never settled. Public opinion never becomes 
a substance that can be measured; rather it has to be studied as a dynamic proc-
ess. In this process, controversies can be viewed as points of condensation in the 
constant production of public articulation. Controversies have a theme that 
makes it possible to speak of a controversy as an association of connected argu-
ments. But how this theme should be defined is a question for the analyses to 
answer. So the definition of particular controversies is not the starting point of 
the analyses, rather it is the outcome. But what can then function as the object of 
analysis? I have settled for the argument as the analytical unit to be analysed. 
 
In order to be able to speak of a controversy there must be conflicting articula-
tions of a particular object. Controversies can therefore be said to consist of con-
flicting arguments, which construct particular relations between problems and 
solutions with the aim of making an audience adhere to a particular representa-
tion of a situation7. To speak of an audience is not necessarily to imply an actual 
addressee, but only to observe that an argument implies an imagined audience. 
Within the rhetorical tradition it is possible to speak of ‘the universal audience’ 
as the imagined audience of an argument that is not directed at a specific audi-
ence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:31-35). It is, therefore, plausible to 
say that arguments articulated in public are directed at a universal audience, but 
since it is a construction on behalf of the articulation there is nothing ontologi-
cally universal about this imagined audience.  
 
It should be noticed that when I speak of arguments as the establishment of a 
particular connection between problems and solutions, they are not ontologically 
                                          
7 This notion of argument is modelled over the definition of arguments in The New Rhetoric: 
‘the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the 
theses presented for its assent’ (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:4).  
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given entities, but rather particular constructions that vary between arguments. 
One example is that the prohibition of human cloning can be constructed as both 
a solution and a problem. It can be seen as a solution because it prevents unac-
ceptable research, and it can also be constructed as a problem because it is an 
attack on an ideal about freedom of research and a prohibition against a new and 
promising type of research. Arguments are therefore a particular kind of propo-
sition that establish connections between particular definitions of problems and 
solutions, hereby articulating phenomena in particular ways. And the analytical 
strategy of the present analyses is to study arguments about the development and 
regulation of biotechnology with the aim of identifying controversies, defined as 
observable patterns of differences in these articulations.  
 
As already mentioned, the dissertation is constructed as an exploratory study of 
the thesis that controversies persist because they bear upon basic political opin-
ions about the constitution of society. During the study, however, I found it dif-
ficult to conduct the analyses with the sole theoretical inspiration of Bruno La-
tour alone. The relational ontology stipulates that phenomena can only be con-
textually defined in temporal relations to other phenomena. This analytical per-
spective is suitable for analysing different patterns of articulation, but the ob-
served pattern does not hold any claim to stability. This became problematic in 
connection to the ambition of analysing the controversies as political conflicts. 
When I started to analyse how the phenomena of science, ethics and public de-
bate were presented in different arguments, some stable patterns emerged which 
were hard to capture by the radically actor-oriented, processual perspective of 
Latour. Rather it seemed possible to classify the arguments in a relatively stable 
typology inspired by the theoretical framework of anthropologist, Mary Doug-
las’ cultural analysis.  
 
The combination of the actor-oriented concepts of Latour and the structural 
framework of Douglas is not of course without its tensions, as I will make clear 
in Chapter 2. But it allowed me to establish a heuristic typology of different ar-
ticulations of science, ethics and public debate, which illuminate possible alli-
ances and tensions in the discursive conditions for regulating biotechnology. 
This combination also made it possible to develop a conceptual framework of 
public opinion as medium for a constant cultural dialogue about the constitution 
of society, which I will discuss towards the end of the dissertation. 
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Empirical site and data collection 
The last issue to be dealt with in this introduction is the question of empirical 
data. As it will become clear in Chapter 1, controversies concerning biotechnol-
ogy have been studied internationally in polls, focus group studies, mass media 
content, popular culture, scientific texts and policy documents. All these kinds 
of material exhibit both advantages and problems. As mentioned I have chosen 
to study mass mediated debate since it provides access to diverse constructions 
of arguments, and furthermore makes it possible to study public opinion forma-
tion as a dynamic process. An important benefit of studying mass mediated ar-
ticulation is that it is possible to follow controversies over time. Furthermore, 
many of the mass mediated articulations are explicitly put forward as arguments 
that present a particular construction of problems and solutions. This makes it a 
very good empirical site for the study of the continuous production of articula-
tions in public, where arguments present problems and solutions differently. 
 
This choice of data, however, also presented some notable challenges, since the 
mass media cannot be viewed as a neutral mediator of arguments. Rather mass 
mediated news must be seen as productive constructions of representations of 
the world. As I will argue in Chapter 2, however, this is not considered a prob-
lem for these analyses in particular, but rather a condition of any analysis of 
public articulation of opinions. Public articulation of opinion always has to take 
place in a medium, whether mass media, opinion polls, focus groups or consen-
sus conferences. None of these are media, which neutrally transmit an underly-
ing or ‘authentic’ public opinion. Rather, all these media are ways of negotiating 
or constructing the articulation of public opinions.  
 
In this way the thesis inscribes itself in a tradition of work that views public 
opinion as a ‘social construction’ (cf. Vallentin 2002). Within this perspective, 
the objective has primarily been to identify the particular conditions for the pro-
duction of public opinion in the mass media. For example Lund has focused on 
the journalistic production of public opinion in a particular pre-negotiated con-
text (Lund 1997), whereas Pedersen et al. have focused on the institutionalisa-
tion of a political communication system with journalists as a central actors 
(Pedersen et al. 2000). The perspective in the present dissertation is slightly dif-
ferent since it is not my intention to search for particular features of the journal-
istic production of news. Rather I am going to argue in Chapter 2, that mass me-
diated articulations can be viewed as a proxy for the articulation of public opin-
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ion in general. Based on Latour’s theoretical perspective, I will argue that mass 
mediated articulations are not separate formations or reflections of public opin-
ion, but rather a central part of the public production of opinions.  
 
It is on this background that I have chosen to study arguments presented in mass 
mediated articulations of biotechnology. Establishing a credible data source for 
this study, however, turned out to be a challenge because of my inability to point 
to any particular controversy that could be defined and delineated as object of 
study. On this account, I decided to construct an archive of all the mass medi-
ated articles that articulated biotechnology in a given period. In order to con-
struct this archive, however, it was necessary to conduct a preliminary study of 
content, since content was the means to decide, which kinds of articles to in-
clude and which to exclude. The construction of this archive was therefore 
linked to an analysis of associations between articulated phenomena in these ar-
ticles. This combined construction of archive and study of content is thoroughly 
documented in the appendix to this thesis, and it serves as the basis for the fur-
ther empirical analyses undertaken in this thesis.  
 
Here it should be mentioned that in the course of the establishment of this ar-
chive, the issue of biotechnology was narrowed to a focus on health care related 
biotechnology. This was due to a necessity of limiting the study, and articula-
tions of GMO and agricultural gene-technology were found to constitute a vast 
body of material, which was fortunately relatively easy to disregard, as it 
seemed to be treated as a different sphere of application primarily articulated in 
separate articles. Furthermore, methodological considerations also led to a focus 
on four national daily newspapers, since national newspapers offer the best 
search facilities while being an important part of the mass mediated production 
of articulations. 
 
Structure 
The dissertation is structured in three parts. The first part consists of a discussion 
of the theoretical background as well as the methodological framework for the 
study. Chapter 1 is a discussion of the theoretical conceptualisations of the 
changing role of science and the function of controversies. The chapter concen-
trates on the academic tradition of studies in Public Understanding of Science 
(PUS), identifying three different models for the conceptualisation of the com-
municative relationship between science and the public. These three models can 
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be seen to imply three different ways of explaining controversies about biotech-
nology, the last of which is subscribed to in this thesis. On the basis of this 
model, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework for the study of biotechno-
logical controversies inspired by the concepts of Bruno Latour as sketched in the 
previous section. The chapter ends by including the structural framework of 
Mary Douglas’ cultural theory as a necessary counterpart to the relational ontol-
ogy of Latour.  
 
The second part of the dissertation studies how the inscription of occurrences 
into newsworthy stories constructs problems and solutions differently. Chapters 
3 and 4 are empirical analyses of concrete cases of articulations of the techno-
logical application of human cloning and gene therapy. They both focus on con-
crete occurrences, which has been object of a large number of mass mediated 
articulations. The objective of these two analyses is to study concrete patterns in 
the inscription of problems and solutions. These patterns are termed scripts and 
in Chapter 5 the scripts are grouped in a typology of four modes of articulating 
the collective on the basis of the work of Mary Douglas.  
 
The third part of the thesis deals with the question of the controversies as politi-
cal conflicts over the constitution of society. In Chapter 6 the typology of four 
articulated collectives identified in Chapter 5 is used as a structured perspective 
in order to study how different arguments inscribe the phenomena of science, 
ethics and public debate, and the tensions and alliances between these different 
inscriptions are discussed. This leads to a concluding discussion in Chapter 7, in 
which the theoretical, empirical and practical results of the analyses are dis-
cussed. 
 16  
 
Chapter 1  
Science interacting with the public 
- A background study of explaining controversies 
 
Within areas such as sociology of science, technology, risk, innovation and pub-
lic policy there seems to be a growing consensus that the social role of science is 
changing. Science is presented as having lost its authority. Public confidence in 
science is apparently declining as a result of scandals and ‘unforeseen’ accidents 
leading to increasing controversies. The proliferating controversies about bio-
technology are often mentioned as prime examples of this trend. It is argued that 
they reveal an urgent need for improving the communicative relationship be-
tween science and its public. If science and the rest of society communicated 
more effectively with each other, it would be possible to reach closure on these 
controversies.8 In this chapter I have let this hypothesis be the focus of a review 
of previous academic analyses of the proliferation of public controversies over 
science: How are public controversies over science conceptualised in different 
theoretical approaches as a lack of communication in a broad sense between sci-
ence and its public?  
 
It can be argued that posing this question is already to subscribe to a particular 
worldview in which science and public are defined as discrete entities with a 
relation to each other. This is not the intention. Rather, when I speak about a 
communicative relation between science and public it is out of a discursive need 
for a term for the object of interest. But it should be clear, that the nature of this 
relation is the very object of discussion. On this account, I will adopt the term 
‘publics’ in a general and unspecified form as a term for all the possible ways of 
                                          
8 In the studies that have been made of scientific controversies, a large part of the analytical 
effort have gone into the construction of a taxonomy of the termination of controversy and a 
distinction between solution, closure and abandonment is frequent (Brante & Elzinga 1988; 
Engelhardt & Caplan 1987). According to this scheme, solution is seen as a termination where 
all parties agree on the outcome, whereas closure is seen as the termination by force, and 
abandonment designates giving it up. In the context of this dissertation this distinction does 
not work, since the relational ontology does not provide a point of observation from which it 
is possible to decide whether all parties agree or whether force has been employed. Instead the 
words solution and closure are used interchangeably about termination of controversies in the 
outset. During the analyses, however, it will become possible to identify a distinction between 
these terms but only as observable ideals in the controversies, rather than as analytical con-
cepts making normative evaluations possible. 
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constituting a public for science communication that is in some way external to 
the scientific production of knowledge. Furthermore, the term science is em-
ployed as a general and unspecified, or contested, term for the organised activity 
of creating knowledge in systematic ways.  
 
A frequently cited perception of the importance of a good communicative rela-
tionship between science and its publics is the notion of a mode 2 production of 
knowledge, according to which science has moved into the agora in order to 
produce socially robust knowledge (Nowotny et al. 2001; Gibbons et al. 1994). 
This account is an inspiring statement in the present discourse on the changing 
role of science, but I have found it difficult to use as foundation for a concrete 
study of public controversies, because the notion of the agora as a form of public 
sphere is very vague. Sometimes it seems to be equivalent to the Habermasian 
concept of a deliberative public sphere (Habermas 1991), when the focus is on 
participation and it is argued that the agora designates: ‘the space in which mar-
ket and politics meet and mingle, where the articulation of private emotions and 
meanings encounters the formation of public opinion and political consensus’ 
(Nowotny et al. 2001:183). At other places, however, they present the agora in a 
way that seems to be different from this deliberative ideal. Then it seems that the 
general reason for participation is to pursue individual preferences, and the ques-
tion of co-ordination becomes a question of aggregating preferences. This, how-
ever, must be seen in contrast to the deliberative ideal invoked above. In the 
ideal of the deliberative public sphere, identified by Habermas, the idea is pre-
cisely to leave individual economic and social interests at the door when taking 
on the role of enlightened citizen in the public sphere (Habermas 1991), see also 
(Lund & Horst 1999). Participants are assumed to engage in a dialogue as citi-
zens, not as promoters for individual or collective special interests. This citizen 
role is a precondition for deliberation, aimed at reaching a working consensus on 
what could reasonably be viewed as a common good.  
 
In this chapter I will argue that this distinction between participants as either 
consumers or citizens is of fundamental importance. The difference points to 
very different ways of conceptualising the publics, which also shape the way the 
agora can be conceptualised as a mediating space between science and publics in 
diverse ways.  
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In order to make this argument I have turned to the field of Public Understand-
ing of Science (PUS) and Science Communication. These interdisciplinary fields 
of research have explicitly dealt with the relation between science and publics as 
a dynamic process of communication where the definitions of ‘science’ and 
‘public’ are of great importance. Furthermore, the discussions on PUS and sci-
ence communication seem to be far more applicable to concrete analyses than 
the more normative perspectives on the public sphere as an institution in politi-
cal theory, which would be the outcome of a pursuit of the difference between 
deliberative and liberal perceptions of the public sphere as mentioned above. 
This, however, does not mean that I will not be returning to basic themes of po-
litical theory and the role of the public sphere in society, but this will be an im-
plication, not an end in itself. 
 
The literature on PUS and science communication is vast, and I will by no 
means claim to be covering it completely. Instead I will focus on different per-
ceptions of the relation between science and publics in particular as well as defi-
nitions on these concepts. I will start by applying a commonly accepted distinc-
tion (Michael 2002; Miller 2001; Durant 1999) between two traditions of re-
search into PUS, the traditional or positivist tradition and the critical or interpre-
tative tradition. But in view of reservations that have been raised in some recent 
articles within the critical tradition I will argue that it is possible, at least by im-
plication, to distinguish a third perspective on this relation. These three perspec-
tives can be seen to imply three distinct conceptualisations of the mediating 
space between science and its publics. For reasons of clarity I have chosen to 
refer to these three different perceptions as three different models of the agora. 
The following presentation of each of these three models is exemplified by in-
cluding references to different kinds of analyses of the public understanding of 
biotechnology and the controversies that surround it. This is done in order to 
show how different analyses of the controversies can be linked to different con-
ceptualisations of the agora as the space for mediating between science and its 
publics. 
 
Traditional PUS – enhancing ‘scientific literacy’  
As Robert Logan has shown, there has been a long tradition of scholarly writ-
ings on how to improve the public understanding of science by the mass com-
munication of scientific knowledge (Logan 2001). The early writings of this tra-
dition can be dated back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The norma-
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tive basis of these writings was a conviction that it would improve the lives of 
individuals as well as their ability to make rational political decisions if peda-
gogical efforts where made to heighten ordinary people’s understanding of sci-
ence. It is obvious that this program was closely linked to a fundamental as-
sumption that science is a factor in social progress. This assumption also guides 
many current accounts of science and science communication. As an example 
Gregory & Miller list a series of benefits for science, national economics, inter-
national relations, democracy, culture and the individual as likely outcomes of 
an increased public understanding of science (Gregory & Miller 1998).  
 
A key term in this tradition is scientific literacy, though its precise meaning is 
somewhat contested. John Durant lists three different interpretations, where the 
public should a) know a lot of scientific facts, b) know how science works (ac-
cording to the official epistemological theories) or c) know how science really 
works (according to sociology of science) (Durant 1993). In spite of these dif-
ferences the notion of scientific literacy can be seen to indicate that the public 
needs to meet a certain standard of knowledge in order to deal with science. Al-
though there is disagreement on the precise definition of what kinds of knowl-
edge the public should be familiar with, the important thing is that the standard 
set for the appropriate level of information is derived from science itself. Thus 
the notion of scientific literacy brings the figure of authority and education in 
science communication clearly to the fore. It is from within science that the 
standards are set for what the public ought to know. 
 
This view of science communication can be compared to the perspective 
adopted by communication studies, employing a linear ‘transmission’ model of 
communication, according to which a message is mediated through a channel 
from a sender to a receiver with some sort of effect (Cf. e.g. McQuail 1994). 
The sender has certain objectives and the problem becomes the instrumental one 
of designing the communication process accordingly, that is, to achieve them. A 
central issue, then, is the question of effect and, measurement of effect. Science 
communication should be designed so as to promote scientific literacy and in-
crease the public understanding of science, and this increase should be evaluated 
according to the intentions of the communicating sender, primarily science or 
scientific actors.  You know that science communication ‘is working’ to the ex-
tent that the public seems to be ‘getting the message’. 
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Even though the transmission model has been heavily criticised, it still serves as 
the basic model in many analyses of the public understanding of science. In gen-
eral, much health communication research is undertaken according to this model 
as well as more general examinations of the diffusion of innovations (Rogers 
1995). The normative raison d’être in these explorations is a wish to disseminate 
a message in order to make improvements – be it in life conditions, cognitive 
understandings or rational policy making. As mentioned above, the implicit ra-
tionality of this approach assumes that the relation between the disseminator and 
the receiver of knowledge is asymmetrical: the diffuser of scientific knowledge 
knows something the receiver does not know.  
 
This perception of science communication is fixated on the spread of informa-
tion. The public should be educated about science according to the standards of 
science itself.  In principle, science communication has failed wherever the pub-
lic does not know (or believe) something the scientists know (or believe) or, at 
the very least, something that the scientists believe the public should believe. 
Although it can be necessary to let the information flow two ways – since sci-
ence communicators might want to find out what the public is ignorant about – 
the basic feature of the agora as a mediating space between science and public is 
to be a medium for the dissemination of information. Viewed as a model for de-
cision-making, this perception comes close to what, within public policy analy-
ses, is termed the technocratic model of the science policy relation (Weingart 
1999). Here politics is dependent on scientific council to a degree where politics 
itself could become obsolete. What matters is the informational content of scien-
tific advice, since policy decisions should be firmly based on scientific knowl-
edge.  Obviously this perception of the agora has a strong bias towards elitism. 
Even though we cannot necessarily speak of a distinct social group or class as 
the elite, there is no doubt that the public is on the receiving end. Science knows, 
and the public should be made to know. 
 
Along these lines, the model has had great influence in the question of risk per-
ception and risk acceptability (Hellström & Jacob 2001; Douglas 1985; Kun-
reuther & Ley 1981). In a long lasting academic dispute about the assessment of 
risk, a central issue has been a distinction between the objective risk (the scien-
tifically established risk) and subjective risk (risk as perceived by lay people). 
According to this distinction it has been seen as important to explain public de-
viance from scientific rationality – why do people sometimes fear the harmless 
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or unlikely things while accepting very high risks in other contexts? A great deal 
of scientific work has been done to determine how to diminish this gap and get 
the risk perception of lay people to be greater in accord with the ‘real’ or scien-
tifically established risk.  
 
In connection to genetics, too, the distinction between subjective and objective 
risk has been seen as an important feature in the public understanding of genet-
ics. It has been argued that people over-exaggerate or underestimate their own 
risk and that this subjective risk perception leads to inefficient or simply ‘wrong’ 
health care choices (Morton & Duck 2001; Bosompra et al. 2000; Drossaert et 
al. 1996). On this definition of the problem, an important task becomes the en-
hancement of people’s understanding of their objective risk for the sake of im-
proving their ‘health behaviour’. In this connection it is not unusual to point to a 
need for improving the mass mediated coverage of genetics because this is seen 
as important in shaping people’s perception of genetics and risk (Condit et al. 
2002; Rees & Bath 2000; Gunter et al. 1999; Henderson & Kitzinger 1999; Ger-
lach et al. 1997). 
 
In this context I have found it interesting that other researchers have questioned 
the media coverage of genetics as being to simplistic and too positive towards 
genetic science. A frequently cited account is that by Nelkin & Lindee (Nelkin 
& Lindee 1995) in which they argue that popular media and culture present the 
notion of gene in a way that will increase genetic essentialism and determinism 
in the public understanding of genetics. Though the conclusions are somewhat 
different from the previously mentioned – mediated representations are too ea-
ger to ‘sell science’ rather than presenting science too badly – the inherent 
model of communication is similar. People are informed about science through 
public communication and it is important that the information is ‘right’ for pub-
lic perceptions to be influenced in the appropriate way. 
 
As mentioned above, however, it is most common that the reason for improving 
scientific literacy is a wish to enhance scientific legitimacy. The underlying as-
sumption is that knowledge is convincing in itself, and if only people were better 
informed, they would see that the scientific understanding of the world is the 
most correct one. Consequently, controversies are also explained in terms of 
lack of information about science. If people are sceptical about science it is a 
direct result of their lack of knowledge (Weigold 2001). The more you know of 
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science, i.e. the more enlightened you are, the more you will accept scientific 
rationality and scientifically produced knowledge as a ‘true’ (and hence best) 
understanding of the world. Lack of consent for science and technology is seen 
as being due to deficiencies in knowledge. This explanation is especially in fo-
cus in the many surveys conducted in order to measure scientific literacy and the 
general public understanding of science. 
 
The controversies surrounding genetic science and technology are no exception 
to this tendency. Most prominent is the study by the research group ‘Biotech-
nology and the European Public,’ a consortium which has produced several em-
pirical studies which are interesting in this context (Bauer & Gaskell 2002; Du-
rant et al. 1998). On the basis of a survey conducted in 1996 (Eurobarometer 
46.1) they have analysed the public perception of biotechnology in 17 European 
countries. On the basis of this analysis it was argued that Europeans are more 
sceptical of biotechnology than other areas of technological innovation, but that 
people discriminate between areas of application so that the ‘red biotechnology’ 
of the medical sector is viewed more positive than the ‘green biotechnology’ 
being developed in the areas of agriculture and food production. 
 
The study further identified three predominant logics for the public perception 
of future developments within biotechnology: A logic of support, a logic of risk-
tolerant supporters (where expected benefits are seen to outweigh expected 
risks) and a logic of opposition. Regarding medical biotechnology (including 
genetic testing) approximately half the population was portrayed as supporting 
the developments and less than 10% were portrayed as subscribing to the logic 
of opposition (Durant et al. 1998). Drawing on the same data, Hviid Nielsen and 
colleagues have identified two qualitatively different types of opposition: a 
‘green’, post-industrial opposition based on an argumentation about high risk, 
and a ‘blue’, pre-industrial opposition, in which biotechnology is against tradi-
tion and natural order, and therefore just basically wrong (Nielsen et al. 2002). 
 
In the context of the present thesis it is interesting that this European study also 
linked the public’s perception to an analysis of the characteristics of media cov-
erage. They found a general pattern according to which relatively high degrees 
of scepticism in a country were positively correlated to the amount of negative 
press coverage. Compared to the rest of Europe, the Danish public was depicted 
as rather knowledgeable about biotechnology, but harbouring low expectations 
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for improvements in life due to biotechnology, much like other Northern Euro-
pean countries (Jelsøe et al. 1998). Furthermore, the Danish media coverage was 
found to be the most negatively framed coverage of biotechnology in Europe 
(Gutteling et al. 2002).9 In a Danish context two later surveys have been con-
ducted showing that the expectations of biotechnology with regard to the im-
provement of life conditions are still much higher with regard to ‘red’ biomedi-
cal research although the general attitudes to biotechnology have become more 
negative (Mejlgaard & Siune 2001; Thulstrup 2000).  
 
The assumption that negative attitudes towards biotechnology are connected 
with a lack of scientific literacy, however, has not been supported substantially 
in these surveys, as there are a large proportion of sceptics even among the very 
knowledgeable (Mejlgaard & Siune 2001; Durant et al. 1998). This observation 
has promoted a search for other variables to explain the general attitudes to-
wards biotechnology. Other socio-demographic indicators or political/religious 
values have been considered to this end, and differences between supporters and 
opponents have been found. Opponents tend to be older, to be women, to be less 
educated, to be more religious and to hold less materialistic values (Durant et al. 
1998), the first three of these characteristics have been supported by Mejlgaard 
and Siune in the Danish context. Furthermore it has been argued that increased 
regional development (Allum et al. 2002), a general tolerance of risk (Mejlgaard 
& Siune 2001), and a general trust in science and authorities (Gutteling 2002; 
Mejlgaard & Siune 2001; Priest 2001c) can be connected to positive attitudes 
towards biotechnology. Other researchers, however, have argued that neither 
knowledge nor general values can be said to explain attitudes towards biotech-
nology since they only explain a remarkably small percentage of the variation 
(Midden et al. 2002). This has led these researchers to conclude that - at least by 
1996, when the surveys were conducted - attitudes were not yet crystallised in 
Europe, but with further advances in biotechnology this will change:  
 
It seems plausible that, as biotechnology further develops, clearer 
attitudes will emerge. It should be noted that our data were 
collected before the important media events of, for example, the 
                                          
9 This result, however, is probably also connected to the particular methodological design, 
which only includes the two papers Politiken and Information as well as the fact that the se-
lection was taken from ‘Artikeldatabasen’, which primarily include long newspaper articles. 
As the analysis of associations in the appendix shows, these are all factors that would lead 
towards a bias of negative framing. 
 24  
 
modified soya imports and the birth of Dolly the sheep, issues that 
projected biotechnology to the forefront of social debate. As it 
becomes apparent to more people that biotechnology is a diverse 
field, capable of producing a variety of very different products and 
services, people are likely to develop more differentiated attitudes. 
(Midden et al. 2002:223) 
 
In this way the authors sustain the view that public understanding of science is a 
function of public communication, although they do not support the notion of 
increasing support as a linear function of increasing knowledge.10 But it is also 
obvious that they seem to view controversies concerning biotechnology in an 
evolutionary perspective, where knowledge and communication is a decisive 
factor in the future development of the public understanding of biotechnology 
and science in general. 
 
These measures of public opinion are important as overviews of the current 
status of public understanding of science, but they also reveal some of the short-
comings of this method. Without listing all the points of criticism that can be 
directed towards these measures of public opinion it should be mentioned that 
although it is possible to compare polls at different times, they are still a static 
measure in that opinions are viewed as a stock of individual attitudes. In this 
way they leave out the social and processual aspects of public opinion forma-
tion. Furthermore they often treat national publics as a general entity. They 
hereby enforce a view of the national public as a coherent entity, which can be 
opposed to science, albeit graduated according to different levels of scientific 
literacy. It is the public which is the object of study, not science which is seen 
merely as an externally and ontologically given entity.  
 
In this section I have presented the traditional PUS tradition as exemplifying an 
asymmetrical outlook on the communicative relationship in the agora. It allo-
cates a privileged place to science and scientific knowledge just as it perceives 
the public as a more or less ignorant mass in need of information and education. 
Accordingly, reaching closure in controversies is a matter of increasing the pub-
lic understanding and acceptance of science through information campaigns. If 
the public is sceptical they need to be informed, educated or otherwise made sci-
                                          
10 Rather they seem to subscribe to what has been termed the mobilisation thesis, where in-
creasing knowledge is seen to leading to mobilisation of both positive and negative stand-
points. This hypothesis has been contested in a Danish context (Mejlgaard & Siune 2001).  
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entifically literate. This will provide them with an increased understanding. And 
not only will this make them lead healthier lives and become better democratic 
citizens, it will also make them more favourable towards science and scientific 
knowledge.  This is, in an important sense, simply what it means to ‘improve the 
public understanding of science’. 
 
Critical PUS – democratising science 
The traditional model of PUS has been the object of much criticism over the past 
decade, where critics have referred to it as a ‘deficit’ model (Wynne 1996). 
What the critics point to with this criticism is the authority assigned to science 
and the unquestioned presumption of the superiority of scientific knowledge 
with regards to how to live a healthy life, how to make rational political choices, 
and the subsequent definition of communicative problems as a lack of under-
standing, a deficit on the part of the public. In this way, their critique parallels 
the existing criticism of the transmission model within general communication 
theory. Here it is argued that the ‘syringe theory’ understands the perception of 
messages as merely injecting information into a receiver, hereby construing the 
audience as far too passive. Rather than being passively injected with informa-
tion in a process of transmission designed by senders, receivers actively select 
information according to its perceived utility, leaving information that does not 
gratify any informational needs unnoticed. Furthermore audiences are seen as 
actively constructing messages in the reception of information – making it im-
possible for senders to determine the outcome of the communicative process. 
 
Along the same line of criticism, Irwin and Wynne edited a collection of essays 
in 1996, in which all authors were trying to temper the traditional conception of 
the words Public, Understanding and Science (Irwin & Wynne 1996). It was ar-
gued, that the public cannot be understood as a single, homogenous and ignorant 
mass, but is composed of locally situated groups, each of which make sense of 
scientific knowledge in their own way. When viewed in their local contexts, par-
ticular instances of sense making, previously characterised as ‘deficient’, now 
seemed perfectly reasonable. Likewise the term understanding had to be broad-
ened so as to denote more than just a one-way transmission of knowledge. Fi-
nally, science should not be treated as an unquestioned and automatically privi-
leged sphere of society, but as one social activity among others. The editors con-
cluded by arguing that:  
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The practical target of advancing the public understanding of 
science depends upon a willingness to facilitate a broader 
discussion of the contemporary – and changing – character of 
science and the relationship between this and wider relations of 
knowledge and citizenship. This will raise difficult questions about 
the limitations of scientific understanding, the direction of 
scientific research, the relationship between public needs and 
private profit, and ultimately, about who should control science. 
(Irwin & Wynne 1996:221) 
 
This view, that is, has implications for the conceptualisation of both the publics 
and science. Parallel to the emphasis on multiple publics as active participants in 
the interpretative process, science is not depicted as a single autonomous author-
ity. The asymmetrical relationship portrayed by traditional PUS is substituted 
with a different relation, where scientific knowledge is one kind of knowledge, 
which should be evaluated on equal terms with other forms of knowledge. Fol-
lowing these lines of inquiry many researchers have argued for the need to un-
derstand the way lay people make sense of scientific knowledge. With special 
regards to genetics some of these attempts have been carried out as focus group 
studies (Condit et al. 2002; Barns et al. 2000; Kerr et al. 1998a; Kerr et al. 
1998b). These studies stress the capability of lay people to comprehend and ap-
preciate complex sets of problems. It is argued that the large interpretative reper-
toire of lay people can serve as a valuable hermeneutic contribution to experts 
conducting bioethical discussions, because it enhances the experts’ possibility of 
reflexivity and ability to evaluate biotech in a broad perspective of ‘the good 
life’ (Barns et al. 2000). Likewise Kerr et al. have argued that lay people possess 
a form of lay expertise and that their accounts of problems are much more open-
ended and reflexive towards boundaries between autonomy and responsibility 
than traditional experts’ accounts (Kerr et al. 1998a). These studies all stress that 
lay people’s accounts should be brought to influence policy making since the 
technology has far reaching consequences for all members of society. 
 
In these accounts science is not perceived as a privileged authority producing 
true knowledge. Rather science is viewed as one social activity among others 
and is therefore also presented as amenable to control by democratic institutions 
in society. In this way these writings can be seen as parts of a broad tendency 
within sociology of risk and public policy to talk about a democratisation of sci-
ence. These tendencies have been reinforced by the reverberations of the publi-
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cation of Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (Beck 1992). Beck stressed that science 
was changing and increasingly producing fallible, uncertain and de-monopolised 
knowledge. The risks implicit in the risk society are not of random accidents but 
have been manufactured by the advance of science and technology. As a conse-
quence he instigated a call for science to assume responsibility and become re-
flexive. Science needed to pay much closer attention to its consequences. It 
should “install brakes and a steering wheel” (Beck 1992:180) by changing its 
self-conception and the political arrangement it is caught up in. Under terms like 
‘reflexive science’ or ‘citizen science’ this request has gained wide support 
within the sociology of risk (Franklin 1998; Irwin 1995; Giddens 1990). It has 
thus reinforced a view of science as an activity that should ultimately be exter-
nally controlled. Science should be subject to political decisions made by socie-
tal institutions instead of developing according to its own internal logic. 
 
In later years the term Public Participation in Science has come to emphasise 
this understanding (Joss 2002; Joss 1999). One of the reasons for the growing 
interest in participatory methods is an apparent observation of increased public 
scepticism towards science and technology. In this respect it bears much resem-
blance to the intentions behind the efforts to create scientific literacy. The prob-
lem of scepticism, however, is conceptualised differently just as the suggested 
solutions differ from the idea of scientific education. Under the heading of pub-
lic participation, it is not information campaigns but participation in decision-
making processes, which is supposed to reduce scepticism. For instance, the 
noted promoter of scientific literacy, John Durant, has recently argued that we 
need to understand public scepticism as a demand for greater equality between 
scientists and non-scientists (Durant 1999).  
 
These diagnoses and problem definitions point to a different perception of the 
agora than has been presented in the previous section. Rather than being a me-
dium for the diffusion of information, the agora is perceived as a sphere for de-
mocratic mediation and the exercise of control over scientific development. It is 
argued that ideals of equality and informed public debate is a precondition for 
creating socially sustainable public policies (Weale 2001; Davison & Barns 
1997; Schwarz 1993). A more or less explicitly Habermasian inspired ideal of a 
public sphere is often invoked in this connection. As an example Edwards point 
to the public sphere as a vehicle for democratic control with science and for co-
ordination between the public, policy-institutions and science (Edwards 1999). 
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Expert advice takes on a completely different role in this perception of the ag-
ora, since science is no longer an autonomous authority, but just one, fallible, 
voice among many. In this model different knowledge claims should be voiced 
on equal terms and solutions to problems should be reached through ‘a thick 
democratic debate’ (Davison & Barns 1997). 
 
Within this specific framework of deliberative democracy, procedural standards 
of fairness and competence become crucial requirements for new participatory 
processes. As an example Webler and Tuler argue for the importance of fairness 
and competence, where a fair procedure means that everyone ‘has an equal 
chance to make his or her voice heard and shape the final decision’ (Webler & 
Tuler 2002:183). However, they make the case that the process should be ‘com-
petent’ in order to ensure, that ‘the best rules and procedures are used to gather, 
evaluate and select knowledge’. These procedural standards thus separate form 
and content in order to stress the importance of the former, arguing the crucial 
first step is to create consensus on how decisions are made.  
 
The ideal of participation on equal terms has also had an impact on practical de-
velopments. Governments and other policy institutions in Europe have increas-
ingly been experimenting with activities concerning public participation in sci-
ence, especially within the field of technology assessment (Joss 1999; Wheale & 
McNally 1998). Models employed include consensus conferences (Joss 2002), 
citizens’ juries, electronic public consultation (Finney 1999), and technology 
foresight (Borch & Rasmussen 2000). Although the practical models differ in 
scope and method, they all aim to ensure or improve public participation in the 
evaluation of scientific and technological development or policy formulations 
concerning science and technology. Much in line with Habermasian ideals of the 
public sphere and deliberative democracy, Joss outlines three characteristics in 
the development of participatory methods in Europe: 1) public access in terms of 
openness, 2) active actor involvement and deliberation in terms of empower-
ment of participants, and 3) institutional anchoring outside the formal state bu-
reaucracy (Joss 2002).  
 
In this connection Denmark is often mentioned as being in the forefront of the 
development of a participatory agenda with the Danish Board of Technology as 
an eager promoter. Especially the Consensus Conference is a procedure that has 
been adopted in many other countries (Joss 2002). In a consensus conference a 
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panel of citizens and a panel of experts adopt different roles as inquirers and ex-
pert witnesses, but the goal is a dialogue that treats all participants as equals in 
that they all contribute on equal terms. Thus it is the citizen panel, which writes 
the final consensus document and the experts have no way to influence the result 
at this stage in the process. Andersen & Jæger point out, that support for the 
consensus conferences in Denmark is probably linked to a strong tradition for 
integrative political processes in Denmark and a cultural bias towards participa-
tion or deliberation in the common Danish perception of democracy (Andersen 
& Jæger 1999). An argument that is similar to the previously mentioned ideal of 
public reflection as means for integration and public edification inherited in the 
Danish Grundtvigian tradition. 
 
Not all scholars view the current experiment with participatory methods with 
equal approval. Levidow and Marris have argued that the participatory agenda 
and the rhetoric of openness employed within European policy formulation on 
agricultural biotechnology are part of an effort to increase public trust in science 
and policy making, but they also stress that these efforts are ‘tagged on to the 
dominant models of science, technology and the public, rather than superseding 
them’. (Levidow & Marris 2001). On this account they issue a warning that 
these efforts might do more harm than good with respect to legitimation and 
public trust, if the publics do not perceive them as truly participatory, as open-
ings for real democratic change.  
 
Wheale and McNally have presented a somewhat similar critique (1998). In an 
edited volume analysing the social management of genetic engineering, they 
stress the importance of openness in public deliberation. They argue that the 
plethora of bioethics committees advising policy-makers pose a danger that poli-
ticians use these committees to abdicate from democratic responsibility. This is 
problematic because public debate should not be substituted with more or less 
institutionalised expert, i.e. elitist, deliberation on ethical questions. These kinds 
of criticism stress the importance of the authenticity of participatory methods. In 
order to improve democratic influence and reduce scepticism through participa-
tion it is important that the influence exercised is perceived as genuine. 
 
Summarising we can conclude that critical PUS presents a different perception 
of the agora as a public sphere for democratic debate, where the central issue 
becomes one of reaching agreement within a community. Closure can no longer 
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be determined with reference to ´truth´ or certainty but should be determined 
according to what different social actors can agree on. In this deliberative model 
put forward by critical PUS, the communication process is presented as symmet-
rical, but it is very interesting that this symmetry apparently is not something 
that is there in advance or by nature. Rather it has to be constructed and safe-
guarded by institutional design. It is worth noticing that most of these notions of 
a democratic agora put forward strong requirements for procedural regulations 
in order to secure real dialogue and equality of communication partners in the 
process. It is not enough that science and policy-makers be more open, processes 
have to be designed for participation and the influence has to be ‘real’. 
 
A third perspective – negotiated credibility in networks 
During recent years, however, criticism of the established critical PUS has 
emerged and within this criticism we might be able to identify a third notion of 
the agora as a space for mediating between science and publics. It should be 
noted, that I have only located this new type of conceptualisation sporadically in 
the literature. I will point to some contours of this new criticism by discussing 
some recent analyses by Mike Michael, in which he explicitly criticizes not just 
the deficit model but also the critical, interpretative PUS tradition. For other 
hints at this kind of criticism see (Miller 2001; Irwin 2001; Locke 1999).  
 
Michael points to a tendency to romanticize the public within critical PUS 
(Michael 2001). The consensual aspects of lay local knowledge are stressed in 
an image of the lay public as devoid of internal conflicts due to power and di-
versity. The lay public is depicted as a homogeneous entity without any sensitiv-
ity towards internal differences and cultural dynamics stemming from relations 
to other cultural domains in society. As opposed to this image Michael argues in 
favour of stressing heterogeneity, making the move also to a plurality of publics. 
He conceptualises the relationships between science and the rest of culture in 
terms of a network, or rhizome, which stresses discontinuity, fractures and non-
linearity. This image does not just have consequences for the understanding of 
how the relationship is perceived, but also for the notion of science and publics 
(or society) as distinct spheres. As he puts it ‘this imagery of the rhizome sug-
gests that there is no easy differentiation between the expert and the popular, 
between the scientific and the lay.’ (Michael 2002:370)  
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In the next chapter I will return to the Latourian concept of network, which I 
will argue can be used as synonymous to the Deleuzian concept of rhizome in 
the present context. In my view Michael can be seen to be completely in accor-
dance with Latour, whom he also cites, when he stresses that we should seek to 
place ‘emphasis on the role of the corporeality, distributedness, hybridity, parti-
ality, and emergence (or, what might be called, the ‘process-uality’) of the pub-
lic’ (Michael 2002:374). The public must be understood in terms of heterogene-
ity, always as several publics, and emphasis should be placed on ‘the ways in 
which disaffection, resistance, or accommodation to expert knowledge are re-
sourced by broader cultural dynamics’ (Michael & Carter 2001:10). The percep-
tion or understanding of science by ‘the publics’ should thus be seen in a 
broader cultural context, where the diversity of publics is recognised, and where 
connections to other cultural influences and dynamics is given due reflection. 
Michael suggests, that, ‘perhaps chief among such dynamics is the globalized 
rise of consumption’ (Michael 2002:369). 
 
Michael has elaborated on this figure of consumption as central to the meaning 
of PUS by emphasizing a shift from the role of citizen to the role of consumer 
(Michael 1998). Here he emphasises the shift from the role of citizen to the role 
of consumer, when members of the public are increasingly ‘voting with their 
purchasing choices to make concerted efforts to influence policymaking’ 
(Michael 1998:320). This increasing focus on the citizen as a consumer should 
also have implications for the understanding of PUS. He argues that along these 
lines we could begin to understand scientific knowledge as a consumable, which 
is being evaluated and valued according to different standards of usability. 
Among these standards we could count also its aesthetic value, that is, the ways 
in which it ‘contributes to the expressive or stylistic dimensions of everyday 
life’ (Michael 1998:316). Science is thus no longer only evaluated according to 
its own authoritative ideal, but is given to different standards of evaluation be-
yond its own control. With the increasing focus on the layperson as a consumer, 
science, too, becomes a consumable good, which is distributed, consumed and 
evaluated in competitive settings. As opposed to the ideal that guides critical or 
interpretative PUS, the rhizomatic view or network model is not grounded in the 
possibility of reaching a common understanding by following particular proce-
dures. The consumption of science is distributed and fragmented, and the 
mechanism of evaluation is closely connected to contextual utility, which might 
differ between individuals.  
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It is precisely the same features of science as a consumable that Miller points to, 
when he in a critique of the paradigm of interpretative PUS states that ‘people 
will pick up the knowledge they need for the task at hand, use it as required, and 
then put it down again’ (Miller 2001:118). In line with traditional PUS, Miller 
argues that scientific knowledge can be viewed as a tool for people living their 
lives in the modern world. He differs, however, from the traditional view by 
stressing that communication is essentially audience driven. People will pick up 
the knowledge they need in a particular context, not the knowledge that science 
communicators see as universally important. This shift changes the focus in the 
perception of the members of (various) publics away from what is common 
within traditional PUS. As consumers they engage in communication about sci-
ence motivated by an individual experience of their own particular needs, not 
primarily in order to fulfil a universal role as enlightened and educated citizen. 
 
These examples develop a notion in which the agora as a mediating space be-
tween science and the publics is best depicted in terms of contextual networks of 
negotiations over usability, credibility and influence. Publics are temporal con-
structions of users of scientific knowledge with a plurality of ways of evaluating 
this knowledge. They cannot be viewed as a co-ordinated community with 
something in common, e.g. a wish for the common good or some kind of con-
sensus. Rather, negotiations over credibility becomes of central importance, as 
socially robust knowledge is created through association. The better connected a 
given claim to knowledge is, both in terms of sheer numbers and the quality of 
allies, the more robust it seems to be. This reference to ‘socially robust knowl-
edge’ is intended to indicate the affinities between this third model of the agora 
as a network of negotiation and the idea of an agora put forward by Nowotny et 
al. (2001). 
 
The crucial difference between the deliberative model suggested by critical PUS 
and this third perspective is the question of achieving social integration through 
communication. In the deliberative model, integration is proactive and inten-
tionally created through a communicative process. In the network model, how-
ever, integration is principally a result of dispersed, fragmented actions. In the 
network model only the network of associations can reveal which kinds of 
knowledge is considered most credible. It is not possible to look to authorities 
like science or procedures of dialogue in order to establish ‘the better argument’ 
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or ‘the best knowledge’ – it will have to be measured by connections. The case 
of BSE can be used to illustrate how analyses according to this model would 
look. If we view the slaughter of millions of cattle in Europe as the socially con-
structed ‘right thing to do’ this closure can be seen as a result of negotiations 
over credibility. Most of the public did not view assurances from scientific 
sources that eating beef was not very risky as credible, but demanded policy 
formulations to be based on other kinds of risk assessment.  
 
In this perception of the agora as a network of negotiations, the identification of 
socially robust knowledge, always dependent on attributions of credibility, must 
deal with a time lag compared to the other two models, both of which stipulate 
proactive standards of judgement. In traditional PUS, expertise is a function of 
the authority of science, whereas in critical PUS it is a function of procedural 
rules. But in the network model, there is no way of establishing such authority in 
advance. ‘Time will tell’ is the ultimate answer to questions about the robustness 
of knowledge. Socially robust knowledge is that which people continue to sub-
scribe to. Following this argument, science itself is also a much more openly 
contested construct. It is not possible to determine a priori or in any universal 
way, what is to count as scientific. Rather this is a matter of context and con-
crete negotiations. 
 
On the other hand, this should not be taken to imply that expertise is deemed 
impossible in principle by this model. But the expertise is now more a function 
of trust and credibility than of truth and authority, or we might say that what 
matters now is the ‘expectation of expertise’ rather than the ‘stipulation of ex-
pertise’. Expertise is much more relational and relative in the network model 
than in the other two. In contrast to the other two models, where trust is the 
normative goal intended to be created through the process of communication, 
trust is an instrumental value in the network model, something that has to be ac-
tively created and maintained because it serves the function of increasing the 
smoothness of negotiations in the network. Whether or not a network is func-
tioning smoothly can only be determined by observing it in action, and any such 
determination will therefore only be possible retrospectively.   
A way of getting around the time lag in this model and explore the possible ro-
bustness of knowledge is to stage an interim settlement by having some kind of 
measurement of preferences (in the form of election or poll) or a negotiation be-
tween parties. The latter case bears some resemblance to the participatory or 
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democratic sphere of democratic debate as perceived within critical PUS, but in 
the network model there is no normative ideal of consensus. Rather, negotiation 
can be one way of engineering a measurement of preferences, so that the multi-
plicity of individual preferences can be made visible to the policy makers. The 
critique of the European policy experiments with participatory methods men-
tioned in the previous section can perhaps best be understood in this light. These 
experiments are carried out under the heading of participatory methods, but 
whereas European policy makers possibly intend these experiments to be novel 
ways of accounting for multiple judgements of credibility, as I have shown 
within this network model, the academic scholars base their criticism on a dif-
ferent ideal – that of a deliberative public sphere.11 
 
Since the identification of this network model does not build upon a commonly 
accepted distinction within the tradition of PUS, it is not possible to point to 
analyses of public understanding of biotechnology that explicitly subscribes to 
such a third model. There are, however, quite a number of accounts of public 
perceptions and representations of biotechnology, which I view as more equiva-
lent to this model than the other two (Michael 2001; Michael & Carter 2001; 
Priest 2001a; Dijck 1998; Turney 1998; Mulkay 1997)12.  
 
A common feature in these accounts is to stress the dispersed, floating and nego-
tiated construction of both publics and science. For instance Priest stresses that 
if the American publics have been regarded as more or less unanimously posi-
tive towards agricultural biotechnology this is because analysts have disregarded 
the enclaves of resistance and the large amount of latent scepticism or indiffer-
ence in the publics, and primarily relied on institutional sources. Similarly Tur-
ney, van Dijck and Michael & Carter stress the need to go beyond authorita-
                                          
11 These tensions could also be conceptualised in the difference between bottom-up and top-
down models, just as it was argued in the introduction to this thesis about the engineering of 
public debate in Denmark as a means to solve controversies. 
12 It should be noted that some of the studies of biotechnological controversies presented in 
connection to the former two models adopt this view as a general statement of intent. For in-
stance the prominent study headed by Bauer and Gaskell formulate the overall perception of 
the nature of controversies like this: ‘in the course of its twenty-five-year development: first, 
biotechnology regularly presented challenges to observers within the public sphere; and, sec-
ond, these observers at times responded with counter-challenges or resistance that contributed 
to shape the continued development of biotechnology itself’ (Bauer & Gaskell 2002:5). In 
many of the particular analyses, however, they do seem to subscribe to the traditional PUS 
model of the agora as a means to educate the public.  
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tively sanctioned representations of science and include both non-fictional and 
fictional sources, in order to portray the multifaceted cultural constructions of 
science and scientific knowledge. In his mapping of the social representations of 
the Frankenstein myth, Turney shows how this cultural ‘script’ has become ‘one 
of the most important in our culture’s discussion of science and technology’ 
since it tends to polarise political debates about biotechnology in either all-for or 
all-against positions (Turney 1998:6). In these accounts, drawing on fiction as 
well as non-fiction, popular presentations of science are seen as having constitu-
tive influences on the public construction of science and scientific knowledge.  
 
These accounts also stress the adversarial nature of the public negotiation over 
science and technology and link the controversies to the influence of general 
‘ideological tenets’ (Dijck 1998:4). In a study of biotechnology in the American 
media, Priest argues that biotechnology becomes news when it threatens central 
cultural values, as the issue of cloning threatened the fundamental value of indi-
vidualism in US culture. Controversies of biotechnology are not just about tech-
nology, but embedded in other aspects of political and social debates: ‘To un-
derstand the development and impact of news about biotechnology would not be 
possible without taking into account the influence of the cultural context in 
which public opinion is formed’ (Priest 2001a:13-14).  
 
Mulkay elaborates this point in the study of the dynamics of public debate and 
political struggle over embryo research in Great Britain. He demonstrates how 
the ‘conflicting ideas about the place of the life sciences in present day society 
were publicly formed and displayed, as [people] struggled to respond to the 
challenge posed by embryo research’ (Mulkay 1997:2). Mulkay portrays the ap-
proval to conduct embryo research within a period of 14 days after conception 
that was eventually granted, as the triumph of the rhetoric of hope over the 
rhetoric of fear. In a multi-layered analysis, he concludes that this triumph was 
negotiated in many different forums and by different actors in different combi-
nations. Within parliamentary circles a pro-research lobby was able to establish 
embryo research as an exemplary case of controlled scientific progress with ma-
jor benefits and without significant infringements of existing moral values. In 
the media, public opinion was won by a combination of scientific authority and 
moving personal testimony from happy families with healthy babies. More gen-
erally, the proponents of research were able to present science as the rational 
alternative to religious dogma, here using the example of Galileo as a convinc-
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ing image of the need to free science from these ‘irrational’ constraints. In this 
context, Mulkay also shows, how the Frankenstein myth ‘backfired’ on the op-
ponents, because it could be used by proponents to discredit any resistance as 
based ultimately on myth rather than rational arguments.  
 
Summarising, I propose that besides the two perceptions of the agora as a space 
for diffusion of knowledge in order to educate the public or as a sphere for the 
exercise of deliberative democracy, it is possible to identify a third perception of 
the agora as a network of negotiations over credibility in competing knowledge 
claims. In this perception, the relations between science and its publics are di-
verse, just as neither ‘science’ nor ‘public’ can be universally defined; rather, 
these phenomena are contextual constructs dependent on their mutual relations. 
This model has a distinct view of the evaluation of scientific knowledge, since 
robust knowledge is not identified by authority or by deliberation. Instead credi-
bility and negotiation is crucial in any evaluation, as robustness is determined by 
exploring which knowledge claims can gain most support in the form of allies 
and/or votes. This, on the other hand, means that public opinion is presented as 
volatile and heterogeneous, with different and contextual standards of usability. 
 
Implications for the present study 
At least two implications for further research can be drawn from this identifica-
tion of three different perceptions of the agora as the mediating space between 
science and its publics, each with specific standards for evaluating scientific 
knowledge. One is to follow the difference between appealing to citizens or con-
sumers in participatory methods, and explore different criteria for success in 
connection with participatory methods in policy processes. This strand of analy-
sis can lead to theoretical arguments in favour of one of these models, but also to 
empirical analyses of actual policy processes. In this way it might be possible to 
explain why the mechanisms of participation do not always seem to have the 
intended effects as implied in the criticism mentioned in connection with the 
deliberative model. It makes a critical difference whether members of the public 
are addressed as citizens supposed to be educated, citizens partaking in mutual 
deliberation, or consumers exercising consumer choices, for the expectations 
entrenched in the communicative relationship. And these expectations are deci-
sive for the outcomes of the communication. The experience of ‘failure’ proba-
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bly has a lot to do with heterogeneous and unclear expectations.13 On the other 
hand, it can perhaps be argued that it is precisely the ambiguity in the account of 
these participatory methods that makes it possible to gain broad support, both in 
normative theory and in concrete experiments with actual policy-making. In or-
der to keep the scope of this thesis within reasonable bounds, I will not pursue 
these questions any further, and offer the hypothesis, that vagueness at the same 
time supports consent and causes controversy about the experienced content and 
outcome of public participation, as an interesting topic for further study.  
 
These different models can be seen as three different perceptual frameworks for 
the analytical interpretation of public controversies as a social phenomenon. I 
have identified them as three different models for an understanding of the agora; 
i.e. models for the conceptualisation of the mediating space between science and 
its publics. In the following figures I have tried to explicate the crucial feature of 
each of these models for the explanation of controversies. 
  
 
 Diffusion model Deliberative model Network model 
 
Science  Science  Science 
  
    
 
Publics  Publics  Publics 
Credibility 
Legitimation  Information  
 
 
Following traditional PUS, the most important feature of the agora is that it can 
be viewed as a means of disseminating information about science and scientific 
knowledge to the public. Consequently controversies are seen as instances 
where this diffusion of information has gone wrong. Lay people have not got the 
message right, either because information has been distorted or because they 
have not been presented with the message at all. This can make feedback proc-
                                          
13 Previously, I conducted an analysis of a Consensus Conference in Denmark that arrived at 
precisely this conclusion (Horst & Horst 1996). The analysis pointed to a need for organisers 
of consensus conferences to make the precise intentions crystal clear to the participants, ex-
perts as well as lay people. Confusion led to frustration on behalf of all the participants. Either 
because their expectations were not met or because they were unclear about the nature of the 
dialogue undertaken. 
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esses necessary in order to understand why the public does not understand the 
information. But the fundamental idea here is that controversies arise as a result 
of badly conducted processes of diffusion of information and knowledge.  
 
In the second model of critical PUS the problem is not that the public does not 
listen to science, but that science does not listen to the public. In this model, 
controversies are signs of scepticism and revolt because the sciences and their 
publics have become alienated from each other. Although scientific openness 
about progress and problems is seen as a necessary precondition for diminishing 
this alienation, the main focus in this perception of the agora is to secure legiti-
macy through deliberative dialogue and democratic control over science. The 
direction of information is therefore basically from the public toward science, 
since it is science, which is supposed to know and follow the consensus, created 
in the public to serve as the basis for legitimate knowledge creation. 
 
In the third model, controversies are seen as struggles in the constant negotiation 
over the development of technology and the changing and relational definitions 
of science and publics. It stresses heterogeneity and adversarial mutuality, and 
does not view controversies as instances of badly conducted diffusions of tech-
nology, nor as indisputable, normative calls for democratising science. Rather it 
views them as integrated and normal features of the mutual constitution of both 
science and publics. Solving controversies in this model is therefore a question 
of reaching a provisional closure of a distribution of credibility, but this distribu-
tion can in principle always be problematised all over again.  
 
These models can be viewed as three different perceptions of the agora as a 
space for communicative relations, where the medium for relations is construed 
differently in each case. In the diffusion model the medium is rational argu-
ments based on information about nature with the aim of improving instrumen-
tal decision-making. In the deliberative model the medium is rational arguments 
based on social and cultural norms with the aim of improving an ideal of le-
gitimacy. And, finally, the medium in the network model is rational arguments 
based on pragmatism and credibility with the aim of reaching interim closure in 
political negotiations. Viewed in this way these different models can be under-
stood as perspectives on the agora or the communicative relation between sci-
ence and its publics, each of which stresses different aspects. The identification 
of these three models should therefore not lead to a judgement as to what is bet-
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ter or worse, but rather to a sensitivity towards the strengths and weaknesses of 
each model.  
 
In the present dissertation, I have adopted the third model since it is the explicit 
ambition to study the processual aspects of the controversies with the aim of un-
derstanding how problems and solutions are defined in mutually constitutive 
relations. An important feature of this network model is an ability to analyse 
public opinion as a process rather than as an institution with a particular norma-
tive function as in the two former models. In traditional PUS, for instance, pub-
lic opinion can be measured in polls, but strict methodological rules will have to 
be respected in order not to distort the ‘objective’ description of people’s atti-
tudes and opinions. Critical PUS criticises this conception of public opinion as a 
passive stock of opinions and argues that attitudes are always socially con-
structed. Therefore special procedural rules for deliberation have to be followed 
if a valid process of opinion formation is to be established. In this way, it is pos-
sible to argue that critical PUS also institutionalises public opinion to a certain 
degree, as a phenomenon with special rules that have to be observed if we are to 
get access to ‘real’ public opinion. I will argue that the emphasis on heterogene-
ity in the third model abandons this possibility of accessing a particular essence 
of public opinion. There is no true essence in public opinion – rather it is always 
mediated – whether in the form of opinion polls, focus groups, mass mediated 
debate and so on.14 
 
As I have already indicated by the use of the word ‘network’ to describe the 
third model, it is analytically equivalent to the concepts employed by Latour’s 
theories. The following chapter is a presentation of the theoretical and methodo-
logical framework for a network perspective in the study of mass mediated con-
troversies concerning biotechnology. With inspiration from Latour, I will de-
velop an analytical framework that subscribes to a relational ontology in which 
the definition of phenomena and actors always is contextual. In this framework, 
mass mediated controversies on biotechnology can be studied as a dynamic 
processes of articulation, incorporating a heterogeneous plurality of actions from 
dispersed actors constantly negotiating public opinions on biotechnology.  
 
                                          
14 A different way of saying this is to claim that of these three models, the network model is 
the only one that allows for a second order perspective, that is, a perspective which observe 
observations (Andersen 2003)  
 40  
 
Chapter 2 
Mass mediated networks of articulation 
- a theoretical and methodological framework 
 
 
The mass media are a major arena for public debate about biotechnology. The 
sheer quantity of information and the enormous complexity in modern societies 
make mass media an indispensable medium for those social actors who seek to 
spread their messages. But, as Eide and Hernes have pointed out, mass media is 
not just an arena were different actors can compete for influence by diffusing 
their message; media can also be understood as actors in themselves in that they 
select and represent different messages in particular ways (Eide & Hernes 1987). 
This double function indicates that mass mediated public debate cannot be taken 
merely as the reflection of a debate originated outside the realm of mass media 
and subsequently portrayed in the media. Rather, mediated public debate must 
be understood as the complex result of processes of opinion formation that take 
place both inside and outside the realms of mass media.  
 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that defining the realms of mass 
media is not straightforward. We could, of course, conceive of mass media sim-
ply as those organisations that normally produce mass mediated communication, 
such as newspapers and electronic media. This, however, seems to be a rather 
narrow notion, since it excludes many important actors such as the communica-
tion departments of many firms and whole organisations devoted to conducting 
strategic communicative actions in order to attract mediated attention (PR firms 
and advertising agencies as primary examples). We could, therefore, consider 
the mass media as an arena for communication, which includes all kinds of 
communicative actions that aim at reaching a wider public through mediation. 
This expansion of the realms of mass media further complicates the causal com-
plexity, which arises from the double function as arena and actor, because it ex-
pands the relevant number of actors radically.  
 
Briefly put, the resulting causal complexity can be expressed as follows.  When 
analysing mass mediated debate about biotechnology, we are at one and the 
same time analysing the outcome of a journalistic practice and the sedimentation 
of a general, social discourse about biotechnology. Accounting for this double 
influence, many analysts of mass mediated coverage of biotechnology have em-
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ployed a two-pronged explanatory approach.15 Mass media coverage is influ-
enced by broader cultural contexts, but it simultaneously influences these con-
texts in particular ways. Neither of these influences can be left out of an analysis 
of mass mediated coverage of biotechnology, but rather than treating this as a 
fundamental problem, I want to circumscribe it by combining the perspectives of 
arena and actor in a dynamic comprehension of mass mediation as the produc-
tion of articulation rather than as a mirror of reflection.  
 
This chapter provides a theoretical and methodological framework for such a 
study by drawing on a relational ontology inspired by Bruno Latour. In this per-
spective, the mass media is at the same time an actor and an arena. Several fea-
tures of journalistic practice can explain why journalists might be more inclined 
to do one thing rather than another, but it is equally important that journalists are 
at the same time completely dependent on all the other actors and institutions 
existing both inside and outside the organisations of the mass media. And rather 
than trying to disentangle this complexity, and sort it into different kinds of in-
fluences, I will focus on the outcome – the mass mediated network of articula-
tions. 
 
 
The social construction of news 
The central point in the perspective adopted here is that news is a product of a 
social process in which a phenomenon is shaped into a newsworthy story. In or-
der to be covered in the mass media, biotechnological occurrences have to be 
presented as newsworthy stories. But this constructive view does not imply that 
journalists can construct news in any way they see fit. Journalists cannot write 
everything they want, but have to make news out of the admittedly large, but 
also limited, number of available occurrences, sources and sustainable interpre-
tations. So even though news is a constructed reality, there are limits as to how 
they can be constructed.  
 
                                          
15 In the words of Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee: ’We assume that the images and stories 
of genes in popular culture are not isolated artifacts but social products that both reflect and 
affect the cultural ethos’ (Nelkin & Lindee 1995:ix). Similar arguments can be found in other 
analyses (Gutteling et al. 2002:95-97; Priest 2001a:13-15; Dijck 1998:4). With special refer-
ence to public opinion formation, Bauer has argued that mass media can be seen as a proxy 
for public opinion at the same time as it sets the agenda and hereby cultivate particular views 
(Bauer 2002:155) 
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We might therefore argue that the productive work of creating news is not done 
by journalists alone, but rather in a relational process of trial and error exploring 
what kinds of connections between sources and occurrences are possible. In 
principle this process includes an unlimited number of actors, all with a possible 
influence on what can be made to seem newsworthy. Rather than ascribe influ-
ence to actors, we should insist that journalistic practices, news values and so 
forth are created in productive relations of negotiation between actors. Journal-
ists do not decide by themselves what is a good story. They rely on an ability to 
make productive connections between sources and other news stories, between 
editorial practices and narrative possibilities. In short, the news are not con-
structed by journalists alone, but in productive networks of an in principle 
unlimited set of relevant actors. 
 
It should be noted that this perspective, inspired by Latour, has great affinities 
with the constructivist tradition within media sociology, where mass mediated 
news are analysed as a productive practice of constructing socially viable repre-
sentations of the world (Berkowitz 1997). The reason for choosing the Latourian 
framework, rather than that of constructivist media sociology, is that the rela-
tional ontology of Latour and his focus on productive associations make explicit 
what media sociology only implies, namely, that a news story is not a particular 
instance of construction, posterior to, or disconnected from, the phenomena they 
are constructed around. Rather mass mediation can be viewed as a mode of pro-
duction connected to the totality of productions of propositions about the world.  
 
That the creation of news should not be seen as fundamentally different from 
other social practices of representing the world is central to this view of the mass 
media. Everywhere people articulate propositions, they are engaging in a pro-
ductive practise of establishing socially viable representations of phenomena in 
the world. The media, of course, is a particular field of action with particular 
rules of engagement, but in the framework inspired by Latour, relational con-
struction in the media is not ontologically different from other social practises. 
This also implies that mass mediated representations of public opinion are not 
different from other mediations of public opinion, like opinion polls or focus 
groups. They are each a particular way of constructing public opinion by media-
tion. They are real as concrete constructions in a particular context, but there is 
no prior essence that we acquire access to in any direct way. Therefore mass 
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media studies of public opinion formation do not pose a particularly constructed 
case in opposition to other ways of measuring public opinion.  
 
Representation of biotechnology in the mass media can accordingly be studied 
as one among several ways of constructing public opinion on that issue. It is not 
a reflection of more ‘true’ or ‘original’ interpretations and images created in 
other contexts, subsequently being represented in a more or less distorted way in 
the mass media. Just as mass media is not a tool for doing away with informa-
tion or legitimation deficits (as in the traditional and critical PUS traditions), it is 
not a filter, which somehow distorts another ‘more true’ formation of public 
opinion. But this will be much clearer after I have conducted a little detour into 
the laboratory of the French bio-chemist Pasteur, where a long list of ‘microbes’ 
were ‘found’ in the 19th century.  
 
Articulation of facts 
In the relational ontology presented by Latour, the work done by scientists is 
always basically productive. A successful experiment produces something – for 
instance the lactic acid ferment as Pasteur did in 1856 (Latour 1999b:113-73). 
This should not be interpreted to mean that milk could not turn sour before 
1856, but the lactic acid ferment did not exist before 1856. Before that fateful 
year, curdled milk was a result of ‘spontaneous generation’ or of such abstract 
forces as invasion, disease, or mishap. But Pasteur constructs an experiment, 
which renders lactic acid ferment into that particular actant that makes milk turn 
sour: 
 
Let us say that in his laboratory in Lille Pasteur is designing an 
actor. How does he do this? One now traditional way to account for 
this feat is to say that Pasteur designs trials for the actor to show its 
mettle. Why is an actor defined through trials? Because there is no 
other way to define an actor but through its actions, and there is no 
other way to define an action, but by asking what other actors are 
modified, transformed, perturbed, or created by the character that is 
the focus of attention. (Latour 1999b:122). 
 
The design of the actor is done through a process of inscription, a term used 
about ‘all the types of transformations through which an entity becomes materi-
alized into a sign, an archive, a document, a piece of paper, a trace.’ (Latour 
1999b:307). In the case of the lactic acid the inscription devices are the set of 
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instruments cleverly arranged in a particular experimental design, which con-
structs lactic acid as a particular entity with particular characteristics that consti-
tute the actant. A constitutive characteristic of the lactic acid ferment, for in-
stance, is that it can make milk into yoghurt if it is treated properly. The vocabu-
lary, however, of designing experiments in order to inscribe entities as actants 
should not be taken to imply that Pasteur is free to construct lactic acid ferment 
as he pleases (Latour 1999b:122-26). The something Pasteur is observing can 
resist inscription in many ways. If temperature is too high or too low, nothing 
will happen. The laboratory, therefore, is Pasteur’s examination room – how is 
the unknown actant reacting to different questions (experimental trials). Through 
a long list of questions the hitherto unknown actant is inscribed as lactic acid 
ferment, able to ferment milk if treated in particular ways.  
 
In regard to the production of facts, Latour proposes that we substitute the model 
of statements corresponding to the world with a model of articulation of propo-
sitions. Pro-positions are not statements aiming at correspondence, but “occa-
sions given to different entities to enter into contact. These occasions for interac-
tion allow the entities to modify their definitions over the course of an event” 
(Latour 1999b:141). In this way, inscription by articulation is not performed 
solely by human actors, but is the common feature of different entities entering 
into relation with each other. Likewise, propositions are not distinguished from 
each other by one single test of correspondence but by the many differences be-
tween them that make new phenomena visible in the cracks that distinguish 
them: 
 
articulation is in no way limited to language and may be applied not 
only to words but also to gestures, papers, settings, instruments, 
sites, trials. (…) If Pasteur is able to speak truthfully about the 
ferment, it is not because he says in words the same thing as what 
the ferment is – an impossible task since the word “ferment” does 
not ferment. If Pasteur, through his clever handiwork, speaks 
truthfully of the ferment, it is because he articulates entirely 
different relations for the ferment. He proposes, for example, that 
we consider it as a living and specific entity instead of as a useless 
by-product of a purely chemical process. (Latour 1999b:142-43).  
 
But the inscription of lactic acid through the experiments is only visible to Pas-
teur, and therefore the actant is still rather unknown and insecure. In order to 
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make the inscription of the actant more stable, Pasteur has to introduce the fer-
ment to other actors by translating the inscription in the laboratory into proposi-
tions articulated in other relations.16 So Pasteur writes a scientific paper about 
his newly found associate. At first, the scientific community disagrees about ac-
cepting this new ferment. But slowly a long list of associations between other 
actors (both humans and theories, experiments, other bacteria and so forth – 
what Latour calls non-human actors) and the ferment is forming. The ferment is 
making so many connections that it becomes tightly weaved into a huge net-
work, which makes it hard to ignore. In Latour’s relational ontology, this net-
work is the same as existence. Latour argues that the length and stability of as-
sociations ‘make for a great deal of what we mean by existence and reality’ 
(Latour 1999b:161). The stronger the network, the greater the existence (Latour 
1987). 
 
Around 1856 it was not very difficult to reject the lactic acid ferment and still be 
taken seriously by both scientists and other actors.  Even Pasteur would take 
such a rejection seriously. But these days it is not just the ferment, Pasteur and 
his scientific experiment, which would have to be refuted – it is also necessary 
to cut connections to a large field of actors encompassing dairy production, bio-
chemistry, primary school education and much more. Latour has spoken about 
the power of associations for this notion that the creation of associations is the 
productive force that makes things come into existence (Latour 1986). Forming 
associations to other phenomena in the world creates ferments and other facts. 
The basic work of technoscience is therefore to ask questions about what can 
connect to what? And the more associations that are created, the stronger the 
alliances that are formed, the more real any actant becomes:  
 
through the artifices of the laboratory, the lactic acid ferment 
becomes articulable. Instead of being mute, unknown, undefined, it 
becomes something that is being made up of many more items, 
many more articles – including papers presented at the Academy! – 
                                          
16 Latour uses the word translation for the productive process of transformation in which a 
displacement of a phenomenon from one context to another is taking place: ‘Chains of trans-
lation refer to the work through which actors modify, displace, and translate their various and 
contradictory interests’ (Latour 1999b:311). It is important, that the concept of translation is 
understood as a processual concept. Latour describes translation as a process of mediation, 
which always exceeds its original conditions. Translation, thus, is not a question of a purely 
mechanical exchange where input equals output. Rather, the process is productive, since there 
is always some kind of change. 
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many more reactions to many more situations. There are, quite 
simply, more and more things to say about it, and what is said by 
more and more people gains in credibility. The field of biochemistry 
becomes, in every sense of the tem, ”more articulate” – and so do 
the biochemists. Actually, thanks to Pasteur’s ferment, they come 
into existence as biochemists, instead of having to choose between 
biology and chemistry as in Liebig´s day. (Latour 1999b:143) 
 
In the year 2000 it is hard to understand lactic acid ferment as something other 
than a brute fact just waiting to be discovered. In the eyes of Latour, however, 
this is how it looks in hindsight. In 1856 no one knew whether Pasteur had the 
right connections to last into the following centuries. In Science in Action Latour 
formulated two parallel rules of method stating that since the settlement of a 
controversy is the cause of Nature’s representation and Society’s stability, we 
cannot use either Nature or Society to explain why a controversy has been set-
tled. 17 We should rather consider the efforts to enrol human and non-human re-
sources in the productive work of creating facts symmetrically (Latour 
1987:258). Neither Nature nor Society can be seen as underlying structures, or a 
priori determinants of the given outcome of a controversy. Rather the represen-
tation of nature and the stability of society are produced in the settlement of con-
troversies. The solution of a disagreement is the result of productive work, not 
just the activation of a determining potentiality. This in turn means that the clo-
sure of controversies is a matter of granting some phenomena a relative exis-
tence only: 
 
When a phenomenon “definitely” exists this does not mean that it 
exists forever, or independently of all practice and discipline, but 
that it has been entrenched in a costly and massive institution, which 
has to be monitored and protected with great care. 
So, in the metaphysics of history that I want to substitute for the 
traditional one, we should be able to talk calmly about relative 
existence. It may not be the sort of existence science warriors want 
for objects in nature, but it is the sort of existence science studies 
would like propositions to enjoy. (Latour 1999b:155-56) 
 
                                          
17 These rules of method also contain an indication of Latour’s criticism of social constructiv-
ism, which he later elaborated in, for instance, ’We have never been Modern’ (Latour 1991). 
The argument is that social constructivism often just substitutes one determining factor (Na-
ture) for another (Society). 
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What Latour wants us to notice with the phrase ‘protecting with great care’ is 
that institutions are in a sense fragile. Without the concrete actions that uphold 
the institutions, the institutions will immediately go out of existence. If lactic 
acid ferments were not used in the production of yoghurt, education of dairy-
men, biology classes in high school, et cetera, they would not exist as lactic acid 
ferments. I find Latour's use of the term institution complicated. My own under-
standing starts with the notion that associations are what constitute actors in re-
lation to other actors. An actor is therefore always an actor in relation to a par-
ticular network. Stabilised networks that endure in time and space can be called 
institutions, and the term can be used as a short cut for the depiction of a net-
work that continues to establish relationally defined actors (human and non-
human) in particular ways18. 
 
Latour’s attribution of fragility to this institution is a bit ostentatious. The efforts 
it would take to stop this production are enormous, as hundreds of thousands of 
connections had to be substituted with other connections for the institution of 
lactic acid to disappear. Instead of talking about entrenchment of the institution, 
I would rather talk about embeddedness because it signals less need for active 
protection. To be sure, the life of an institution is in the hands of actors, human 
and non-human alike, but a well-embedded institution is well connected and 
thus not easily dissolved.  
 
Important is that institutions are relationally defined. If institutions endure, it is 
because actors keep relating to them as institutions. And secondly, that which 
counts as an institution in one connection (for instance democracy on the day of 
general election) might be an object of fierce controversy in other connections 
(for instance in discussions on whether the government has a democratically le-
gitimate right to declare war on Sweden). On a general level I have found this 
theoretical framework in which all phenomena have relative existence according 
to their contextual associations very fruitful for this study of public articulation 
of biotechnology and as a short hand I have termed it a relative ontology.  
 
 
                                          
18 ‘…institutions provide all the mediations necessary for an actor to maintain a durable and 
sustainable substance.’ (Latour 1999b:307) 
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Articulation of news 
Viewed in this theoretical framework, I will argue that there is no ontological 
difference between the productive work of constructing scientific facts and that 
of constructing news. Also in editorial offices, actants – news – are articulated 
when journalists are exploring what is connected to what. How can a given oc-
currence be interpreted in relation to other occurrences? What sources will give 
a statement and how can different statements be connected to each other? How 
is any news article connected to other news? What stories will the editor in chief 
accept and what about the format and editorial style of the paper? The journalis-
tic work of creating news is a question of exploring possible connections just 
like the scientific work of establishing facts.  
 
This should not be taken to imply that there is no difference between the news 
and the scientific facts. An important part of the networks in which scientific 
facts are constructed is the institution of science, which in many ways is differ-
ent from the institution of mass media. But as mentioned previously, the institu-
tions can only be studied retrospectively. They are the hitherto observable stabil-
ity in networks, they can be used as shorthand for the account of stability, but 
they only exist as long as the relations in the network they designate are being 
reproduced.  
 
This also means that, in the concrete production of a scientific fact, the institu-
tion of science can be seen as a multitude of actants influencing the new creation 
of associations. Norms and rules of objectivity, professional disciplines, organi-
sation of expertise can all become important actants that make Pasteur or any 
other scientific researcher form associations in particular ways. And vice versa: 
as far as Pasteur and all the other scientific researchers keep reproducing these 
norms and rules in their daily practice of producing associations they also repro-
duce the institution of science. When we say that the institution of science dif-
fers from the institution of media it therefore means that the enormous amount 
of relations, which uphold the phenomena of scientific facts and journalistic 
news, differ from each other. But this is not a pre-given feature of the phenom-
ena of scientific facts and mediated news, but a concrete and historical produc-
tion of networks. Speaking about the institution of mass media in this Latourian 
context is therefore a way of incorporating all the different features of media as 
an actor and an arena. But these features can only be identified retrospectively – 
as the outcome of a dynamic process.  
 49 
 
 
This need for a retrospective perspective can be illustrated with the concept of 
news value, which is common as shorthand for the patterns in the selection of 
news (McQuail 1994:213-14). With Latour we should insist that this pattern is 
the result of processes of selection, not an input in the form of a determining 
structure. Although most journalists and media analysts (as well as ordinary 
people) have a pretty good idea of what kinds of phenomena will make news, 
the news values of identification, sensation, actuality, importance or conflict, are 
basically elastic and hard to use prescriptively. In principle any occurrence or 
phenomenon can always be pushed aside by other occurrences or phenomena 
and, conversely, almost any story can be presented as newsworthy in one or an-
other way. We can therefore use the notion of news value as a pattern visible in 
hindsight, but not as a causal explanation. Something is produced in the process 
of constructing news and that is precisely the news value.  
 
When I argue that the creation of news is a productive process, it is because a 
particular story derives from a multitude of possible connections. In the follow-
ing I will employ the concept of inscription to pick out this process in which an 
occurrence is associated with other occurrences and sources in a particular way, 
hereby inscribing it as a newsworthy story. Inscription is productive work, since 
input does not equal output. We should acknowledge that not all journalistic ef-
forts result in actual pieces of news, and view the institutional influence in the 
creation of news, as a network of pre-negotiated relations that make some in-
scriptions easier than other. The fact that a journalist is writing an article, which 
is actually printed, on page 5 in today’s paper should not be causally explained 
by determining influences in the institution of mass media.  
 
In this thesis, news is identified as the tangible result of chains of translations 
that has led to a particular inscription of an occurrence or a phenomenon. In 
this inscription the occurrence is associated with sources articulated in different 
roles (such as researchers, politicians, citizens) just as non-human actors are 
aligned in particular ways. This perspective circumscribes the two distinctions 
made in the beginning of actor/arena and inside/outside mass media. Mass me-
diation should be understood as a network of production where all the produc-
tive forces can be seen as actors. The arena can be seen as the institution of mass 
media, but this terminology is only shorthand for the stabilised network, and the 
institution is only an institution as long as it is not problematised.  
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The same can be said of the distinction between inside and outside. As soon as 
connections are made, the associated actors are all inside the network and hence 
on the same side. The productive force is not located at any particular place in 
the network. It is not the journalists who produce the inscriptions, but neither is 
it the sources, the media organisations or the institution of mass media. It is the 
network – the totality of associations between all the different actants – that pro-
duces the news. This is precisely the reason for talking about chains of transla-
tion. There is no initial object that is set in motion by a mastermind subject, 
hereby creating newsworthy stories in the papers. Rather the chain of transla-
tions that ‘leads to’ a newspaper article is constructed by actors following their 
various and contradictory interests. The question of subjects – who inscribes – 
thus has to be answered with either nobody or everybody.19  
 
On the background of this theoretical framework it is possible to construct at 
least two different analytical strategies for a study of mass mediated articula-
tions of biotechnology. One is to follow the work of journalists as chains of 
translation, in which the occurrence is negotiated into a newsworthy event. In 
this dissertation, however, I do not focus on the way journalists negotiate asso-
ciations with sources and phenomena in order to create news. The focus of the 
present study is not on how the actors in the mass media act. Rather, I am inter-
ested in the mass mediated inscription of news, because it is a way of studying 
public articulation of biotechnology. I have therefore chosen a second strategy 
by studying the networks produced in the outcome of mass mediated inscrip-
tions. This choice of methodological strategy means that I will leave the produc-
tive chains of translation black boxed. But it should be remembered that, like 
any black box, it can in principle always be opened, in which case we would 
find a multitude of different translations as trajectories of any news article. 
 
Script, inscription and subscription 
Rather than following the chains of translation, I intend to study patterns in the 
traces of the productive work of journalists – the news articles. This objective 
rests upon an observation, that although there are no determining structures in 
the creation of news, this does not mean that it is impossible to look for some 
                                          
19 This description is parallel to the notion of a news institution (Lund 2002) or a system of 
political communication where the agenda is an independent political institution (Pedersen et 
al. 2000; Cook 1998).  
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sort of pattern in the mass mediated articulation of biotechnology. Any descrip-
tion of these patterns, however, is never more than an account of the observable 
patterns in the news inscribing particular occurrences in particular ways – they 
are not effects of an underlying structure that was there all along, controlling the 
work of the journalist and just waiting for the analyst to excavate it.20 The pat-
terns in these inscriptions can be termed scripts. The crucial point is that when 
an occurrence is inscribed as a newsworthy event, it at the same time organises 
associated occurrences, sources and phenomena in particular ways. And the term 
script is employed about a generic pattern in a number of concrete inscriptions 
of biotechnological occurrences.  
 
Before the particular methodological strategies of the study of these scripts is 
elaborated, however, it is necessary to explore the relation between the notion of 
script and the notion of argument since a script is not the same thing as an argu-
ment. Analysing scripts is a necessary step, since it is the analysis of the net-
works in which it is possible to articulate a given phenomena as a problem or a 
solution. But whereas ‘script’ is defined as the organising network, which lets 
phenomena appear as particular phenomena, the argument is defined as the es-
tablishment of a particular argumentative relation between problem and solution. 
To study the patterns in these argumentative relations, I have found it necessary 
to develop a methodological framework for classifying arguments. Central to 
this framework is the notion of subscription, which is a parallel term to inscrip-
tion in that it designates a relation between the singular articulation of a phe-
nomenon and the networks of articulation. 
 
In order to define this notion of subscription it is necessary to touch upon the 
sociological discussion of action and structure. In the context of this dissertation, 
articulation can be seen as the constant flow, the medium in which inscription 
takes place. Networks of articulation, on the other hand, are the term for the par-
ticular shape that is created in the process. In this way, ‘networks of articulation’ 
is a term for a structure that can be analysed by studying scripts. The term script, 
however, implies a post-structural approach that I will argue is implicit in the 
                                          
20 As may be apparent in my use of the term ‘pattern’, I am also inspired by the discourse ana-
lytical tradition originating with Foucault (Andersen 2003; Foucault 1992). I have however 
found the concept of discourse so multi-faceted that it was difficult to employ in concrete 
analyses. So the concept of networks of articulation has functioned as my analytical term for 
discourse. In general it can be argued that the combination of Foucault and Latour is not so 
problematic as one might think, since they share a non-subject oriented ontology.  
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Latourian ontology, although he claims to be dissolving the structure/actor divi-
sion. In a recent essay about the future development of the research program of 
actor-network-theory, for instance, Latour has stated that it would be more pre-
cise to adopt the terms of framing and summing-up instead of the notions of ac-
tor and network, because these notions keep us alternating between the actor-
structure divide (Latour 1999a:16). Rather than being held prisoner by this di-
chotomised thinking, he argues that we should realise that it is a false dichot-
omy. According to Latour, becoming an actor is a ‘local achievement of obtain-
ing a “total” structure’, (Latour 1999a:18) that is, a local framing by an immense 
array of relations, in principle unlimited, but given a particular form precisely by 
this local achievement.21 In the same essay, Latour also argues that the network 
is not just another word for structure:  
 
The network pole of actor-network does not aim at all at 
designating a Society, the Big Animal that makes sense of local 
interactions. Neither does it designate an anonymous field of 
forces. Instead it refers to something entirely different which is the 
summing up of interactions through various kinds of devices, 
inscriptions, forms and formulae, into a very local, very practical, 
very tiny locus. (Latour 1999a:17) 
 
The summing up of networks is ‘the folding’ of the many different relations into 
a coherent locus, which makes the framing of actors possible. Framing and 
summing up are therefore two perspectives of the same process, not two oppo-
site movements divided by an origin in either structure or action. As mentioned 
previously, structure can be understood as the result of pre-negotiated actions – 
as a result of the various shapings of actors in their local totalities: 
 
’Nature’, ’Society’, ’Subjectivity’ do not define what the world is 
like, but what circulates locally and to which one ’subscribes’ 
much as we subscribe to cable TV and sewers – including of 
course the subscription that allows us to say ’we’ and ’one’. 
(Latour 1999a:19) 
 
                                          
21 This is the crucial point in the relational ontology in general, since it points to the radical 
indeterminacy of the actor (Callon 1999). The point is not that actors are socially constructed, 
but that actors only become actors in concrete relations and this state of becoming is univer-
sal. 
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It can be argued that the conception of structure that Latour is deploying here is 
a very structuralist notion of structure as determination of action. But surely we 
do not have to subscribe to structuralism just because we look for observable 
patterns in actual processes.22 Rather the structure, which is identified by the 
analysis of scripts is a pattern visible in hindsight, but not a structuralist deter-
mination of action. On this basis, I will argue that the dissolution of the actor-
structure divide, which he advocates, does not make the division disappear, but 
rather constructs it as two dialectical perspectives, which mutually constitute 
each other.23  
 
For my purposes, subscription is the central term in the previous quote, since the 
relation between inscription and subscription can be seen as equivalent to the 
relation of framing and summing up. Inscription designates the process in which 
a phenomenon is inscribed in a network that makes it possible to frame it in a 
particular way. Subscription designates the summing up of the total structure in 
the local framing, which is obtained in the same movement.24 Any phenomenon 
in the controversies concerning biotechnology can only become a phenomenon 
by being inscribed in a particular script, but at the same time this script sub-
scribes to a particular way of summing up the world. Rather than ‘world’, how-
ever, Latour uses ‘the collective’ to denote this combination of nature and cul-
ture (society) into one liveable whole: 
  
While a division between nature and society renders invisible the 
political process by which the cosmos is collected in one livable 
whole, the word “collective” makes this process central. (Latour 
1999b:304) 
 
                                          
22 A point, which has also been stressed by interpretations of Foucault’s work (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow 1982). 
23 Talking about dialectics in this context is probably heretical. Since a full theoretical discus-
sion of this point is outside the scope of this dissertation, however, I will not pursue it further 
here. I will simply emphasize that I speak of dialectics as an analytical perspective for a study 
of processes. It is not an ontological description of a particular outlook on society or sociol-
ogy. 
24 In this context it can be noted that the term framing is central in media sociology and also 
often used as an analytical concept in the analyses of mass mediation of biotechnology. The 
use in these contexts, however, is not compatible with the presently adopted perspective, be-
cause it is most often used to construct a hypothetical taxonomy, which is then used deduc-
tively to classify articles. 
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The collective is made of humans and non-humans together as an immense set 
of associations, ‘folded’ or black-boxed into a workable practice, but always 
with the possibility of unfolding. Therefore, the collective is always in flux, al-
ways being explored through the processes of translation, articulation and in-
scription (Latour 1999b:193). Harmony is not part of this perception; rather, 
conflict and controversy are central features in the constant exploration of the 
collective.25 Furthermore it is obvious that the collective only exists by being 
constantly articulated. The central notion of this argument is that subscription 
and inscription are part of the same movement, which means that the collective 
is always articulated simultaneously with the singular phenomena. When we in-
scribe the phenomena in particular ways we are at the same time subscribing to a 
general articulation of the collective, which makes this inscription possible.  
 
In the introduction I defined controversies as instances of competing networks 
of articulation. Now this statement can be qualified as follows. As I have just 
argued, any script is always also an articulation of the collective in a particular 
way, that is, it articulates a particular way of maintaining, re-storing, re-
cognising or re-establishing the social and natural order of the collective. In 
making any argument, an actor is always establishing some implicit or explicit 
way of articulating the collective – a notion of how the world works and how 
social and natural order is composed and restored.26 It is therefore possible to 
claim that when arguments are adversarial in a controversy, they subscribe to 
different scripts that articulate the collective in different ways.  
 
On this background an analysis of patterns in the inscription of phenomena 
(scripts) simultaneously points to patterns in the ways that the collective is ar-
ticulated. In the present dissertation this move from an analysis of scripts to an 
identification of modes of articulating the collective is conceptualised as induc-
                                          
25 Although I have chosen not to use a Habermasian analytic in this dissertation, it should be 
noted that this perception is not far from his notion of communicative action. Although many 
followers have stipulated the ideal of consensus, as mentioned in the deliberative model pre-
sented in the previous chapter, Habermas’ own description also stresses that any consensus is 
always contextual and volatile: ‘the complexity of any lifeworld is narrowly restricted by the 
limits of the strain that can be placed upon the mechanism of mutual understanding. (…) Or-
dinary language is a risky mechanism for coordinating action; it is also expensive, immobile 
and restricted in what it can accomplish.’ (Habermas 1987a:349-50) 
26 This construal of arguments is comparable to Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation 
(Toulmin 1983), consisting of premises (problems), conclusions (solutions), and warrants 
(elements of the collective). 
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tion. The analysis of scripts points to a number of inductively defined ways of 
articulating the collective. Analysing patterns of subscription is therefore partly 
the same process as analysing patterns of inscription but the patterns are sought 
in the way the arguments subscribe to different modes of articulating the collec-
tive rather than the way singular phenomena are articulated by inscription. 
 
In order to be able to identify a pattern in these different modes of articulating 
the collective, I found it useful to complement the theoretical framework of the 
relational ontology, with a typology of four cultural forms identified by Mary 
Douglas and her colleagues under the term ‘cultural theory’. The original reason 
for the interest in Douglas was that the inductively defined scripts appeared to 
have certain similarities with the Douglas’ cultural typology. An exploration of 
these similarities led to a view of this typology as a powerful heuristic tool in the 
analytical condensation of the inductively defined scripts into four modes of ar-
ticulating the collective.  
 
The combination of the theoretical framework of Bruno Latour and the more 
structural analysis of Douglas, however, is not straightforward. Like the exten-
sion of most networks, introduction of cultural analysis brings new problems 
with it. I will therefore present a short introduction to cultural theory, one which 
is guided by a wish to make it explicit in what way it is possible to combine the 
theories, but also to exhibit points on which they are incompatible.  
 
 
Cultural theory 
In their widely cited book from 1982, Risk and Culture, Douglas and Wildavsky 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983) made the provocative claim that it is not so-called 
objective and rational estimates that guide the selection of those environmental 
risks that people will most fear, but rather that people fear the dangers that suit 
their view of the world and preferred social order. They wrote that dangers ‘are 
selected for public concern according to the strength and direction of social 
criticism’ (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:7). When members of American society 
choose to fear asbestos poisoning more than death from house fires (that asbes-
tos is supposed to prevent), this is because it fits with an anti-industrial criticism 
that particular cultural and material trends in America have provided the breed-
ing ground for.  
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In their analysis of the increased focus on the risks associated with pollution in 
America, they identified three types of social order with a particular and distinct 
set of values and beliefs: Hierarchy, Market and Sect. Whereas the first two 
were primarily identified by reference to mainstream political theory about bu-
reaucracies and markets, it is obvious that Douglas’ previous work to establish 
the grid-group schema and its four distinct cultural types or cosmologies were 
also a heavy influence.27 A cosmology can be described as a coherent pattern of 
norms, specifying rewards and punishments, by appeal to which the individual 
would know how to behave in sanctioned ways, how to justify oneself to others, 
and also to judge the actions of others. Being a system of rewards and punish-
ments, a cosmology is therefore defined as the perception of a system of social 
accountability, a notion of how the world is expected to work and the way soci-
ety is organised – in short it is the perception of a naturally ordered social con-
text (Douglas 1978:52-54). On the basis of two structural variables Douglas de-
fines four possible cosmologies. Hierarchy and Sect have a high sense of group 
belonging, whereas Market and Isolate are low on this dimension. On the second 
dimension, Hierarchy and Isolate experience a highly pre-structured set of rules 
and regulations for action, whereas Market and Sect do not experience this outer 
                                          
27 She originally introduced the scheme in Natural Symbols (Douglas 2001[1970]). When she 
later elaborated the scheme in Cultural Bias, the ambition was to produce a universal classifi-
cation of different social contexts, which could be seen to have permissive and constraining 
effects on individuals’ choices (Douglas 1978:6). Here she refines the grid-group scheme in 
which grid is the perceived sense of restriction by formal rules and regulations, whereas group 
is the perceived sense of belonging to a group. Thus, Cultural Bias can be seen as the locus 
classicus of the theory, there stated in its pure form. It should be noted, however, that this 
book should not be seen as an authoritative source for the typology I employ here since it has 
been under continuous development both by Douglas herself and by a group of other re-
searchers in the following decades. Douglas herself has put the cultural typology to use in 
many different contexts, such as for instance cognition (Douglas 1986; Douglas 1982), con-
sumption (Douglas 1996b) and risk (Douglas 1996a; Douglas 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky 
1983). In this dissertation I have primarily followed the trail of the typology as it has been 
developed in connection with the notion of risk. This is for two reasons. First, the arguments 
on risk and culture have many similarities with the present analysis of controversies on bio-
technology. Secondly it seems that the arguments on risk are somehow less structural in ori-
entation, than for instance the writings on cognition. Comparing a reading of How Institutions 
Think (Douglas 1986) and Essays in the Sociology of Perception (Douglas 1982) with a read-
ing of Risk and Culture (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983) and the essays collected in Risk and 
Blame (Douglas 1996a), it seems that institutions do more to determine thought styles than 
social organisation does to determine risk perceptions. I am not hereby claiming to have iden-
tified a consistent or constitutive difference in the writings of Mary Douglas. It should just be 
taken as an indication of how I have found it easier to combine Douglas, the risk-analyst, with 
Latour than Douglas, the analyst of individual cognition. 
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pressure. At this point in the dissertation, however, I will not present these four 
forms any further, since it makes more sense to introduce them in more detail in 
Chapter 5 in connection with the definition of the inductively defined modes of 
articulating the collective.  
 
The argument put forward by Douglas and Wildavsky in Risk and Culture does 
not imply that some societies (or collectives) are more rational than others, or 
that some societies choose to fear the wrong things. Rather it means that any 
form of society or social organisation produces a particular view of nature and 
the natural environment, and that this view influences which dangers are se-
lected for social action and criticism. Out of an immense array of dangerous 
possibilities some things are selected for attention and this selection is not arbi-
trary but closely interwoven with the needs of social organisation. Thus, their 
argument was not intended to suggest one-way causality. Rather they argued 
that the choice of risks and the choice of how to live in a society are taken to-
gether. Producing particular patterns of risk assessment is thus a simultaneous 
production of a particular social order, and in this respect their argument is very 
similar to the relational ontology hitherto adopted in this thesis:  
 
There is no gap between perception and reality and no correct 
description of the right behavior, at least not in advance. The real 
dangers are not known until afterward (there always being 
alternative hypotheses).  In the meantime, acting in the present to 
ward off future dangers, each social arrangement elevates some 
risks to a high peak and depresses others below sight. This cultural 
bias is integral to social organization. Risk taking and risk 
aversion, shared confidence and shared fears, are part of the 
dialogue on how best to organize social relations. For to organize 
means to organize some things in and other things out. When we 
say, therefore, that a certain kind of society is biased toward 
stressing the risk of pollution, we are not saying that other kinds of 
social organization are objective and unbiased but rather that they 
are biased toward finding different kinds of dangers. (Douglas & 
Wildavsky 1983:8) 
 
This use of the term ‘organising’ can be seen as similar to the previously defined 
concepts of inscription and subscription. And just as I have argued that sub-
scription is not determined by structure, but instead produces structure, Douglas 
rejects determination and presents social context in a way that is very similar to 
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the notion of actions taking place in networks. She speaks of the social environ-
ment as consisting of the ‘deposit from myriads of individual decisions made in 
the past, creating the cost-structure and the distribution of advantages, which are 
the context of present-day decisions.’ (Douglas 1978:6) Each day the context is 
new, but some of its effects are long term, just as the choices we make each day 
stretch in their longest effects way back into the past and far into the future. This 
is true of both its affirmative and subversive consequences. A given social order 
does not exist independently of the simple little daily choices of its inhabitants.   
 
A group is not taken to be formed, solid, existing independently of 
the volition of its constituent members. Their investment of time 
and energy quickens its life and marks its boundaries. Once they 
withdraw their own commitment, it dissolves away. Every time a 
member appeals successfully to the paramount need to ensure the 
survival of the group, its being in existence can be used as a more 
powerful justification for controlling individuals. (Douglas 
1978:13) 
 
The general idea behind the theory is that the cumulative effect of individual 
choice is the social situation itself. The social environment is not given a priori, 
but precisely created by the many choices of the individuals. Choices are not 
pre-determined, though the costs of some choices may be higher than other 
choices. The individual and the environment interact and either can move, be-
cause the environment is defined so as to consist of all the other interacting indi-
viduals and their choices. These interactions of individual subjects produce a 
public cosmology, a world-view, capable of being internalised in the conscious-
ness of individuals if they decide to accept it and to stay with it. Individuals can 
choose to buy the whole package, so to speak, but Douglas stresses that the ap-
proach does not assume that they must. ‘It is not an exercise to demonstrate the 
sociological determination of thought.’ (Douglas 1978:14)  
 
This construal is equivalent to the notion of subscription in which the articulated 
collectives exist because they are invoked in the scripts that are used for shaping 
phenomena in particular ways. The notion of internalisation in individuals, how-
ever, is not compatible with Latour’s relational ontology. In his perspective the 
individual subject is just as relationally constructed as all the other actors and 
internalisation is not an issue. On the other hand, Douglas herself stresses that 
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the relation between the individual and the cosmology should not be understood 
in terms of one-way causality:  
 
Although the argument involves this directionality, it is not 
intended to imply that a causal relation exists between cosmology 
as effect and social context as cause. In any social context, it may 
be assumed that the chains of cause and effect between the 
structures of social interaction and cosmological and cultural 
system, which are supporting them, are indefinitely interwoven and 
interdependent. Cosmological values, being used to provide 
justifications for the actions expected from a person by the 
constraints of his social environment, are likely to be involved in 
the choice of actions. Consequently a stabilising factor is 
identified. However, the individual, not seen here as being 
passively acted upon by the forces of his social context, is himself 
a part of that social environment, and he will be actively 
maintaining and constituting it. Any individual can interact at any 
level and choose to accept or reject the social pressures and 
prevailing cosmology in which he finds himself. (Douglas 
1978:53) 
 
Cosmologies therefore do not determine actions but are rather created as a result 
of actions, just as the inscriptions of phenomena in the controversies about bio-
technology produce a pattern of subscription to modes of articulating both the 
technology and the social and natural order of the collective. When people dis-
agree over biotechnology, they can simultaneously be seen to disagree about the 
way the world is made into a coherent whole, but there is no priority in either of 
the two perspectives. The influence is simultaneous and should be analysed as 
such – rather than seeking causal explanations behind particular arguments, the 
objective is to look for patterns in connections. 
 
On this background I have found that Douglas’ perception of culture, as a con-
flictual dialogue about the exercise of power, fitted the earlier characterisation of 
controversies as political conflicts about the social and natural order of the col-
lective. She defines culture as equivalent to politics, if politics is defined in a 
broad sense as power games over who should decide what in any social (politi-
cal) order. In this definition culture is inherently adversarial. Culture is confron-
tation, since any perception of a social relation only exists in contrast to other 
relations. It can always be questioned and contested. Any exercise of power can 
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be challenged by an exercise of counter power, although it can be more or less 
manifest. Finally, there is no division between small and large political and cul-
tural conflicts, between practical daily conflicts and general, ideological con-
flicts. Rather, they are extensions of each other in different contexts. Explicit 
controversies can be about particular details of the daily business of organising a 
life in common, but can at the same time be seen as general struggles over social 
order and the principles and institutions to be held sacred. 
 
In this connection, however, it should be emphasised that this is a particular 
reading of the cultural theory of Douglas, which stresses the indeterminacy in 
cultural forms. It is guided by the intention to make it compatible with Latour’s 
relational ontology. In some versions of cultural theory, especially when the fo-
cus is on epistemological consequences, it seems that determination is more pre-
dominant as cultural restraints on cognition (Douglas 1986; Douglas 1982). 
These approaches have been criticised by Latour for granting undue priority to 
society. He argues that they wrongly replace nature with society or culture, 
hereby disregarding the fundamental principle of symmetry as presented ear-
lier.28 On account of this criticism, I have chosen to speak of articulated collec-
tives rather than cosmologies or social order. The term ‘collective’ implies a 
symmetrical consideration of both social and natural order, and the term ‘articu-
lated’ stresses the fact that the collective is not a structure with an independent 
existence, but is invoked in arguments by being articulated. 
 
The most crucial point in which the present dissertation differs from the cultural 
theory of Mary Douglas, however, is her structural perception, according to 
which there are only four kinds of cosmologies and that they can be identified 
with universal validity on the basis of two structural dimensions. To serve the 
purposes of this dissertation the typology must be the outcome of a concrete 
analysis. It is not seen as a structure determining the possibilities given to actors. 
It will appear from the presentation in Chapter 5, that I have employed the ty-
pology as a heuristic device, but I have not hereby proved it universally right or 
inclusive in connection to any political controversy. Rather I have found the ty-
pology useful as a compressed description, which improves the inductive em-
pirical analyses by providing an analytical framework, which makes for greater 
clarity in the analysis of patterns in arguments.  
                                          
28 Latour has criticised the sociology of science perspective for this asymmetry (Latour 
1999a:21; Latour 1991:27-32). 
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The force of this analytical condensation is to be very productive in the efforts to 
answer the second part of the problem statement: how different arguments con-
struct the relations between particular definitions of problems and solutions, 
pointing to the discursive conditions for the possibilities of regulating biotech-
nology in contemporary Danish society. The analytical typology provides a way 
of classifying arguments according to the relations they establish between prob-
lems and solutions – the way they articulate the collective. On the basis of this 
classification it can be analysed how different types of arguments frame the 
question of regulating biotechnology differently. Taken together, these differ-
ences are seen as the discursive conditions for the possibilities of regulating bio-
technology.  
 
 
Three kinds of analyses 
In the foregoing, a theoretical and methodological framework for an analysis of 
patterns in networks of articulations has been presented. I will finish the chapter 
with a short introduction to the concrete methods of analysis that will be em-
ployed. The dissertation is constructed around three different kinds of analyses. 
An analysis of associations, which is documented in the appendix, two parallel 
analyses of inscription of occurrences into newsworthy events, documented in 
Chapter 3 and 4, and finally, an analysis of discursive possibilities of regulating 
biotechnology as expressed in arguments subscribing to different modes of ar-
ticulating the collective documented in Chapter 6. Rather than providing an ex-
haustive account of the methods and data employed at this point, I have chosen 
to treat the concrete method of analysis in connection to each of these chapters. 
At this point, however, I will give an introduction as to how the four analyses 
are related to each other. 
 
 
Associations in news articles 
In mass mediated articulations of biotechnology, phenomena are inscribed in 
particular ways by being associated to other phenomena in particular ways. In 
order to study these inscriptions, however, it was necessary to establish an ar-
chive. And, as already mentioned in the introduction, this demanded a prelimi-
nary analysis of content, since the archive could not be constructed without a 
certain amount of knowledge about the content of the articles. On the back-
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ground of the theoretical framework presented in this chapter, this analysis of 
content can now be conceptualised as an analysis of patterns in associations. In 
the appendix this analysis of associations between different kinds of technologi-
cal applications, health care related problems and sources are thoroughly docu-
mented. It was conducted by working out a coding scheme applied to each arti-
cle in order to count the frequencies in the appearance of different types of asso-
ciations and it serves as the basis for the analyses of inscription in this thesis. On 
a general level it can be said to have created a map of the landscape of genetic 
news from the following questions:  
 
 What is associated with what in mass mediated articulations of biotechnology? 
 When do these associations seem to point to controversy – divergent notions of 
the technology as problem and/or solution? 
 
In this context it should be noted that the finished archive has come to consist of 
1575 articles from four national daily newspapers. For practical reasons I have 
had to limit the number of media included in the search process, but it was im-
portant that the chosen media represent a fairly broad spectrum in order to give 
the analysis a reasonable amount of generality. Unfortunately, I had to leave 
electronic media out, since the search process within these media would have 
been too extensive. This is true of TV and radio, where it is very time consum-
ing to search systematically for coverage of particular issues in Denmark. A 
slightly different argument pertains to the Internet, where it is relatively easy to 
search, but where it is extremely difficult to know what archive one is actually 
searching in. On this background I have chosen to study the written media, more 
specifically, the national newspapers.29  
 
Focusing on newspapers has a further advantage; it is a type of media that most 
clearly has a distinct editorial style. This means that it is possible to make some 
informed choices on which media to choose, since I also had to limit the number 
of written media. The choice fell on four national newspapers exhibiting charac-
teristic differences. Included are the two large broadsheets, the social-liberal 
Politiken and the conservative-liberalist Jyllandsposten. In order to broaden the 
analysis, two other newspapers have also been included: The tabloid Ekstra 
                                          
29 A study of the food chains in the Danish Media supports this method, since it was shown, 
that electronic media to a very large degree replicate news stories from the printed media 
(Lund 2002; Lund 2000). 
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Bladet, and the intellectual niche newspaper Information. Ekstra Bladet has a 
general reputation of being the most populist and radical tabloid in Denmark. In 
contrast, Information has a reputation for being elitist with leftist leanings and 
focused on environmental issues. In the appendix, I present some quantitative 
figures for the overall editorial style of the articulation of biotechnology in these 
four papers and I have also included some considerations about other daily 
newspapers, which are left out of this analysis.  
 
A systematic full text search was carried out on these four papers on the basis of 
a list of keywords and covering the period from August 1997 to December 2001. 
The archive includes all articles, both news and views in this period, which ar-
ticulate genetic technology in connection with the human body. It was found to 
be too comprehensive to also include agricultural technology. Of the 1575 arti-
cles, 405 did not cover health care related issues, but rather the use of biotech-
nology in relation to forensics, for instance DNA fingerprints or other non-
health care related issues. They were treated separately, since they appeared to 
be inscribing problems and solutions differently than the 1170 articles, which 
covered health care related gene technology. On this account it is mainly these 
1170 articles that have been the basis of the analysis of associations in genetic 
news. 
 
 
Inscription of occurrences into news 
On the basis of this mapping of associations, it has been possible to select two 
concrete cases for the study of the inscription of occurrences into newsworthy 
events. They are both cases, in which a particular occurrence has generated 
much articulation as well as much controversy, and they are therefore seen as 
exemplary cases for the study of inscription. The first occurrence is an an-
nouncement by an American researcher that he intended to clone a human being 
for reproductive purposes. The second occurrence is an announcement that a 
Danish experiment with gene therapy as treatment for liver cancer had been sus-
pended. On the basis of the analysis of associations, documented in the appen-
dix, it is obvious that cloning and gene therapy has been articulated in different 
ways in the Danish mass media. Human cloning is part of the articulation of a 
problematic field of applications intervening in human reproduction. This also 
includes foetal diagnostics and other reproductive technologies. Besides being 
articulated as rather problematic, these applications are also more often articu-
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lated as objects of routine use and public regulation, whereas the other gene 
technologies more often are articulated as objects of basic and applied science. 
Gene therapy, on the other hand, has been articulated as less controversial and is 
very often articulated as an object of applied research. On this basis, I have cho-
sen to call them the technologies of fear and hope30 respectively, hereby viewing 
them as exemplifying two different points of condensation in the complex net-
works of articulation of health care related biotechnology. 
 
The notion of inscription implies that precisely this process of inscription creates 
the newsworthy event. When cloning is articulated in a particular way, it is not 
just cloning, which is constructed in a certain way, but all the other associated 
entities whether they are human or non-human actors. Since the objective of this 
dissertation is to study arguments, and since arguments are constructed as rela-
tions between problems and solutions, the analysis of these two cases in Chapter 
3 and 4 will focus on how phenomena are presented as problems and solutions. 
The search for scripts in this particular context is therefore conducted in order to 
answer the following research questions:  
 
 How is the concrete occurrence inscribed as a newsworthy event? 
 What is constructed as problems and solutions in these inscriptions? 
 
In Chapter 3, the analysis is primarily conducted on the articles that address hu-
man cloning in the four national newspapers in a three-week period after Seed’s 
announcement hit the front page on January 7th 1998 (there are 54 articles of this 
kind in all). This includes both news and views since the purpose is to investi-
gate the whole spectrum of inscriptions of Seed’s announcement as a newswor-
thy event. As could be expected, a comparison between the four papers shows a 
great deal of difference in the way the four media have edited their coverage of 
the story. Generally, the two big broadsheets, Politiken and Jyllandsposten, have 
printed the great majority of the articles (21 and 20 respectively) while also 
keeping the story running for the longest period of time. The coverage in the 
other two papers is less extensive and spans a shorter period of time (Informa-
tion 8 articles and Ekstra Bladet 5 articles). Moreover, Ekstra Bladet and Jyl-
landsposten have the majority of letters to the editor and other opinion pieces 
                                          
30 Inspired by Mulkay's analysis of the rhetorics of hope and fear in the British embryo debate 
(Mulkay 1993). 
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(approximately half of the articles are debate contributions) whereas the other 
two only have half as many.  
 
In chapter 4 the story is conducted on all the articles (here again, both news and 
views are included), which articulated the suspended experiment in Århus (98). 
This coverage is also unevenly distributed between the four papers. Jyllandspos-
ten covers the case very intensely (38 stories in the following two months and 
subsequently 26 articles in the next half year). In this context it should be noted 
that Jyllandsposten is based in Århus (it is the only national daily newspaper not 
based in Copenhagen).1 Politiken covers the story less intensely (17 in the two 
following months and only 3 in the subsequent half year). It should also be 
noted, that Politiken uses a high degree of wire service news. Ekstra Bladet cov-
ers the story with 3 articles in the first two months and 5 articles in the following 
half year, whereas Information almost totally ignores the story, with only 5 
small notes in the first two months and subsequently one little note in the next 
month.  
 
 
Arguments subscribing to different articulated collectives 
The result of the analyses of the inscription of these two occurrences is a set of 
scripts that leads to the development of the typology of four articulated collec-
tives in Chapter 5. On the basis of this typology, the basis and direction of the 
analytical movement is subsequently changed in the last analysis presented in 
Chapter 6. Instead of studying the inscription of events in mass mediated stories 
the strategy is to study subscription of arguments to different articulated collec-
tives, categorised according to the typology of articulated collectives. With the 
establishment of the typology in Chapter 5, all the different scripts are ‘folded’ 
into four modes of articulating the collective. In the third kind of analysis in 
chapter 6, this fold is then used as a structured perspective for classifying argu-
ments in order to analyse the discursive possibilities for regulating biotechnol-
ogy. On the basis of the introductory problematisation of the concepts of sci-
ence, ethics and public debate I have chosen to structure the analysis around the 
way different argument articulate these three phenomena. 
 
The analysis was therefore conducted with two objectives in mind. The first was 
to classify a set of arguments according to the typology of four articulated col-
lectives. This was done by analysing the kinds of social and natural order that 
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was implicitly or explicitly formulated in the particular construction of a relation 
between problems and solutions.  The second objective was to look for patterns 
in the way the arguments subscribing to different collectives articulate the phe-
nomena of science, ethics and public debate differently. Altogether, the analysis 
was therefore conducted from the following research questions:  
 
 What kind of social and natural order of the collective is implied in the argu-
ments? 
 How are the phenomena of science, ethics and public debate articulated differ-
ently in these arguments? 
 
As empirical material for this analysis, I chose to focus on arguments about 
regulation of biotechnological research. And in order to identify these arguments 
I have selected a particular sample of articles. It consists of all the editorials as 
well as other long opinion pieces, which express arguments about the regulation 
of biotechnological research as a societal activity, that is, of arguments about the 
preferred relation between biotechnological research and the natural and social 
order it is part of. The reason for choosing this sample is that views (as opposed 
to news) are explicit formulations of arguments and by choosing long contribu-
tions the arguments are most extensive. This sample also has the quality of com-
bining explicit editorial views with views from outside commentators.31 The 
sample consists of 34 (15) articles from Politiken, 31 (4) articles from Jyl-
landsposten, 33 (12) articles from Information, and 6 (3) articles from Ekstra 
Bladet – altogether 104 (34) articles, where the figures in parenthesis indicate 
how many of these where editorials. 
 
Altogether these three kinds of analyses constitute a set of related analyses that 
build upon each other. In this way it should be observed that the first analysis 
also establish the basis of reliability and validity on which the last analysis is 
dependent, just as the last analysis has served as a lodestar for some of the 
methodological choices made in the previous analyses. So although they are pre-
sented as independent analyses, they should not be evaluated as completely de-
tached from each other. In this context it should also be noted that although the 
first analysis counts frequencies, all the analyses are basically qualitative in na-
ture and should be evaluated as such. In order to strengthen the transparency of 
                                          
31 Opinion pieces are edited too, but there is much less direct journalistic influence on the ar-
guments as compared to articles written by journalists. 
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the analyses, I have quoted the mass mediated articulations at length. These 
quotes should generally be seen as illustration of the arguments made in the text, 
rather than proof that my arguments are true. Furthermore, they have all been 
translated into English; a job, which has not always been easy, since one is often 
faced with strange sentences and mixtures of metaphors. I have therefore aimed 
at making the translation as literal as possible.  
 
The overall objective is to establish a qualitative framework for the understand-
ing of how biotechnology is inscribed in public articulation and, taken together, 
these analyses make it possible to answer the problem stated in the introduction 
– how do the arguments inscribe problems and solutions hereby pointing to the 
discursive conditions for the possibilities of regulating biotechnology in present 
Danish society.  
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Chapter 3 
Cloning Sensations 
- Inscription of a technology of fear 
 
 
The cloning of Dolly the sheep was the subject of wide public debate in both 
North America and Europe in the spring of 1997. The mass mediated coverage 
of this occurrence has been the object of several analyses (Nisbet & Lewenstein 
2002; Einsiedel et al. 2002; Priest 2001b; Neresini 2000). It is argued that this 
occurrence transposed the notion of human cloning from the realm of science 
fiction into the real world (Einsiedel et al. 2002:340) while at the same time re-
vealing this notion to be a particularly explosive issue. Looking at the Danish 
media coverage, as presented in the analysis of associations in the appendix, it is 
obvious that human cloning has been articulated often and not seldom as contro-
versial.32 Moreover, after Dolly became a familiar sheep in the Danish media, 
human cloning has been a persistent topic of interest in the coverage of health 
care related gene technologies. Of the eight different fields of application for 
gene technologies, identified in the analysis of associations, it is the most fre-
quently articulated (The appendix). Indeed, it is articulated as one of the most 
controversial fields of application with a high focus on regulatory issues. It fur-
thermore appears that the coverage of human cloning has been very unevenly 
distributed and concentrated in three different peaks (see fig. 3.1).  
 
The first of these peaks of attention was occasioned by an announcement by 
Richard Seed that he intended to conduct a reproductive cloning of a human be-
ing in order to help childless couples reproduce. This claim was presented as 
highly controversial and its announcement received more attention (measured in 
number of articles) than other biotechnological occurrences including, notably, 
the announcement that the human genome mapping project had been concluded 
in June 2000. When the two fertility researchers, Antinori and Zavos, later en-
tered the scene with approximately the same claim, media attention also peaked 
twice, in March 2001 and again in August. It should be noted, however, that not 
                                          
32 In this context it should be noted that human cloning has been object of discussion since the 
beginning of the 1980ies, see for example the two reports from the minister for the environ-
ment: Indenrigsministeriet, 1983: Etiske sider af gensplejsnings-, ægtransplantations-, fos-
terundersøgelses- og inseminationsteknikken, og Indenrigsministeriet, 1984: Fremskridtets 
Pris. Human cloning has been prohibited by law in Denmark since 1987. 
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all of the articles involved in these peaks articulated the claim made by Antinori 
and Zavos. The surge of attention in March was also fuelled by the publication 
of a report on human cloning from the Council of Ethics, which introduced and 
employed the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. In Au-
gust 2001, the articulations concentrated on Antinori’s associate, Zavos, who 
had announced at an international conference that their team of researchers were 
in contact with several hundred couples who had consented to be part of re-
search trials with reproductive human cloning, and that these trials were set to 
begin by November 2001.  
 
Figure 3.1: Coverage of human cloning 
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There is a difference between the articulation of Seed’s announcement in Janu-
ary 1998 and that of Zavos and Antinori in August 2001. Seed was the first to 
announce deliberate experiments with human cloning and by August 2001 the 
story had lost much of its novelty. In 2001 reproductive human cloning seems to 
be articulated as a scientific fact, since most articles present it as certain that a 
human clone will be born at some point. So the shock that seemed to be the pri-
mary reaction to Seeds announcement, seemed to have abated by 2001 and de-
veloped into a more normal state of affairs, in which human cloning is regarded 
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as a fact, albeit one that is unanimously rejected as a socially acceptable way of 
reproduction.   
 
In contrast to this, the ‘facticity’ of Seed’s announcement was more fluid. Sev-
eral of the mediated articulations of this claim in 1998 at the time explicitly 
question whether the enormous amount of media attention given to this an-
nouncement is justified. In line with several academic studies of mass mediated 
coverage of science and technology they argue that the level of attention is an 
expression of undue sensationalism.33 The issue of sensationalism, however, in-
stalls an ontological distinction among occurrences, which is not a fruitful tra-
jectory for the relational perspective adopted in this thesis. Instead of registering 
a ‘sensational’ gap between the empirical facts (about cloning) and the articula-
tion of these facts in the media, the accusation of sensationalism here becomes 
an important empirical fact in its own right. The newspaper articles themselves 
raise as an explicit theme the question of whether there are limits as to what can 
be articulated as news in biotechnological controversies. The case of Richard 
Seed’s announcement thus constitutes a paradigmatic case for the study of how 
occurrences are articulated as news: How has this occurrence, whose newswor-
thiness is explicitly questioned, generated such a large amount of media cover-
age? This is the reason for considering the mediated articulations of Seed’s an-
nouncement as the most interesting case history in the coverage of human clon-
ing. On this account I will deal most explicitly with this story in the following 
analysis, but the articulations of Antinori and Zavos’ experiments will be re-
ferred to later as a way of putting the case of Seed in perspective. 
 
As explained in the overall analytical strategy presented in Chapter 2, the objec-
tive in this chapter is to analyse how cloning is inscribed in a network of articu-
lation that constructs particular definitions of problems and solutions. On this 
background I have conducted an analysis of the way Seed’s announcement of 
the intention to clone a human being is articulated as a newsworthy story. I ac-
knowledge that the process of translation began long before the story entered the 
Danish media, but I have left the black boxes of these chains of translation 
closed in order to focus on articulation through inscription alone. In the follow-
                                          
33 The critique has often been put forward by natural scientists, but also some social scientists 
seem to share the view, see for instance (Nelkin 1995). In connection with the mediated cov-
erage of cloning the critique of sensationalism has been discussed by Gunter et al. (1999). 
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ing sections I will present these inscriptions after an introduction about the way 
Seed’s announcement was introduced as breaking news. 
 
 
‘Danes shocked at plans to clone baby’34 
On January 7 1998, the morning news on the main Danish radio news channel, 
DR, brought the first report of an American scientist, Richard Seed, who had 
announced that he was now ready to clone people for the purpose of producing 
children for infertile couples. The statement was originally put forward at a sci-
entific meeting in December 1997, but it wasn’t until it reached American na-
tional radio on January 6th that it created headlines internationally (Nisbet & 
Lewenstein 2002). The news evoked a response in most Danish media in the 
course of the following days.  
 
On January 8 and 9, the Danish newspaper coverage consists mainly in reports 
about Seed's announcement and articles reporting national and international re-
actions. It is noteworthy that the articles about this issue often include a perspec-
tive that suggests Seed's lack of credibility, which in some sense takes the edge 
off the way the announcement is otherwise articulated as a sensation. Neverthe-
less, the event is articulated as a major problem, one which Danish readers ought 
to be aware of. Even though it seems like an exotic piece of news from abroad, it 
is still close enough to home to pose a threat to our domestic conception of the 
‘good life’: 
 
Danish researchers and politicians are angry and astounded over 
the plan by the American researcher Richard Seed to start 
experiments with human cloning. 
Attempting to produce cloned babies is absurd and perverted, 
exclaims Peter Holm, a researcher in genetic engineering at the 
Centre for Embryology in Foulum who also works with cloning. 
(...) Richard Seed’s plan about cloned babies confirm for many 
people that certain researchers will do whatever seems possible 
even if the majority is against it.  
Spokesman for the Social Democrats Torben Lund: 
- American researchers have now confirmed the existence of an 
unacceptable and unethical slippery slope when progress is 
                                          
34 Headline in the daily paper Politiken, January 1998. 
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controlled by the moral and economic interest of the individual 
researcher alone. This development35 must be curbed.36 
 
In this way, human cloning is articulated as a potential disaster, which should be 
avoided, and Richard Seed is cast in the role of the villain against whom forces 
must be mobilised in order to protect ourselves. Seed is presented as the stereo-
typical mad (if ingenious) scientist who unscrupulously conducts hazardous sci-
entific experiments that pose a threat to the rest of society. 
 
In the course of several days, however, the announcement comes to be articu-
lated in a different context. It emerges that the European Council has already 
prepared a declaration, which prohibits human cloning, to be signed on one of 
the following days. It is probably fair to assume, that this occurrence is granted 
more attention because it can be associated with the story about Richard Seed. 
The declaration fits in the narrative as a kind of solution to the problem posed by 
Seed’s plans. Although the signing of the declaration is not directly linked to the 
story about Seed, the coverage implies a connection. It is presented as a more or 
less direct consequence, and so it seems that political action has been taken in 
order to prevent human cloning from happening:  
 
Frankenstein is to remain a movie monster, and the American 
expert on cloning, Richard Seed from Chicago, must be stopped at 
any price. The European Council will lead the way and demand a 
worldwide ban on the copying of human genes. Last night in Paris, 
19 of the Council's 40 members signed a convention, which makes 
it a crime for scientists and laboratories to carry out human 
cloning37  
 
The story about Richard Seed could have ended here. Viewed as a mediated nar-
rative, the declaration from the European Council could function as a plausible 
ending, which re-establishes a sense of calm in the articulations and allows an 
                                          
35 The translation of the Danish term ‘udvikling’ is tricky throughout the dissertation and I am 
not always satisfied with the solution.  This passage is a good example.  To want to ’curb pro-
gress’ is almost a contradiction due to the positive connotation of ’progress’, which it does not 
necessarily share with ’udvikling’.  My solution in this case came at the cost of using two 
words to translate the same Danish word in two different sentences.  This was in order to cap-
ture, in my opinion, the different senses which ’udvikling’ takes.  
36 "Danes shocked at plans to clone baby," Politiken, 8 January 1998. 
37 " Europe against cloning," Jyllandsposten, 13 January 1998. 
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implied reader to sleep peacefully, order now having been restored.38 The prob-
lem of the possible human clone is curbed by the solution brought forward by 
Europe's decision to pass a bill against cloning. The association between the two 
events creates an interim closure or solution39 to the problem of cloning. The 
story of Seed does not, however, disappear from the mass mediated agenda in 
the following weeks. On the contrary, articulations about the probability of cre-
ating a human clone proliferate and different inscriptions of problems and solu-
tions occur.  
 
Below I will identify the main patterns in these different inscriptions, using the 
way cloning is articulated as problem as the analytical discriminator. All articu-
lations reject cloning as a legitimate means of human reproduction, but there is a 
great variety in the reasons for this rejection, just as there are large differences in 
the solutions proposed. A preliminary three-fold division has been found appro-
priate as the articulations primarily problematise technical, regulatory and wider 
societal aspects more or less discretely. This division does not imply any essen-
tial difference, but just that the primary focus in a given articulation is on one of 
these three aspects.  
 
Technical aspects 
Many of the articulations deal with the technical aspects of cloning. Cloning is 
presented as a technical procedure, which should be evaluated according to its 
technical viability. A central issue seems to be the probability that Seed will ac-
tually succeed in cloning a person, both in terms of the present stage of the tech-
nology, but also in terms of whether his technical skills are adequate. Several 
comparisons to the cloning of Dolly are put forward, often used as a means of 
evaluating the probability of technical success as well as a general evaluation of 
the technical problems in human cloning:  
 
The ‘fathers’ of Dolly the sheep reject the possibility of cloning 
people at this stage. (...) Harry Griffins argument is not, that it isn’t 
theoretically possible. The cost and risk of trying is simply far too 
                                          
38 Elsewhere I have argued that this is a common feature of the mass mediated dramaturgy of 
serialised risk stories (Horst & Lolk 2000). 
39 As mentioned in Chapter 1, studies of scientific controversies have used the terms ‘closure’ 
and ‘solution’ to signify different ways to end a controversy. The fact that the story of cloning 
continues in spite of the EU declaration’s seemingly unanimous rejection could be taken to 
indicate that closure or solution is not easily reached. 
 74  
 
great. (...) - In order to make Dolly we used 277 fertilized eggs, 
which required 430 un-fertilized eggs. Every donating woman in 
Seeds experiment can supply 10-12 eggs, but in the clinic the 
fertilization will only be successful in 10-20 per cent of the cases. 
This means, that Seed needs between 100 and 300 donating women 
to make one child. This is the first obstacle, says Harry Griffin. – 
The second obstacle is worse. As surrogate mothers these women 
will carry all the defective experiments – dead foetuses, abnormal 
and deformed children. Abortions and even birth of handicapped 
children will follow, so who will volunteer, asks Harry Griffin.40  
 
The implications of this comparison with Dolly are clear. It is assumed that it is 
roughly the same kind of technical endeavour to clone a human, but it was only 
because this experiment was performed on sheep that the costs in terms of dead 
and abnormal foetuses were acceptable. Cloning is thus articulated as a more or 
less neutral technical procedure that can be applied to different ends. In itself the 
technique is not controversial, even though it might be demanding and even ex-
citing. Rather it is the particular application on humans, which is problematic.  
 
Technical evaluations are also applied to articulate future possibilities and im-
plications of human cloning. Although they often leave open the question of 
whether or not it will actually be possible to clone a person one day, a central 
feature is a preoccupation with scientific knowledge or facts. This is used to dis-
cuss the possibility of an actual human clone, but also to assess the benefits and 
dangers in the process. Furthermore, technical facts can be used to discuss the 
outcome, that is, the kind of creature that a human clone would be. Indeed, it 
appears to be an object of sizable interests, what it means to be a clone:  
 
Even if we were to succeed in the cloning of a human being, it 
would never be an identical copy. If we were to clone Elvis, the 
clone would not be a new Elvis. There are several relevant factors: 
First of all, the conditions in the uterus during the embryonic 
development would be different, secondly, new genetic 
components would have arisen (the mitochondria from the egg cell 
contain their own DNA and is thought to contribute 0-10 percent of 
the hereditary characteristics), and thirdly, family background will 
be different for the copy.41 
                                          
40 “Baby cloning is unlikely,” Politiken, 18 January 1998. 
41 "The Lab is swarming with sheep," Politiken, 18 January 1998. 
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It is typical for these articulations of cloning as a technical procedure to rely 
heavily on scientific expertise by including quotes from researchers articulated 
as scientific authorities, for example, and by presenting scientific facts as the 
basis of the assessments. In the above example, the influence of mitochondria 
and their relative contribution works rhetorically as a sign that this is not mere 
speculation but in fact an estimate on the basis of scientific knowledge. These 
articulations can be understood as efforts to enhance the implied reader’s factual 
knowledge about science in general and genetic research in particular, through 
communication of factual information and knowledge about the scientific ra-
tionality. They are generally presented with emphasis on the hopes connected to 
genetic research and a basic faith in the scientific community. 
 
Cloning and recombinant DNA research are not just notions from 
science fiction, which researchers grapple with in order to prove 
their own virtuosity. The most important application and the most 
important objective of research comes via these new techniques for 
developing new treatments, diagnoses and pharmaceuticals for the 
benefit of people all over the globe. And this trend started long 
ago. In this connection human cloning is merely to be seen as a 
curiosity – at least for the time being.42  
 
As this quote implies, Richard Seed is often articulated as an exception to a gen-
eral rule according to which science is a means to create a better world. Many of 
the articles explicitly establish a distinction between genetic researchers in gen-
eral and Seed, who is often presented as a complete outsider. He is articulated as 
not having the right credentials, and therefore he should not be trusted to be able 
to do what he claims. As a leading gynaecologist puts it:  
 
I have very little confidence in the American, Richard Seed, who 
believes that he will soon be able to clone humans. Nobody has 
seen his name in acknowledged scientific journals. He is, as far as I 
have understood, not even a medical doctor, but a physicist.43 
 
In this way human cloning is articulated as an anomaly. It is the exception to the 
rule of science as a beneficial activity in society. Seed is an outsider, rather than 
                                          
42 “New and better medicine,” Politiken, 18 January 1998. 
43 “Danish doctors refuse cloning,” Jyllandsposten, 12 January 1998. 
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a proper scientist, and it is ‘bad’ science to clone a human, since the procedure 
has not yet been perfected on animals, and therefore can be expected to create 
many unwanted side effects. These articulations also imply that it is unlikely 
that Seed will succeed in actually cloning a person, since it is so difficult and 
costly in terms of both money and participants in the trial. Yet, it is not ruled out 
that it is possible, but only that under the present circumstances it is irresponsi-
ble because of the present state of the art.  
 
On this basis, I will call the pattern found in these inscriptions the script of sci-
entific information. This script inscribes cloning in a network of articulation that 
draws heavily on the articulation of scientific facts and scientific authorities. In 
this script science is generally articulated as an advantage because it provides 
society with effective means to cure diseases. Cloning is presented as a more or 
less neutral technology, but the specific application of human cloning for repro-
duction is rejected, because it is technically unfeasible. In this script Seed’s an-
nouncement is primarily problematic because it reveals him to be irresponsible; 
i.e. he does not adhere to scientific and rational evaluations of what is sensible 
and feasible. This is problematic in two ways; firstly, because Seed might do 
something that is against scientific standards for good behaviour; and secondly, 
because it can give science a bad reputation if people outside the realms of sci-
ence believe that human cloning is just around the corner. 
 
The solution to this problem seems to be twofold. First, it is argued that it is 
highly unlikely that Seed will succeed in cloning a person, because it is techni-
cally unfeasible. Second, a distinction is created between ‘proper’ scientists and 
people like Seed, where ‘proper’ science is articulated as an activity that is bene-
ficial to society and would never experiment with human cloning in order to 
create a human baby. So in spite of its immediate ability to stimulate popular 
anxieties, Seed’s announcement is not very worrying, since it is highly implau-
sible that he will actually be able to clone a human person, while those scientist 
who might be able to succeed are not willing to undertake such experiments. In 
this script problems are generally articulated as caused by ignorance or neglect 
of scientific knowledge and therefore information and education seem to be so-
lutions to the problem. The public is articulated as in need of information about 
relevant technical details in order to evaluate the possibility of cloning on the 
basis of factual information, rather than be frightened unnecessarily by people 
like Richard Seed. Within the scientific community knowledge about the techni-
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cal details also ought to prevent researchers like Seed from engaging in these 
kinds of experiments.  
 
Regulatory aspects 
A second type of articulation focuses on regulatory aspects and presents human 
cloning as a problem that can be dealt with in terms of political, social or profes-
sional regulation. These articulations do not question the scientific plausibility 
of Seed's announcement, but asks what kind of regulation is necessary in order 
to prevent this kind of deviant behaviour by some researchers. They all unani-
mously back the intentions of the EU declaration against cloning and articulate 
prohibition as an obvious precaution against the dangers of cloning:  
 
Tomorrow Denmark and 11 other European nations will sign a 
declaration, which prohibits human cloning. All other countries 
ought to follow as soon as possible. We will undoubtedly hear 
several worn-out phrases about not being able to hinder progress 
and that inventions cannot be undone. It will not hold. That 
something is possible does not automatically mean it has to be 
permitted. The technologies of cloning are an instance of scientific 
progress, which must be met immediately by restrictive 
international legislation.44 
 
The particular articulation of Denmark as a regulative arena is interesting as 
many of the articles specifically refer to the fact that Denmark has already had a 
statutory ban on research in human cloning for some time. The implications 
seem to be that Denmark is somehow in the forefront of ‘ethical’ regulation of 
biotech. Sometimes this is made explicit: ‘It gives us a global responsibility to 
show the rest of the world, that a ban is most effectively enforced when it is 
based on the ethical views in the population.’45 It is interesting to note how eth-
ics in this context is articulated as an essence. Ethical views seem to be a sub-
stance in the population, which is furthermore presented as a unified container 
for this substance. The ethical views of the Danish population is somehow a uni-
fied entity that can be measured and compared to legislative regulations – as if 
they were independent from each other at the outset.  
 
                                          
44 “Copy Humans,” Editorial in Jyllandsposten, 11 January 1998. 
45 “Debate on Cloning brings great emotions to boil,” Jyllandsposten, 12 January 1998. 
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As in the above example, the focus on regulatory aspects often leads to a kind of 
ethno-centrism, where it seems to be taken for granted that the population of 
Denmark is somehow taking the ethical high road on biotechnology. It is com-
mon in this context that human cloning is primarily articulated as a problem for 
less ethically responsible cultures or nations. This also appears in connection 
with evaluations of the European ban on cloning. In spite of widespread support 
for this ban, the question of whether it will actually have the desired effect 
seems to be a recurring theme. It is claimed that researchers like Seed are always 
able to find some country where it is not illegal or the ban is not enforced: ‘It 
will be like prohibiting the pill or abortion,’ says jurist and commentator Paula 
Metzger. ‘If you can’t get it here you will just have to go somewhere else’.46 
Statutory regulation is therefore not unanimously articulated as the solution to 
the problem of cloning because even if it were globally prohibited some coun-
tries might not enforce this regulation. 
 
In light of these discussions, it is also questioned whether legal constraint is the 
most desirable form of control or whether there are better options. A major issue 
is the question of freedom of research versus external regulation of research. 
Two issues are articulated as relevant in these discussions of pros and cons of 
the external regulation of research. The first is the problem of delimiting and 
specifying regulation: How should regulation be designed in order to achieve its 
goal in the best possible way? The second issue is that of agency and authority: 
Who should be the regulating authority? 
 
In several articulations it is presented as premature to create statutory regulation 
since there is still far to little scientific knowledge about cloning. If we establish 
a ban on cloning we might prevent research that will later prove useful:  
 
The immediate reaction to the news about researchers 
experimenting with human cloning is to impose a total ban on 
cloning. But that requires a scientific definition of the limits of 
acceptable experimentation in the fight against genetic diseases, 
and we have not yet gotten that far.47  
 
                                          
46 “The Dream of Cloning Humans,” Jyllandsposten, 9 January 1998. 
47 “WHO: Cloning of humans is reprehensible,” Jyllandsposten, 9 January 1998. 
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The assumption implicit in this quote is an expectation of great positive out-
comes of future medical science, and the objective of regulation should be not to 
limit these possibilities unnecessarily. In this way many of these articulations 
engage in questions of striking the right balance between restriction and permis-
sion, thus articulating a distinction between ‘good research in animal cloning’48 
and bad research in human cloning. Two years later this distinction between 
good and bad research in cloning is rearticulated as the distinction between 
therapeutic and reproductive cloning, but these terms were not used in the mass 
mediated articulations of 1998. The articulation of this pragmatic distinction is 
explicit in presentations of the British rejection of signing the European declara-
tion against human cloning:  
 
The British leave the possibility of human cloning open. A 
scientific committee is to review the presumed advantages within 
the next ten years. And experiments with human cloning could be 
possible in Great Britain from 1999. (...) Like President Bill 
Clinton in the USA, British Ministers have responded with utmost 
scepticism to the break-through in the cloning of the sheep Dolly in 
recent years. However, the British will not reject all possibilities of 
human cloning experiments as long as their aim is to remedy 
serious hereditary diseases.49  
 
The other issue concerning regulatory aspects and freedom of research is the 
question of who should be in charge: ‘Is it legislation, public opinion or the per-
sonal ethics of researchers, which will determine whether or not we can wel-
come the first little cloned baby to the world in a couple of years time?’50 This 
issue is naturally linked to the previous one – the argument about legislation be-
ing premature leads to arguments in favour of leaving it to professional stan-
dards and collegial pressure. ‘I don’t think any proper medical doctor would 
give it a try. He or she would be frozen out of the scientific establishment’51. 
Other articulations pinpoint public opinion as an important factor: ‘The most 
effective weapon is debate and resistance in the public together with condemna-
tion from scientific colleagues.’52 So it seems that although there is unanimous 
                                          
48 “Clinton wants to ban cloning,” Politiken, 2 February 1998. 
49 "The British leave the possibility of cloning open," Jyllandsposten, 12 January 1998. 
50 “Debate on Cloning brings great emotions to boil,” Jyllandsposten, 12 January 1998. 
51 “Danish doctors reject cloning,” Jyllandsposten, 12 January 1998. 
52 “WHO: Cloning of humans is reprehensible,” Jyllandsposten, 9 January 1998. 
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agreement that human cloning should not be performed, there are different ar-
ticulations of the preferred means of regulation. Some articulations point to 
statutory regulation, but others point to professional discipline, public opinion or 
personal ethics as the basis for regulating human cloning.  What they all, how-
ever, have in common is that they articulate the cloning of humans as a problem, 
which should be prohibited by some form of regulation.  
 
Like articulations, which follow the script of scientific information, these in-
scriptions of cloning as a problem for regulation also articulate science as a fun-
damentally beneficial activity for society. But they do not seem to articulate the 
same kind of distinction between ‘proper’ science and human cloning. Instead, 
science is articulated as an activity that can lead to both positive and negative 
results. Unlike the script of scientific information, they do not articulate a low 
probability of human cloning, but seem to take it for granted that it is a viable 
technology. The important question in the articulations focusing on regulatory 
aspects is therefore a pragmatic question - of finding the best way of doing it, so 
that it only prevents the kind of science that society does not want, but leaves 
researchers free to pursue ‘good science’. These articulations therefore first and 
foremost establish a framework for the assessment of the advantages and disad-
vantages of different types of regulation. Cloning is a problem that should be 
solved by effective regulation, but this regulation should not undermine the ex-
pected positive outcome of genetic research. Many actors seem to be entitled to 
speak in these articulations of cloning, but administrative roles are often articu-
lated as sources of authority in explaining pros and cons of different kinds of 
regulation. Furthermore, researchers seem to have a slightly different role than 
they do in the script of scientific information, since they are often presented as 
interested parties. Accordingly they can be allowed to voice their opinions as 
opinions.  
 
On this basis I have termed the pattern in these inscriptions the script of prag-
matic regulation. Like the script of scientific information, this one also estab-
lishes a framework for the assessment of Seed’s announcement. But rather than 
evaluating the technical aspects, it takes the technical plausibility of cloning for 
granted and inscribes cloning as an object in a juridico-regulatory network of 
articulation. This script asks what kind of control system would be relevant in 
order to prevent human cloning from happening. Science is articulated as a 
valuable activity in society, and the main problem with cloning is articulated as 
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a question of striking a pragmatic balance between granting permission to those 
who pursue beneficial research and prohibiting the activities of those who are 
likely to produce the unwanted side effects (such as the cloning of humans). The 
solution to the problem of cloning presented in this script therefore amounts to a 
decision on the most appropriate form of regulation. In order to make this deci-
sion a pragmatic assessment of different types of regulation will have to be car-
ried out.  
 
Wider societal aspects  
A third kind of articulation does not focus on the particularities of human clon-
ing but articulates Seed’s announcement as a symptom of a more general prob-
lem of science and modern society gone awry. These articulations do not deal 
with concrete technical or regulatory aspects of the particular case. Rather the 
announcement is presented as an important event because of its symbolic impli-
cations. Seed’s announcement is not a problem in itself, but it is a symbol of sci-
ence as a problematic activity in general:  
 
When we concern ourselves with Seed’s fantasy, it is obviously in 
the light of a fear that the seed he has sown will one day grow into 
something that could become reality. (...) Dizzying perspectives 
present themselves: Eugenic cloning of particular supermen, hosts 
of genetically identical parents and clone-children – or the 
establishment of banks with humanoid transplant organs, possibly 
in the form of headless homunculus’, which only exist as a stock of 
spare parts such as hearts, livers, kidneys and so on.53  
 
This articulation of Seed’s announcement as a kind of omen is even more obvi-
ous in the next quote, where the cloning of humans is explicitly linked to other 
fields of genetic research. In contrast to the previously identified scripts, there is 
no distinction between different kinds of research. Human cloning is not pre-
sented as a particular case or an anomaly in the otherwise beneficial activity of 
science. Rather cloning is presented as an integrated and ‘natural’ extension of 
earlier research:  
 
The mad Seed is just taking the consequences of a set of scientific 
and societal developments, which will undoubtedly lead to a brave 
new world. We – and, truth be told, many others – have pointed 
                                          
53 “Homunculus” Editorial in Politiken, 11 January 1998. 
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this out several times during the discussion about in vitro 
fertilization and genetic engineering. These developments 
undermine the basis for our cultural notions on Life and Man. It 
violates what we hitherto thought was inviolable. It started with 
surrogate mothers, test tube babies and genetic engineering. It ends 
with eugenics and laboratories fabricating human copies.54  
 
This third group of articulations differs from the others (on technical and regula-
tory aspects) in the status they grant to Seed. Viewed as a symptom it is unim-
portant whether or not Seed is able to actually clone human beings. The mere 
proclamation that he intends to do so is enough. Besides, even if he does not 
succeed, other scientists with better skills and more resources will surely follow 
him and succeed where he has failed, as it is proclaimed in the previous quote. 
Thus, Seed is not presented as an outsider, but as a typical scientist doing what 
other scientists do. On this background it can be articulated as natural, albeit in a 
satirical mode, that Seed’s intentions should be associated to visions of other 
scientists speculating about future uses of gene technology:  
 
Naturally it will be a problem to create a human, animated 
creature, which will serve solely the purpose of being another 
human being’s potential organ donor. But here Dr. Seed can get 
assistance from another idealist, professor Slack from Bath 
University in England. Professor Slack is an expert in embryonic 
development and gene technology and has recently managed to 
create a frog embryo without head or tail. The professor has simply 
turned off the genes which control the development of head and 
tail, for which reason only a torso will be developed, a bag of 
organs, which will never be able to stare accusingly and ask 
‘why?’55.  
 
Although satire is often used as a way of creating ironic distance, thereby mor-
ally discounting these visions, they are nevertheless articulated in a factual way, 
rendering them not wholly implausible. In contrast to the script of scientific in-
formation, the references to scientific knowledge are articulated with an enor-
mous (sometimes ironic) distance, as in the following quote where the ‘professor 
believes in his idea’. This distance construes the information about ‘scientific 
                                          
54 “The sheep, the man and the bishop,” Editorial in Ekstra Bladet, 9 January 1998. 
55 “Man of Seed,” Editorial in Information, 9 January 1998. 
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facts’ as reason to reject science rather than reason to accept science as a benefi-
cial activity in society:  
 
With reference to the fact that cloning of frogs 30 years ago has led 
to the cloning of a mammal – Dolly – the professor believes in his 
idea, that a combination of cloning and genetic engineering can 
make human organ banks possible. After all, his colleague, Ian 
Wilmut, has created the sheep Polly and Molly using a 
combination of cloning and genetic engineering.56  
 
Articulated in this way the actual creation of a headless bag of organs does not 
seem implausible. Although Seed and professor Slack is presented with a mix-
ture of satire and detest, the overall impression is that genetic research will 
probably have revolutionary, dystopian outcomes. As in the previously identi-
fied scripts human cloning is not the least bit desirable, but the implications of 
Seed’s announcement is articulated as far more significant. In contrast to the 
script of scientific information, it seems probable that human cloning will hap-
pen and that it will have widespread dystopian consequences. And as opposed to 
the script of pragmatic regulation, there is no pragmatic evaluation of possible 
valuable outcomes of this kind of research. Seed’s announcement is a symptom 
of a general societal trend, one that is deeply reprehensible. It is therefore not 
just Seed’s announcement, or even the probability of cloning which is the prob-
lem. Rather these problems are symptoms of a much broader set of problematic 
developments, leading directly to the creation of ‘headless organ banks’ and 
other instrumental exploitations of human life. Science in general and its societal 
role is the ‘real’ problem in these articulations.  
 
In terms of solutions, however, these articulations of cloning as a symbol of 
problematic social changes leads to the articulation of two distinct possibilities 
of response. In some articulations a general resistance towards the changes is 
articulated as the proper way of reacting to Seed’s announcement:  
 
What if the only response to human cloning, this most recent 
example of the striving in the natural sciences to invent, map out, 
and be masters of God and everything, is either acceptance or 
resistance. In that case, I resist. First and foremost for obvious 
social reasons, when not only respectable men at the Panum 
                                          
56 “Man of Seed,” Editorial in Information, 9 January 1998. 
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Institute [The medical faculty of Copenhagen University, MH] but 
also madmen in remote and exotic laboratories are in a position to 
reproduce an army of new Hitlers. In that situation, not even an 
army of Mother Teresas would provide sufficient protection."57  
 
In these articulations resistance to cloning should not be differentiated since no 
forms of cloning are more acceptable than others: ‘The answer to cloning just 
has to be “no”’58. The cloning of a human being is irretrievable and appalling. In 
this light, resistance is not a matter of striking a pragmatic balance between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ science. On the contrary, genetic scientists are presented as 
fundamentally untrustworthy, and therefore society must take action, securing 
resistance in the form of universal prohibition. Resistance is articulated as a 
means of drawing a line that fundamentally constrains scientific exploration.  
 
In other versions of the articulation of Seed’s announcement as a symptom of 
dystopian societal developments, no prescriptions for action that could serve as 
solutions are presented. Whereas the previously mentioned quotes articulated the 
urgent need for resistance in the form of universal and absolute prohibition, 
other articulations adopt a fatalistic stance where action is more or less pointless 
since research is outside all forms of control, anyway:  
 
Only nature can stop a man like him [Seed]. Like it has stopped all 
of his predecessors, because the perverted dream about creating 
humans in one’s own image is almost as old as humankind itself. 
Nevertheless it cannot be denied, that the dream – or nightmare – 
has moved closer to fulfilment. Hitler, Himmler and all the others 
would rub their hands in glee if they had had Richard Seed’s 
technology at their disposal.”59  
 
In these fatalistic articulations science is fundamentally rejected as a beneficial 
activity, but this rejection is articulated from a standpoint that assumes any form 
of influence is impossible. Research has gone astray and the only thing we can 
do is to laugh at it: ‘We are going to laugh at him. The mere fact that his name is 
Seed! He is sowing the seeds of vanity and arrogance.’60 Fatalism thus seems to 
                                          
57 "Man in the machine," Politiken, 18 January 1998. 
58 ”Europe against cloning,” Jyllandsposten, 13 January 1998. 
59 “Frankensteins heir,” Ekstra Bladet, 9 January 1998. 
60 "The sheep, man, and the bishop," Editorial in Ekstra Bladet, 9 January 1998. 
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be the obvious response to a trend that is basically reprehensible, but at the same 
time beyond our control.  
 
Common for all these articulations is that Seed’s announcement is presented as a 
symptom of a broader social trend. It is presented as a warning or omen of a par-
ticular social tendency in which research has gone astray and become a threat to 
the rest of society. Seed is not articulated as an outsider but cast as an example 
of a typical researcher. In these inscriptions most researchers would do what 
Seed is doing if they could. So it is not so much Seed’s announcement, which is 
the problem, but rather the general development within science. Science is ar-
ticulated as a system run wild that cannot be trusted since it does not adhere to 
the same values as the rest of society. Furthermore science is capable of revolu-
tionary effects, which makes it a threat to society as a whole. Rejecting cloning 
is therefore not a question of striking a balance but a symbol of absolute resis-
tance to the logic of genetic of research in general. 
 
As illustrated earlier, these inscriptions present two different solutions or possi-
ble societal responses to the situation occasioned by Seed’s announcement. 
Based on the previous presentation I have called them the script of absolute re-
sistance and the script of fatalistic irony respectively. Both of these scripts ar-
ticulate the societal trend, of which human cloning is the symptom, as reprehen-
sible. But there are decisive differences in the way this trend is articulated. In the 
script of absolute resistance it seems to be possible, as well as necessary, to fight 
progress. In the script of fatalistic irony, however, the trend is not something that 
can be curbed. The difference is one of different implied readers of the scripts. 
The script of fatalistic irony implies a reader that is without influence and de-
tachment is therefore articulated as the obvious response. Contrary to this, the 
script of symbolic resistance implies reader, who holds some measure of power 
to affect the course of events, and accordingly articulates the need for resistance, 
and raises a call for action. Like other movements of resistance, it might have 
difficult conditions to work with but it is nevertheless a necessary political ex-
pression.  The difference between absolute resistance and fatalistic irony, then, 
is a difference that is ascribed to the readership; each implies a reader that is 
with and without influence respectively. 
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Post-script to the story about Seed’s announcement 
I have only found a few references to Richard Seed in the mediated articulations 
of human cloning in subsequent years, and none of these present him as a suc-
cessful researcher in the area of human cloning. But from 2001 the two re-
searchers Antinori and Zavos seem to be articulated in a role similar to that of 
Seed in 1998. On February 28, 2001 a report about human cloning from the 
Council of Ethics is presented in Denmark in which the distinction between re-
productive and therapeutic cloning is articulated as a means to distinguish be-
tween different kinds of application of the cloning technique. This report is ar-
ticulated in several news articles and after the March 9 it is associated with an 
announcement by Antinori that he intends to begin trials involving reproductive 
cloning. In August 2001, this claim becomes articulated again when Antinori’s 
colleague has apparently made a presentation at a conference claiming that they 
had contact with several hundred couples consenting to partake in the trials, 
scheduled to begin November 2001.  
 
The articulations of the statements by Antinori and Zavos follow the same 
scripts as Seed’s announcement. In many ways their announcement is presented 
as a re-awakening of the threat posed by Seed. But in these articulations from 
2001 the focus is more on the regulatory and societal aspects than on the techni-
cal aspects. It seems to be taken for granted that cloning is technically feasible, 
so the focus is directed towards the possibility of regulation:  
 
Let us face it. At some point in time a human clone will be 
presented. Irresponsible researchers without ethical breaks, let 
alone common human decency are working at it and will do 
everything to carry their preposterous projects through without 
pangs of conscience. Sooner or later they will succeed, but by that 
time, at the latest, international regulation ought to exist, which 
warrants prison terms for such a crime against humanity. This will 
not prohibit them from carrying their experiments out in states that 
have a more relaxed attitude on human rights and ethical problems, 
but civilised societies ought to take vigorous exception.61 
 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that in 2001, cloning is no longer unani-
mously articulated as a problem. Rather, the scripts of scientific information and 
                                          
61 “Mad research” in Jyllandsposten, 10 August 2001. 
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pragmatic regulation employ the distinction between reproductive and therapeu-
tic cloning to articulate the first kind of application as a problem, but the latter as 
a possible solution to problems of disease. Especially in the script of pragmatic 
regulation this distinction is used to establish a possible difference between good 
and bad research, but the articulations are diverse on this point. In this way regu-
lation is still articulated as a contested area, where a pragmatic solution has not 
yet been reached. A similar observation can be made from the inscriptions fol-
lowing the scripts of absolute resistance and fatalistic irony, in which the dis-
tinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning is not accepted as a prag-
matic solution, but is instead seen as yet another reason to reject cloning as such. 
 
  
Four different newspapers 
In the previous presentation of the articulations of cloning, I have not distin-
guished between different newspapers and types of articles, but the analysis did 
reveal some distinct differences that I will now summarise. Generally, it should 
be noted that the different types of scripts are not used in newspaper articles on a 
one to one basis. Instead, several articles employ more than one type of inscrip-
tion in each article. Furthermore, the use of these different inscriptions does not 
follow simple demarcations between different types of articles such as a distinc-
tion between ‘news’ and ‘views’. Still, some patterns can be detected. The 
scripts of scientific information and pragmatic regulation often dominate the 
news articles, whereas the scripts of absolute resistance and fatalistic irony of-
ten function as a kind of counter-perspective towards the end of news articles or 
as the main script in opinion pieces. 
 
Following the articulation of the announcement as a far-reaching threat in the 
first couple of days, the subsequent inscriptions in Politiken primarily follow the 
script of scientific information. They use Seed’s announcement as an occasion 
for presenting the trend within genetic science and human cloning  - how far has 
it come, what are researchers capable of? Reproductive cloning is articulated as 
very problematic but also as considerably more unlikely than a more positive 
application of cloning techniques for the purpose of manufacturing medicine and 
transplant organs – what is later termed therapeutic cloning. Politiken, however, 
also articulates Seed’s announcement in the script of absolute resistance – in 
particular in opinion pieces and editorials. The general picture in this paper is a 
dualistic articulation of genetic science as an activity that holds a great deal of 
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potential but also great risks. As citizens, we (the implied readers) are inscribed 
as having an obligation to be on the alert, but also to familiarise ourselves with 
science. We might say that the inscriptions in Politiken, taken together, seem to 
represent a tempered form of the script of scientific information. Fundamentally, 
science is presented as a benevolent activity in society, but this is tempered by 
articulations of a concern over whether science ‘really’ represents progress. In 
this way, Politiken can be said to articulate a dilemma between, on the one hand, 
accepting science and, on the other, taking a critical stance.  
 
In contrast, Jyllandsposten mainly employs the script of pragmatic regulation 
and presents Seed’s announcement as an occasion for articulating opportunities 
for the regulation of research. A general theme in these articulations is the ques-
tion of how to work out regulation that allows, on one hand, for the desired re-
search to take place, while on the other hand preventing unwanted research like 
reproductive cloning. The articulation of this objective is presented as a prag-
matic evaluation of possibilities of striking the right balance, for instance in dis-
cussions of whether national legislation is adequate and whether professional 
self-regulation is better than statutory legislation. On the whole, the articulations 
in Jyllandsposten seldom inscribe Seed’s announcement in the script of sym-
bolic resistance or fatalistic irony. And they also rarely employ the script of sci-
entific information. One example of this, though, is an editorial that articulates 
the clone as comparable to an identical twin – that is, something exceedingly 
recognisable and therefore rather harmless. It therefore seems that Jyllandspos-
ten inscribes Seed’s announcement as less alarming than Politiken. Furthermore, 
it is interesting to note, that Jyllandsposten articulates the subsequent an-
nouncements of Antinori and Zavos in far less news articles than Politiken and 
Information. 
 
The articulations in Information cover Seed’s announcement mainly in notices 
concerning international reactions, but also through opinion pieces inscribing the 
announcement in the script of absolute resistance and fatalistic irony. There are 
almost no inscriptions of the concrete technical aspects of Seed’s announcement, 
that is, almost no articulations of the question of whether Seed is actually capa-
ble of human cloning. But when the general growth and development of genetic 
science is articulated it is inscribed as having far-reaching consequences. Thus, 
human cloning is primarily articulated as a realistic future development of pre-
sent day scientific trends – as method for reproduction and for other uses, e.g. 
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the production of organ sacks that can be used as donors. Unlike the presentation 
in Politiken therefore, the critique of technology is not articulated as a dilemma 
of simultaneous consent and rejection, but in unanimous rejection. It should also 
be mentioned that the later announcements of Zavos and Antinori generate many 
articles in Information, including reports from the press conferences by a jour-
nalist who has been in Italy. Compared to the articulation of Seed’s work, how-
ever, the articulations of this event are more often scripted according to the 
script of fatalistic irony, describing cloning as an inevitable fact.  
 
Ekstra Bladet, likewise, articulates Seed’s announcement as symptomatic of a 
wider societal trend and makes almost exclusive use of the script of fatalistic 
irony. Ekstra Bladet does not articulate Seed as a scientific outsider at all – 
rather he is articulated as a typical or ‘normal’ scientist. In this way Ekstra 
Bladet can be said to articulate a counter-discourse, one that is directed against 
science. In contrast to Information, Ekstra Bladet articulates a critique of science 
that does not present science as something that can be regulated or even made 
understandable, but only as a detestable, uncontrollable ‘other’. 
 
To sum up, it seems that Information, an intellectual niche paper, appears to 
have similarities with Ekstra Bladet, a tabloid, in the way they inscribe cloning 
as a problem. They both question science in general and articulate far-reaching 
consequences of the technological trends, although the articulations in Informa-
tion more often use examples offering concrete technical details. The difference 
between the two is that Ekstra Bladet primarily adopts the script of fatalistic 
irony, whereas Information more often employs the script of absolute resistance. 
There are also similarities in the adoption of the script of absolute resistance in 
Politiken and Information along these lines. But this should not obscure the fact 
that the largest overall similarity in articulations can be found between the two 
broadsheets Politiken and Jyllandsposten on the one hand, where the articula-
tions primarily employ the scripts of scientific information and pragmatic regu-
lation, and Information and Ekstra Bladet on the other hand, where the articula-
tions primarily adopt the scripts of absolute resistance and fatalistic irony. 
 
 
Four scripts of social response 
With the use of the conceptual framework of inscription in networks of articula-
tion, four scripts have been identified in the way Danish media have inscribed 
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Seed’s announcement into a coherent news story. As scripts they can be seen as 
four distinct patterns, all which articulate cloning as problem, but each pointing 
to different solutions (or responses) to the problem. In the following scheme I 
have summarised the way the four scripts present Seed and his announcement in 
different networks of articulation constructing problems and solutions differ-
ently. 
 
Figure 3.2 Articulation of 
Seed 
Problem Solution 
Scientific 
information 
Outsider – and 
probably harmless 
Frightened public and possi-
bly irresponsible scientists 
Information and 
knowledge diffusion
Pragmatic 
Regulation 
Outsider – point to 
a need for regula-
tion  
How to regulate without pre-
venting good science 
Pragmatic evalua-
tion of pros and 
cons in regulation 
Absolute 
resistance 
Normal scientist Symptom of harmful trends Resistance and de-
limitation of scien-
tific development 
Fatalistic 
irony 
Normal scientist Symptom of harmful trends 
outside control 
Fatalistic detach-
ment 
  
This analysis has shown that all scripts reject cloning and thus cultural unanim-
ity could be stressed. The issue of cloning revives the powerful myth of Frank-
enstein (Turney 1998) and hereby the questions about creating life and design-
ing babies, which is generally articulated as very controversial (see also the 
analysis of associations in the appendix). Along these lines it is argued, that 
cloning is articulated as a fundamental threat to notions of individuality and 
uniqueness in most western cultures and this is why this issue receive much at-
tention (Priest 2001b; Hopkins 1998). On the other hand, this analysis has 
shown that there is differences in the way cloning are constructed as problem-
atic. Notions of individuality are not all that is at issue in this connection. Rather 
cloning is also problematised as a general symbol of a scientific trend on the 
wrong track. While it is no doubt true, that the issue of cloning pinpoints par-
ticular cultural values it is also important to notice, that the scripts reveal distinct 
differences in the way problems and solutions are constructed.  
 
In spite of the unanimous rejection of human cloning, the mass mediated articu-
lations are not homogenous in their inscription of the issue. And I will argue that 
the most striking difference between these four scripts is the divergence in the 
articulation of science and the scientific trends. The difference is comparable to 
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the rhetorics of hope and fear as identified by Mulkay (Mulkay 1993) in the 
analysis of the English debate about embryonic research, see also (Einsiedel et 
al. 2002). As in the rhetoric of hope, where science is presented as the means to 
create a better world, both the script of scientific information and pragmatic 
regulation articulate science as a fundamentally beneficial activity. In these 
scripts human cloning is an anomaly, an unwanted side effect of the otherwise 
desirable activity of genetic science. The crucial point in these scripts is that it is 
possible to act within an existing framework of society (either in terms of sci-
ence or politics) in order to prevent cloning from happening. Society is per-
ceived as basically controllable and therefore it is possible to foster sensible and 
efficient progress in both genetic research and society at large. We can also say 
that these positions fundamentally articulate the social order positively. 
 
In contrast the scripts of absolute resistance and fatalistic irony articulate science 
as a fundamentally problematic activity much in line with Mulkay’s identifica-
tion of the rhetoric of fear. Science is presented as an activity, which is beyond 
our control and proceeding according to its own disconnected and undesirable 
norms. It grows without any form of actual control and general reason, and must 
therefore be regarded as a threat to ‘the good life’. These scripts inscribe science 
as something that is beyond (and perhaps out of) control. The rejection carried 
by the script of absolute resistance is not one that implies the exercise of control 
in order to turn genetic research towards acceptable trajectories, but an act of 
resistance in terms of a fundamental – one could say dogmatic - rejection of the 
whole logic or rationality of contemporary genetic science. By contrast, the 
script of fatalistic irony articulates detachment as the obvious social response to 
this development run wild. In Chapter 5, I will return to a general discussion of 
the differences and similarities between these scripts, but I will first conduct an-
other analysis of inscription of problems and solutions where the focus is on the 
issue of gene therapy. 
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Chapter 4 
Gene Therapeutic Experiments 
- Inscription of a technology of hope 
 
 
Like cloning, gene therapy is a technological application that has been discussed 
for several decades; but there are also some clear differences between the two 
fields of application. In this chapter I will develop these differences in an analy-
sis of the mass mediated articulation of gene therapy, parallel to the previous 
analysis of cloning. Unlike cloning, gene therapy seems to be an accepted area 
of research with high amounts of positive attention in the media. In a US con-
text, Alan Stockdale argues, that gene therapy has been surrounded by an aura of 
‘miracle technology’ and that this aura was ‘initially fed by research hype and 
extensive, but uncritical, media coverage’ (Stockdale 1999). Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Stockdale this aura has changed in recent years in the US. Despite 
many experiments, the great expectations have not been followed by corre-
sponding successes in actual patient treatment, and by 1995 a report from the 
National Institute of Health recommended lower expectations towards gene 
therapy. A similar trend can be observed in Denmark, where a special committee 
established to review gene technologies in the health care sector in 2002 sug-
gested a wait-and-see policy on gene therapy.62 It should be noted in this context 
that only a few experiments with gene therapy have been conducted in Denmark 
and so far none have reported significant effects.  
 
As it appears from figure 4.1, one incident has generated many mediated articu-
lations. This is an experiment with gene therapy on liver cancer patients at År-
hus municipal hospital. Although the attention peaked in July this experiment 
continued to be articulated frequently in the following months, and more than a 
third of the entire number of articles on gene therapy within the 4½ years in fact 
articulate this particular experiment. From the analysis of associations (see the 
appendix), it is also clear that the articulations of this experiment are important 
in the frequencies counted. The association between gene therapy and cancer is 
very high and gene therapy is very often presented with a focus on the tech-
                                          
62 Genteknologiudvalget: Fremtidens bioteknologier – muligheder og risici. Videnskabsministeriet 
http://www.vtu.dk/fsk/publ/2002/genteknologi/genteknologi.pdf 
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noscientific stage of applied science rather than on basic science or public regu-
lation. I have therefore chosen to focus this chapter on the articulation of this 
experiment. I will, however, also briefly sketch the mass mediated inscriptions 
of gene therapy in the time before July 1999 as a sort of ‘pre-script’ to the ar-
ticulations of this experiment. 
 
Figure 4.1: Coverage of gene therapy 
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Like the preceding analysis of the inscription of cloning, it is my intention here 
to analyse how gene therapy is inscribed as news stories in order to make news 
in Danish mass media. The objective is to study patterns in these inscriptions by 
focusing on the way they construct particular definitions of problems and solu-
tions. I found that the division between technical, regulatory and wider societal 
aspects, employed in the previous analysis of cloning, were also useful in the 
analysis of the pre-script, but it had to be revised for the analysis of the articula-
tions of the experiment after July 1999. Regarding these articulations, it seemed 
more appropriate to make an overall distinction between two different ways of 
presenting the experiment. The first focuses on therapeutic aspects and primarily 
articulates the experiment as a problematic treatment of patients. The other pri-
marily articulates the experiment as a problematic research experiment and fo-
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cuses on technical and regulatory aspects. In this manner the case is more com-
plex to analyse than the case of Richard Seed’s announcement, since it results in 
a more complex pattern of inscription, where several competing scripts articu-
late problems and solutions differently.  
 
It should be mentioned that I also investigated whether the four different news-
papers could be said to follow similar or different patterns as in the analysis of 
cloning. The mediated articulations, however, turned out to be very unevenly 
distributed between the newspapers, and therefore it is not possible to identify 
the same kind of distinct pattern between different newspapers. I have therefore 
chosen merely to note the differences whenever it seems relevant as information 
about the general pattern of inscriptions. 
 
 
Pre-script 
Before July 1999, the articulation of gene therapy must generally be said to be 
rather positive. In contrast to cloning, gene therapy is presented as a solution to 
health problems. High hopes are associated with this application of genetic tech-
nology, even though the factual reports on successes seem to be lacking. This 
generally positive emphasis aside, however, the articulations in the period from 
August 1997 to June 1999 vary substantially across the four different newspa-
pers in the analysis. The coverage in Politiken, Jyllandsposten and Ekstra Bladet 
is only scattered. Information, on the other hand, stands out as the paper with the 
most diverse and frequent articulation of gene therapy, presenting it as both a 
possible solution and a possible problem by focusing on technical, regulatory 
and wider societal aspects. 
 
In Politiken and Jyllandsposten the articulations of gene therapy focus primarily 
on either technical or wider societal aspects. The articulations of technical as-
pects seem to be short presentations of single experiments, all of which present 
gene therapy as an inevitable solution, bringing effective treatment for humans. 
Among these is also the first articulation in Jyllandsposten of a doctor in Århus, 
Steen Lindkær Jensen, who is at that time attempting to get permission to start a 
promising treatment of liver cancer with gene therapy. In these articulations, 
technical problems of the technology are mentioned, but they are presented as 
temporary and surmountable.  
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The two papers do, however, differ in their articulation of gene therapy as a 
symptom of a wider societal trend. In Politiken the few articulations of this kind, 
do not place this technology at the centre of attention, but mention gene therapy 
as one out of several technological applications, which are all presented as prob-
lematic. In Jyllandsposten, however, the articulations are reversed so that gene 
therapy is presented as a positive symptom of an inevitable progress brought 
about by technological development. Here, too, gene therapy is not the central 
theme, but is mentioned along with other technologies as a symbol of human-
ity’s effective struggle with nature’s imperfections. The only critical articulation 
of gene therapy in Jyllandsposten is concerned with gene therapy as a new form 
of doping within elite sports. This issue is also found in Politiken, and in this 
context gene therapy is articulated as plain and simple cheating, undermining 
chances of fair play. Taken together these two broadsheets present gene therapy 
as a coming solution to health problems, although they stress the need to be 
careful in choice of applications. This largely positive view of the future is not 
anchored so much in estimates that draw on technical evaluations as it is in high 
hopes for technological progress. The only obvious inscriptions of gene therapy 
as a problem consist of sporadic presentations of gene therapy as a means to im-
prove normality, for instance in elite sportsmen, such improvements being con-
strued as ‘cheating’.  
 
Compared to the two broadsheets, the tabloid paper Ekstra Bladet has even 
fewer articles about gene therapy. It does not seem like a newsworthy issue in 
itself, but on three occasions it is articulated in a way that can be viewed as pre-
senting ‘counter’ inscriptions to articulations in other newspapers. By this term, 
I mean that they refer to the same occurrences as the other papers, but with re-
verse inscriptions of problems and solutions. Most interestingly is that several 
articles in Ekstra Bladet present a critique of the experiment with gene therapy 
in Århus half a year before it is articulated as a problem in the other papers. The 
first of these articles focus on a concrete patient articulating him as victim, be-
cause he had apparently been treated badly by Steen Lindkær Jensen. The next 
article casts doubt upon the doctor’s integrity, but after a few weeks a third arti-
cle presents the experiments with gene therapy in Århus as more promising. 
These three articles cover many of the features later articulated as problems in 
the other papers: the financial dependency of foreign hospitals, the quality of 
treatment, the abuse of trust in patient-doctor relationships, the connection be-
tween public and private health care, and so on. Nevertheless, these articulations 
 96  
 
apparently didn’t have the explosive force of the later story, since it is not taken 
any further by any of the media. 
 
Finally, the articulation in Information is more diverse than in the other papers. 
Although this paper also articulates gene therapy as a potentially revolutionary 
technology, this potential is presented as a very complicated affair, with both 
auspicious and problematic features. The articulations of technical and regula-
tory aspects construe gene therapy as a problematic application, with an empha-
sis on both the hopes and the fears connected with the use of gene therapy. They 
emphasise the many unresolved technical problems, but also underscore the 
positive expectations in the form of possible cures for diseases. In the articula-
tions of regulatory aspects the main problem seems to be a question of using the 
application for either the cure of diseases or the enhancement of normality. Ar-
ticulated as a cure, gene therapy is presented as a solution; but as a means to en-
hance normality, gene therapy is a problem in itself. Finally gene therapy is of-
ten presented as a symptom of wider societal trends, in which case it is invaria-
bly presented as problematic. 
 
In this way, the overall articulation of gene therapy construes it in terms of small 
steps on the road of progress through a landscape of great expectations. Gene 
therapy is presented as a technological application that will eventually have 
revolutionary outcomes, but these outcomes are mostly articulated on a very 
general or even symbolic level. Only Information gets into the technical details 
and offers evaluations of different kinds of gene therapy, as well as making con-
tinuous distinctions between different kinds of gene therapy with respect to de-
sirability.  
 
The only articulation of gene therapy as a problem that all papers seem to share 
is the possibility of an unacceptable enhancement of normality. The topic of 
doping in elite sports can be seen as a condensed version of this problem, where 
genetic doping is presented as equivalent to cheating. This is comparable to ar-
ticulations of gene therapy as a problematic means to genetically design children 
so they become more intelligent or beautiful. This can also be seen as a kind of 
cheating in regard to the prospect of a good life that apparently breaks the norm 
of individuals being born equal. On this articulation, it is not fair to use gene 
therapy to enhance normality, whether in adults or off-spring, an observation 
which also fits the trend identified in the appendix of the greater controversy 
 97 
 
associated with the application of genetic technologies to the field of human re-
production. Reproducing human babies seems to be a particular area of techno-
logical application in which genetic enhancement or ‘tinkering’ with genes is far 
more problematic than in other areas of health care related gene technology. 
 
This is the setting for the articulation of the experiment with gene therapy in År-
hus in July 1999. Until then gene therapy had primarily been presented in a con-
text of great expectations as a solution to the problem of illness, a revolutionary 
technique, which was soon to unleash its potential, even if these revolutions 
might also bring a set of problems. This was also employed in the first presenta-
tion of the new experiment with gene therapy in Århus, almost a year before the 
problems appeared: 
 
In an effort to save incurably ill patients a research team headed by 
liver specialist, professor, dr.med. Steen Lindkær Jensen, Århus, 
recently received approval to test a new method of fighting cancer 
by gene manipulation. This will happen by guiding cancer-
impeding synthetic genes directly into the liver of patients. Here 
they are meant to destroy the sick genes and assume their 
function.”63 
 
Before I proceed, however, it is necessary with a single note on language. The 
Danish word for both medical experiment and medical trial is ‘forsøg’. From the 
mediated articulations it is not possible to distinguish between these two kinds 
of ‘forsøg’. In the following, I will primarily use the term ‘experiment’, since I 
find it the most suitable terminology in this context. In a medical sense, how-
ever, it is probably most correct to sort the activities of Lindkær Jensen under 
the headings ‘clinical experiment’ and ‘experimental treatment’, but it will be-
come clear that these definitions themselves, and especially the lack of distinc-
tions, are crucial to our understanding of the way these experiments are articu-
lated. 
 
A promising experiment suspended 
On July 1, 1999 the two large national broadsheets both feature a story about the 
extraordinary decision to suspend the clinical experiment with gene therapy at a 
hospital in Århus. The story is articulated in two different ways in the two pa-
                                          
63 ”Gene therapy against liver cancer” Jyllandsposten 22 September 1998. 
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pers. In Jyllandsposten it is a problem for patients: “Hope taken from cancer pa-
tients”, whereas Politiken focuses on the role of the researcher: “Sloppiness 
stops gene experiment”64. These two different ways of articulating the story con-
tinue to divide the inscriptions throughout the following months. The case is 
presented as both a story about possible mistreatment of patients and a story 
about a badly conducted research project.  
 
Early coverage presents the head of the Department of Liver Surgery as the trig-
ger of the story, because he has informed the directors at the hospital that there 
were too many irregularities in the gene therapy experiment. Safety procedures 
had apparently been contravened, the clinical protocol of the experiment had not 
been followed, and patients had been sent to London for treatment in return for 
large financial donations. According to the media this had lead to the suspension 
of the experiment and the resignation of Steen Lindkær Jensen, the doctor in 
charge. In the following weeks the articles concentrate on a group of 8-10 pa-
tients, now barred from gene therapy because of the suspension. Since these pa-
tients had apparently been promised gene therapy within the frame of the ex-
periment, an extra-ordinary emergency plan for the treatment of these patients is 
organised. 
  
Two different articulations of the case are subsequently developed. This first 
type is primarily articulated in Jyllandsposten, which covers the story in many 
more articles than the other newspapers. This is the concrete history of the ex-
periment in articulations of  ‘new revelations’ about ‘Cancer patient denied free 
therapy’, ‘Discarded virus used for two years’, ‘Professor faxed money claim to 
patient’, ‘Numerous violations in gene case’ and ‘Evidence ruined in gene 
case’65. As some of these headlines suggest these articulations bear much re-
semblance to the unfolding of a detective story with Jyllandsposten as the cen-
tral character. They reach a kind of culmination when a report from a team of 
five professors is made public in the beginning of September. Apparently the 
report criticizes the management of the experiment, but since Lindkær Jensen 
has resigned no further action is necessary:  
 
                                          
64 Front-page in Jyllandsposten 1 July 1999 and second page in Politiken 1 July 1999 
65 Jyllandsposten 27 July 1999, Jyllandsposten 6 August 1999, Jyllandsposten 8 August 1999, 
Jyllandsposten 9 August 1999 and Jyllandsposten 12 August 1999. 
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In a long expected report about the disputed experiments, Århus 
County and the University of Aarhus state that most of the 
accusations put forward by the management of ward L at Århus 
municipal Hospital to the management of the hospital in May were 
justified. Among other things security stipulations were neglected, 
demands for financial donation in connection to treatment have 
been made and there was no documentation of the purity of the 
preparations that patients received. Still, the report recommends 
that the responsible professor, Steen Lindkær Jensen, is not met by 
a police indictment and, since he is no longer employed by the 
hospital, it is superfluous to contemplate possible disciplinary 
sanctions.66 
 
The second overall type of articulation focuses on those, more general, aspects 
of the case, which suggest it is a research project gone wrong. The Danish 
Medicines Agency (the body in charge of approving medicine and treatment) is 
criticised for granting its approval to the experiment. This criticism leads to gen-
eral articulations of problems in the regulation of these kinds of experiments. 
The experiment of Lindkær Jensen is presented as a messy combination of both 
a real research project, subject to one kind of regulation, and an experimental 
treatment, which is defined as a license to use a concrete treatment on a concrete 
patient. A central issue in this context is whether experimental treatment ought 
to be licensed when an ordinary research project is simultaneously undertaken. 
This issue is presented as especially problematic because experimental treatment 
is not subjected to the same strict process of ethical evaluation (by the system of 
scientific ethical committees) as ordinary research projects. A mixture of the two 
can therefore be seen as a way of evading the regulations on medical research:  
 
Assistant professor of law at the University of Copenhagen, Lars 
Adam Rehoff, finds the approval granted by the Danish Medicines 
Agency discomforting. “- If the Medicines Agency was aware that 
a scientific experiment with the same gene therapy at the same 
hospital had already been approved, the general approval comes 
close to a circumvention of the regulation on experiments. A 
practice like that should be stopped,” he says.67 
 
                                          
66 ”Research mess at Århus Hospital” Jyllandsposten 7 September 1999 
67 ”Agency approved of gene treatment” Jyllandsposten, 8 July 1999. 
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Later, in the beginning of October, the experiments of Lindkær Jensen are again 
subject to mediated attention. This time it happens on the basis of the publica-
tion of an internal report about the effect of the particular gene therapy in this 
experiment. The mass mediated presentation of this report is interesting, because 
it is articulated in completely contrary ways in different newspapers. In Jyl-
landsposten the report is an authoritative scientific statement, proving that the 
experiments had no effect. In Ekstra Bladet on the other hand, it is construed as 
part of a smear campaign, with different actors indicating that it is not scientifi-
cally sound. At the same time the local scientific ethical committee is reported to 
call for an indictment of Lindkær Jensen for a breach of the legislation concern-
ing conduct of medical research:  
 
After two months of independent investigation the research ethical 
committee has asked the prosecution to charge the responsible 
professor in the gene case from Århus Municipal Hospital (...) The 
committee has reported the professor to the police because it 
claims that the treatment [of patients outside the protocol] illegally 
were similar to a research experiment. This has happened without 
the knowledge of the patients and without an official licence to 
carry out this kind of experiment.68  
 
The background to this call for an indictment is that an ordinary research pro-
ject, as mentioned, has to be authorised by the system of Scientific Ethical 
Councils, whereas an experimental treatment has to be licensed by the Medi-
cines Agency. Lindkær had only obtained the latter regarding some patients, but 
apparently he had been collecting information in a way, that suggested a scien-
tific research purpose. As far as mediated articulations of Lindkær Jensen's ex-
periments, this indictment seems to be the end of the story.69  
 
The foregoing is a short version of the story as it is articulated in Jyllandsposten, 
Politiken and Ekstra Bladet. In contrast to the previous coverage of gene ther-
apy, it emerged that apart from a couple of small notes, Information did not ar-
ticulate the story about Lindkær Jensen. In this context it should be noted that 
the frequency of coverage in the other three papers also varies, with Jyl-
landsposten as the paper that articulates the story most frequently.  
                                          
68 ”Gene researcher reported to the police” Jyllandsposten, 25 November 1999. 
69 This indictment was later dropped by the police and no further action has been reported 
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It did not, however, make sense to use the same preliminary distinction between 
technical, regulatory and wider societal aspects exactly as it was employed in 
the analysis of cloning. Instead, the most obvious distinction in the articulation 
of the experiment seems to be whether the focus is on the experiment as a prob-
lematic treatment of patients – and hereby on the therapeutic aspects of gene 
therapy – or on the experiment as a problematic research experiment – in which 
case a distinction between technical and regulatory aspects has proved fruitful.70 
As mentioned earlier, however, the articulation of the experiment with gene 
therapy is more complex with different articulations of problems and solutions. 
The focus on therapeutic, technical and regulatory aspects, therefore, produces 
sets of competing scripts. 
 
Therapeutic aspects 
The first set of scripts is found in a number of articulations focusing on the 
therapeutic aspects, that is, the use of this technology as a cure for cancer. Espe-
cially when the story breaks on the first day the treatment of patients seems to be 
central to the articulation of the experiment as news. It should be noted that 
there generally seems to be mediated confusion about which kinds of authorisa-
tion has been obtained to treat different patients. There is seldom a clear distinc-
tion between different kinds of approvals, experiments and patients. In this con-
text, it should be remembered that the present account focuses on the mediated 
articulations in order to see the productive pattern of inscriptions, rather than the 
shortcomings of the way these articulations present a different reality outside the 
media. Therefore, having noted these absent distinctions, the focus will be on 
the actual articulations, rather than the lack of clarification. And with this focus 
it is interesting to note that the missing distinctions can function as discrediting 
elements in the articulation of Lindkær Jensen's experiments:  
 
The experiment originally included six patients. But, parallel to 
this, the doctors have treated five to ten patients, who were not 
                                          
70 An obvious script that I do not deal with in what follows is the above-mentioned detective 
story, where the journalist or the paper is cast in the role as the active investigator. This script 
is common in present Danish journalism (Lund 2002 and Pedersen & Horst 2001), and in this 
context I view it as a generic script, which is used in connection with all media stories articu-
lated as some sort of scandal. It does therefore not say anything in particular about the articu-
lation of gene technology as such and I will leave an analysis of this script out of the present 
context. 
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included in the project. The treatment of these patients has 
therefore not been authorised by the scientific ethical committee. 
Furthermore, at least one patient has felt pressured to pay 15.000 
British pounds to an account in London as payment for the 
unauthorised treatment.71  
 
In this way the story is presented as a story about a doctor not managing his rela-
tionship with his patients according to Danish legislation. Since it is mandatory 
to have experiments on human beings approved by the scientific ethical commit-
tee, the information that patients have been treated outside the guidelines of the 
experiment implies that Lindkær Jensen has been violating current restrictions 
on experiments with patients and abusing his position of power in order to make 
illegitimate financial demands of the patients.  
 
At this point, however, there seems to be a dilemma in the mediated articula-
tions. It is one thing is that the activities of Lindkær Jensen are shady and sub-
ject to investigation, but the suspension of the experiments has had the added 
consequence that the involved patients have been barred from gene therapy pre-
viously scheduled. This suspension is presented as highly problematic for the 
patients who are in turn presented as completely dependent on this therapy for 
survival:  
 
Advanced liver cancer is equivalent to a death sentence, but 
scannings of the patients in professor Lindkær's experiment 
showed unique results. Several people spoke of an out right 
miracle. About the very solution of the mystery of cancer. But if 
the experiment were to stop now, the patients’ cancer could spread 
again within few weeks, while the staff at L2 would be unable to 
do anything. Without new inoculations of gene-manipulated virus 
the patients would die. The staff knew this and so did the 
administration. Also the managing staff at the ward, which had 
forwarded their knowledge to the executive office [and triggered 
the suspension of the experiment], realised that this would mean 
death of the patients. Still they had chosen to talk about the 
professor’s conduct of the experiment.72  
 
                                          
71 Politiken 1 July 1999: ”Sloppiness stops gene experiment”. 
72 Jyllandsposten 4 July 1999: ”Professor under pressure”. 
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As the very dramatic style of this quote underlines, the story is here presented as 
a drama about individual doctors who take responsibility for deciding upon pa-
tients’ life and death. At this point many articulations leave open the question of 
who should be cast in the roles of hero and villain. Is Lindkær Jensen a villain 
because he has abused his position of power and failed in his responsibility to-
wards the patients, or is he a hero fighting to cure patients by all available 
means? It is however clear, that patients are articulated as the unfortunate party. 
They are the ones who are seriously ill, regardless of whether Lindkær Jensen 
was trying to rescue them or take advantage of their situation. Gene therapy, on 
the other hand, is articulated as a cure for cancer and the main problem is there-
fore to find a way of securing patients access to the therapy. The context of great 
expectations, as presented in the pre-script, means that gene therapy can be in-
scribed as an unproblematic tool in the battle against cancer. As the articulations 
proliferate they seem to follow three different scripts that construct the parts, or 
roles, as victims, heroes and villains differently. In the following sections I will 
present these scripts. 
 
The script of patient rights 
During the first weeks, it seems that the mediated dilemma about the withheld 
treatment finds a dramaturgical solution when the interest is concentrated on the 
small group of 8-10 patients. Apparently they had been promised gene therapy 
by Lindkær Jensen, but had not received it before the suspension. On this ac-
count the authorities are seen as saviours when they establish an emergency plan 
in order to fulfil this promise. This plan is subsequently closely followed in the 
media. It appears to be quite difficult to acquire a portion of manipulated virus 
to treat the patients, and the efforts by the authorities to secure the continued 
treatment is articulated as an important and prominent story:  
 
Negotiations in London secure cancer patients continued treatment 
with gene therapy (..)  states chairman of the health care committee 
in Århus regional council, Knud Erik Særkjær [the liberal party] to 
Ritzau. (…) Særkjær received confirmation by phone from 
London.73  
 
At the same time as the ‘negotiations’ over access to manipulated virus is cov-
ered in minute detail, the principles behind this ‘emergency plan’ is also dis-
                                          
73 Politiken 11 July 1999: ”Patients secured gene therapy” 
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cussed. It is presented as extraordinary to offer this treatment outside the scope 
of a research experiment, but the emergency plan is commonly articulated as a 
justified solution. The epithet ‘emergency’ as applied to the plan is justified by 
articulating the patients as victims, with a rightful claim to the gene therapy, 
since they are seriously ill and had previously been promised this treatment:  
 
Chairman of the central scientific ethical committee, Kamma 
Bertelsen, is in principle against permitting gene therapy as 
treatment, when there is no documentation of effects and side 
effects: “The fact is that nobody knows anything about the 
treatment. But because an unfortunate situation has arisen, where 
ten patients have been promised hope, I find it justified that they 
receive treatment as long as the authorities will vouch for it” she 
says74.  
 
More common, however, is that the emergency plan for continuation of experi-
mental gene therapy is presented almost as if it was a routine treatment of pa-
tients. In this way, the experimental and highly insecure status of this therapy is 
not articulated as a problem. Rather it seems to be of paramount importance to 
ensure that these patients receive the therapy they have been promised since they 
are victims in a double sense: They are ill, and on top of this they have been 
promised and then denied what seems to be an effective therapy. None of the 
mediated articulations of this emergency plan seriously question whether the 
gene therapy will work at a basic level, but seem to take for granted that it will 
have some sort of positive effect. The articulated problem is not whether the 
therapy will work as treatment, but rather whether the patient will get access to 
it:  
 
As late as last Friday this patient envisaged his own death by 
September 1st at the latest, if the suspended treatment was not 
resumed: - I know that otherwise I will only have a month or two 
to live” said Peter Balle. – But now I believe I have a chance.75  
 
On this basis I have termed the pattern in these inscriptions the script of patient 
rights. It is characterized by a focus on patients and the treatment they receive or 
do not receive in the health care system. The issue is not whether the therapy 
                                          
74 Jyllandsposten 10 July 1999: ”Tightened regulations 
75 Ekstra Bladet 7 July 1999: ”Now I believe in life again” 
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will work, but rather their rights to receive a treatment when promised one. 
Once this promise is made, the health care system is obliged to deliver. In this 
way the patient is a user with certain legitimate rights and the health care system 
is contractually obliged to fulfil certain obligations towards the patient. 
 
The script of comportment 
When the little group of patients had received gene therapy according to this 
emergency plan, the articulations move the focus back to the whole group of 
patients treated by Lindkær Jensen. As mentioned above, Jyllandsposten con-
tinuously articulates new ‘disclosures’. One recurrent issue is the clinically and 
technically careless execution of the experiment. For example, it was alleged 
that the genetically manipulated virus in use had been contaminated. Another 
issue is the apparent financial demands made of the patients, which is articulated 
as particularly morally reprehensible:  
 
The  researchers responsible for a cancer experiment at Århus 
Municipal Hospital has on a number of occasions charged 
incurably ill patients 170.000 Danish kroner in exchange for 
treatment with gene therapy. The demand for money was put 
forward by the British-Egyptian liver specialist Nagy Habib and 
passed on by the Århus professor Steen Lindkær Jensen. This is 
revealed by documents that Jyllandsposten has come into 
possession of.”76  
 
These disclosures of demands for payment raises a fundamental question about 
whether Lindkær Jensen has honoured his obligations as physician treating seri-
ously ill patients. In Denmark health care service is free of charge; introducing 
the question of paying for a treatment for cancer is articulated as decisive and 
very problematic, although the problems are presented in different ways. At 
times, Lindkær Jensen and his partner in London are articulated as common 
criminals trying to defraud patients out of substantial sums with the offer of an 
unproven, and possibly ineffective, therapy. And even if this accusation is not 
articulated directly, the two doctors are still frequently presented as being mor-
ally in the wrong:  
 
Patients with advanced liver cancer were promised a 70 per cent 
chance of positive results, when they came to see Nagy Habib in 
                                          
76 Jyllandsposten 8 August 1999: ”Cancer doctors demanded money” 
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London. According to relatives the promise was made by the 
British-Egyptian liver surgeon in connection with the payment. 
(…) Chairman of Danish Cancer Society, Jens Kristian Gøtrik, 
criticises the liver doctors for having suggested great prospects to 
the patients: “It is quite unfair to suggest great prospects to very ill 
people, when you don’t have any documentation that it is true and 
on top of that to demand money for it.” (…) “The doctors have no 
guarantee or documentation that the treatment will help. Still you 
suggest great prospects. Anyone would sell all their belongings and 
this is why it is close to deception”, says Yvonne Herløv.77  
 
This quote presents patients as subjects who would be prepared to do anything 
in order to be cured of cancer. In this vulnerable situation it is especially impor-
tant that doctors do not take advantage of the situation and exploit their position 
of authority to further selfish interests. Since cancer patients are unable to look 
after their own best interests, it is of vital importance that doctors assume re-
sponsibility for the patients, both in concrete experiments and in medical re-
search in general:  
 
As a responsible doctor you withhold comments on research until 
it is concluded and you know the facts. Otherwise you risk making 
a lot of unhappy people insecure and confused and creating false 
expectations. Mortally ill patients’ time is precious,” says Kamma 
Bertelsen.78  
 
By articulating the time remaining to dying patients as too precious to squander 
on false expectations, a particular moral is articulated, where the important thing 
is to face one’s fate. It is important that dying patients acknowledge that their 
time is running out instead of clinging to a false hope of being cured. These ar-
ticulations imply that scientific (statistical) evidence is equivalent to the truth, 
and that disregarding statistics is the same as believing in fairy tales. So, rather 
than occupying themselves with the unrealistic expectation of being cured, they 
ought to focus on the really important task, which is to understand their fate and 
come to terms with it. In this way patients are presented as subjects in need of 
guidance. They are easily led astray by a false hope, because they are trying to 
avoid their fate.  
                                          
77 Jyllandsposten 22 August 1999: ”Patients given good odds”.  
78 Jyllandsposten 25 July 1999: ”Doctors criticise Århus-politician 
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As a counter weight in this situation, doctors are articulated as subjects who 
need to assume the responsibility for guiding patients in the proper direction. To 
be a responsible doctor is to avoid inspiring unrealistic expectations or false 
hopes. This is a central issue in many articulations of Lindkær Jensen as an irre-
sponsible practitioner of medicine. He did not behave properly since it was irre-
sponsible to induce false hopes, when the patients should have been guided to-
wards accepting their fate. In contrast to Lindkær Jensen, however, other re-
searchers are more responsible. Simultaneous to the case of Richard Seed, these 
articulations employ the distinction between proper researchers and outsiders, 
such as Lindkær Jensen, where ‘proper’ and responsible doctors ought to behave 
according to certain norms: 
 
Doctors and researchers behind clinical experiments are often 
under pressure from dying patients who view the experiments as a 
last chance. (…) “As a doctor it can be very difficult to say no. The 
temptation to venture outside the protocol is extremely high,” says 
Jens Astrup. “But from the point of view of medical research one 
must insist that experiments with experimental treatment have to 
follow the protocol strictly. Otherwise we will treat a lot of patients 
without knowing for certain whether the treatment has worked. In 
the worst case we would be tempted to use a lot of resources on a 
promising treatment, which is later demonstrated to have no effect, 
and then we have given patients a false hope,” says the professor.79  
 
As exemplified in this quote the battle against cancer will only be successful if 
doctors and patients behave according to certain prescribed roles and rules. In 
these inscriptions patients are articulated as vulnerable subjects who will want 
any possible treatment, but where it is important that they face the facts and real-
ise their destiny. The role of the patients is therefore to acknowledge the scien-
tific claims of medicine as the truth about their destiny and to face this fate and 
realise that time is short. The understandable, yet ‘irresponsible’, wish of pa-
tients to receive any treatment, should be countered by responsible doctors, who 
put the situation in its proper perspective. Doctors are hereby presented as the 
active subjects, responsible for order, so that patients do not expect to be cured, 
when the statistical chances are minimal or non-existent. It is very typical that 
researchers and medical doctors are articulated as sources of authority in this 
                                          
79 Jyllandsposten 25 July 1999: ”Doctors under severe pressure from patients” 
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type of inscription. Since both patients and doctors have to behave according to 
pre-defined roles and rules of behaviour, I have chosen to term this pattern in 
inscriptions the script of comportment. Central in this script is that both doctors 
and patients have to behave responsibly in the face of cancer and not go around 
expecting cures when they have not been scientifically proven.  
 
The script of heroic action 
In stark contrast to these inscriptions of the importance of responsibility and fac-
ing one’s fate, other articulations present the patient’s battle against cancer com-
pletely differently. In these articulations the high expectations seems to be a 
positive resource for patients struggling to find a cure for their cancer. In an in-
terview, Steen Lindkær Jensen denies the accusations of financial gain as his 
motivator:  
 
The professor emphasises that money was never his incentive. It 
was the patients and the hope of saving lives. “Many of them were 
young people, as young as 30 years, who had been given up on by 
everybody else. They had been told that it was over. But they 
deserved a chance and I tried to give them that,” he says.80  
 
Rather than false expectations, Lindkær Jensen is here talking about a ‘last 
chance’ for patients that nobody else cares about. And he is not the only actor 
associated to this kind of articulation. Some of his patients and their relatives are 
also presented as sources in a presentation of his experiments as a last chance. In 
this connection the articulation of Lindkær Jensen is completely different from 
the previous scripts. Rather than a criminal outsider or an irresponsible practi-
tioner of medicine, he is presented as a hero and a genius. Normal rules of con-
duct should not apply to him because his efforts to cure cancer patients are so 
important that they allow for smaller mistakes and carelessness:  
 
Professor Lindkær is really a friend of the patients. It may be that 
he has left some things in a mess and that safety procedures have 
not been followed and that the manipulated virus was 
contaminated. But what does it matter, when it helps,” says the 
son. “My father has gained 10 kg after the gene treatments. Now 
he can fix both the house and the garden and he couldn’t do that 
three months ago,” says the son and compares Lindkær to Einstein, 
                                          
80 Jyllandsposten 11 July 1999: ”Professor speaks out” 
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who also needed help with practicalities from those around him. 
“Who wouldn’t take a risk, if you had been told you were going to 
die,” says the son.81  
 
Two things are worth noticing in this quote. First of all the treatment is pre-
sented as a working therapy, or at least it is not seen as problematic. But sec-
ondly, this is not a decisive fact. It does not matter fundamentally, whether the 
chances are large or small, in the judgement of the experiment. Even the slight-
est chance is reason enough to justify the experiment. What was ‘false expecta-
tions’ in the previous inscriptions is here articulated in a positive way as ‘a last 
hope’. Correspondingly Steen Lindkær Jensen is praised for offering this last 
chance. He is a hero. 
 
My wife did not make it long enough to receive gene therapy, but 
she had a hope that she held on to for several days. Then the cancer 
tightened its grip and by the end of March it was over. Thank you 
Steen for your fight to change the establishment, for your efforts to 
find new means in the fight against this terrible disease. I am 
convinced that you will find a place where your will to help 
mortally ill patients will be appreciated!82 
 
Whereas medical researchers serve as sources primarily in articulations of Lind-
kær Jensen as an irresponsible practitioner of medicine, the picture is more di-
verse when it comes to patients. It seems that the different inscriptions of Lind-
kær Jensen are rather closely associated with the individual progress of a pa-
tients’ disease. Two relatives (of dead patients) are presented as sources in ar-
ticulations of Lindkær Jensen as a common criminal, but many patients present 
him as a true hero fighting for the cure of the patients in the manner illustrated 
by the foregoing quotes. Two of the patients interviewed have apparently been 
cured of their cancer and their articulation of Lindkær Jensen and his partner 
Habib is very positive. But the presentation of these doctors as heroes seem to 
lead to an articulation of other actors as villains: 
 
I feel fine and the British-Egyptian professor, Nagy Habib has told 
me that I do not have cancer in the liver any more. The ten tumours 
have disappeared after my gene treatment and I feel privileged that 
                                          
81 Jyllandsposten 22 August 1999: ”The price of hope” 
82 Politiken 25 July 1999: ”Thank you for the hope” 
 110 
 
I had the 210.000 kroner that my treatment has cost me. But I think 
it is scandalous that Århus Municipal Hospital is so oriented 
towards economy that I survive because I have the money, while 
the person in the next bed dies.83  
 
It is interesting to note how the saving of this patient is articulated as almost de-
pendent on luck. He was privileged to have the money, while the imagined pa-
tient in the next bed was not so fortunate. The hospital, on the other hand, is pre-
sented as a system that ignores the interests of the patients and acts instead on 
financial grounds. In this way the health care system seems to be a kind of in-
hibitor to the cure of cancer, rather than a system for taking care of patients. 
Thus, in order to be able to defeat cancer, it is necessary for the patients also to 
fight ‘the system’, because the establishment and its book-keepers have aban-
doned the chance of curing cancer on the grounds of what is seen as irrelevant:84  
 
The case tells us something about bookkeepers and a machinery of 
power, which runs whatever way the wind is blowing. The victims 
are the mortally ill cancer patients, which on top of their harsh 
destiny have experienced that the treatment was suspended, 
resumed and stopped again while the parties involved in the smear 
campaign against Lindkær ran to and fro with vague rumours and 
hear-say. Formalities and loose allegations were more important 
than the cries for help of mortally ill patients, and the continuation 
of a treatment that has given them one last hope. Now the 
politicians and the hospital promise to turn over a new leaf. The 
treatment will be resumed immediately. But without Steen 
Lindkær. He was cut out by the bookkeepers. They way the system 
works, they win almost every time.85  
 
On the basis of these quotes I have called this pattern in inscriptions the script of 
heroic action. In this script, the main roles as hero and villain are completely 
opposite from the script of comportment. Here Lindkær Jensen is a hero because 
he fights to give patients a last chance, whereas the health care system is the 
main villain, since it is bureaucratic and does not serve the interest of the pa-
tients. The patients on the other hand are still, of course, victims of cancer, but 
                                          
83 Ekstra Bladet 19 September 1999: ”Liver cancer patient cured with genes” 
84 This type of story about the ‘little man’ against the system is traditionally associated to Ek-
stra Bladet, but it should be noted that the previous quotes are from other papers. 
85 Ekstra Bladet 7 September 1999: ”The system requires bookkeepers” 
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they are not in need of guidance in order to face their destiny as in the previous 
script. Rather it is articulated as natural that they fight in order to get a ‘last 
chance’. It is also interesting to see, how this ‘last chance’ is really only a possi-
ble chance. Since patients cannot rely on the health care system for a fair treat-
ment, they have to count on heroic action from men like Lindkær Jensen as well 
as their own ability and good fortune - finding Lindkær Jensen, travelling long 
distances to receive the therapy, and paying the bills out of their own pockets.  
 
Summarising we can say, that the articulations of the therapeutic aspects of the 
experiment presents gene therapy as a tool in the ongoing battle against cancer 
and are dramatised as stories about heroes and villains trying to rescue concrete 
patients from imminent dangers. This type of articulation follows three different 
scripts that construe patients and doctors in different roles. In the script of pa-
tient rights, the patients are presented as subjects with a right to receive treat-
ment in the health care system. The problem is the broken promise of therapy 
and a re-establishment of the contractual order is, therefore, the solution.  
 
In the script of comportment Lindkær Jensen is articulated as a villain taking 
advantage of the vulnerable situation of patients in disregard of his duty as a re-
sponsible doctor. In this script patients are irresponsible subjects unable to look 
after their own best interests. And although the doctor can be tempted to follow 
the wishes of the patient it is unacceptable since it induces false hopes instead of 
leading the patients on the right path. The basic problem in this script can there-
fore be seen as a lack of recognition of pre-defined roles and responsibilities, 
and the solution is to enforce these roles and rules. Only responsible action will 
make patients face their destiny, and make doctors fulfil their function.  
 
In contrast to this, the third script of heroic action, articulates Lindkær Jensen as 
a hero fighting to cure patients in spite of resistance from the established health 
care system. In these inscriptions treatment of the patients is the only important 
issue and even a small hope is worth fighting for. Central to this second kind of 
script is a belief in chance rather than rule-following behaviour. Lindkær is a 
hero, because he is taking chances in the struggle against cancer instead of just 
adhering to statistically established predictions of incurability. Patients are cor-
respondingly articulated as legitimately trying to win the fight against cancer by 
believing in ‘the last hope’.  
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Technical aspects 
As mentioned in the shorter version earlier, many of the mediated articulations 
focus on the general aspects of the experiment as a research project gone wrong. 
Initially the dominant theme is the professional credibility of Steen Lindkær 
Jensen and his partner, Nagy Habib. Subsequently the accusations diversify so 
that actions and merits of several authorities are put in question also. As a gen-
eral pattern in this diversification it seems relevant to distinguish between articu-
lations of technical and regulatory aspects.86 The articulations of technical as-
pects focus primarily on the question of effect. Did the gene therapy have posi-
tive effect on cancer patients in this particular case and will it be an effective 
therapy in the future? The articulations of regulatory aspects focus on the ques-
tion of legality and control. Was the experiment conducted according to current 
regulations and how should regulations be designed in order to prevent future 
problems? I will deal with these two kinds of articulations separately in the fol-
lowing because the patterns in these articulations also lead to the identification 
of different scripts with different articulations of problems and solutions 
 
The first set of articulations focus on gene therapy as a technical issue, and the 
central issues focus on effect, that is, whether it works as a therapy for cancer or 
not. As early as three weeks after the first mediations of problems in the experi-
                                          
86 It is worth noting that with one exception I have not found any equivalent to the focus on 
wider societal aspects in the coverage of this scandal. 
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ment, a medical doctor from another hospital states that the experiment with 
gene therapy on liver cancer has not had any effect:  
 
The results from the scientific experiments with gene therapy at 
Århus Municipal Hospital show no effect on patients with 
advanced liver cancer. So far four patients out of a group of five 
have been MR-scanned after treatment at the hospital with gene 
manipulated virus, and in none of these patients have the tumours 
diminished, states the head of the MR centre at Skejby Hospital, 
head of department, dr.med. Thorkil Christensen.87  
 
This statement, however, does not receive a lot of attention in the subsequent 
media coverage, where the question of effect in the particular experiment seems 
to be overshadowed by articulations of general expectations towards future ef-
fects of gene therapy. Later, in the beginning of October, interest in the effect of 
the particular experiment is renewed, as doctors at the Municipal hospital have 
finished an internal report, which is primarily presented as a scientific statement, 
showing that the experiment did not have effect:  
 
When county mayor Johannes Flensted Jensen (Social Democrat) 
announced after the September report that experiments with gene 
therapy should be resumed in Århus County as soon as possible, 
the doctors at the wards of radiotherapy and of liver treatment 
decided to systematically review the results of the gene therapy on 
liver cancer patients. “The result is important, because there are 
still cancer patients who think that this treatment is the one and 
only for them,” says chief consultant Anne Grethe Jurik from ward 
R at Århus Municipal Hospital, where the report has been 
prepared. Today it is clear, that the gene experiment will not be 
resumed. 13 out of 31 patients are dead, while the disease has 
worsened in 11 other patients. In a single case the condition of the 
patient is unchanged, while it has been impossible to establish any 
change in the last six patients. The scientific material was too 
insufficient.88  
 
As mentioned previously, this report is presented in a variety of ways. In Jyl-
landsposten and Politiken the lack of effect is articulated as a fact in the manner 
                                          
87 ”Gene therapy without effect” Jyllandsposten, 24 July 1999. 
88 ”Gene therapy without effect” Jyllandsposten, 3 October 1999. 
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of the example just given; the articulation in Ekstra Bladet, however, fundamen-
tally questions this status. The difference is a very appropriate illustration of dif-
ferences in the inscriptions of problems when the focus is on technical aspects of 
gene therapy. 
 
The script of anti-scientific information 
The most striking feature of the articulation in Ekstra Bladet is that the report is 
not presented as scientific documentation, but rather as part of a political power 
struggle and a smear campaign against Lindkær Jensen:  
 
Two chief consultants are now accused of misleading the public 
and manipulating scientific facts – probably as part of a power 
struggle with the aim of stabbing a knife into the back of the leader 
of the ground-breaking research project, cancer researcher 
professor Steen Lindkær Jensen. (..) Nor does Knud Erik Særkjær 
[chairman of health service committee in Århus County] mince his 
words, when he criticises the consultants for misleading of the 
public. –“Those gene therapies have to be continued, not opposed. 
It is the future. There is no doubt, that there were good 
opportunities in them,” he says. – “This is also why it is regrettable 
that Jurik publicly states that they don’t have an effect. Primarily 
on account of the 18 patients, who are still alive. That is ethically 
tough, I must say.” On the question of whether the whole case 
basically is about a power struggle between consultants, who 
cannot stand each other, the committee chairman answers: “well 
yes, that has a lot to say.”89  
 
Although this quote articulates scientific evaluations of a research experiment, it 
seems to move the focus away from a discussion of scientific knowledge to-
wards a question of power relations. The scientific evaluations ascribed to the 
chief consultants are disregarded as false and guided by extra-scientific reasons. 
Whereas the two broadsheets Politiken and Jyllandsposten articulate this state-
ment from researchers as a scientific fact, the articulation in Ekstra Bladet does 
not present these sources as having credibility.  Instead of drawing on the as-
sessments of medical doctors, they articulate the politician, Særkjær, as a credi-
ble source in explaining the contents of the report. This statement does not refer 
to any kind of scientific argument and in this way the articles in Ekstra Bladet 
                                          
89 ”Reprimands to consultants in the gene case from Århus” Ekstra Bladet, 15 October 1999. 
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seem to reject the scientific claims to knowledge and explain the whole case in 
terms of a power struggle – hereby presenting the problems as caused by politi-
cal actions rather than scientific knowledge. Furthermore the unproblematised 
future expectations articulated by Særkjær should be noticed as well as the fact 
that he is presented as the credible source on this.  
 
Quantitatively speaking, this positive articulation of a definite effect is not very 
prominent in the coverage; it is primarily articulated in Ekstra Bladet. It is inter-
esting though, that as far as media coverage goes this dispute is never settled and 
the position presented in Ekstra Bladet is qualitatively very important. It demon-
strates a distinctively different way of inscription, where gene therapy is pre-
sented as a working therapy and it is claimed that the experiment was stopped 
for political reasons as part of a smear campaign against Lindkær Jensen. Thus, 
the authority of scientifically established knowledge and its principles of inquiry 
are not articulated as credible and trustworthy. Rather these authorities are dis-
qualified since they only conceal a power struggle, which is presented as the ba-
sic explanation of the problems in the experiment. In this way, the scientific as-
sessment is disregarded as false and substituted with a politically informed ex-
planation. On this background I have chosen to term the script used in Ekstra 
Bladet the script of anti-scientific information. The basic problem in this script 
is the power struggle, with some doctors trying to stop people like Lindkær Jen-
sen from achieving the medical breakthrough of finding a cure for cancer. In this 
way the anti-scientific information script is closely connected to the script of 
heroic action. They both articulate Lindkær Jensen as the hero stopped by the 
establishment, but in connection to the evaluation of the effect of the scientific 
experiment it leads to a general articulation of disregard for scientific authority. 
The solution to this problem of power struggles, however, is not clearly articu-
lated, as it seems that the demonstration of the problem is the most important. 
Yet, the implicit solution would be a dismissal of the smear campaign and an 
acknowledgement of the heroism of doctors like Lindkær Jensen.  
 
The script of great expectations 
There is one feature of Ekstra Bladet’s coverage, which can also be found quite 
often in the other papers. This is the great expectations and an unquestioned and 
unfettered hope vested in gene therapy. The politician, Særkjær, who is quoted 
in Ekstra Bladet above, is a common source in other newspapers articulating 
similar arguments about the unquestioned great prospects for the future. But he 
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is not the only actor associated with these future expectations. Fellow members 
from the liberal party are articulated as equally optimistic, but also politicians 
from other parties are connected to this view. For instance the mayor of Århus, 
who is a member of the Social Democrats, is also quoted as having no doubts 
about the great promise offered by gene therapy:  
 
Bad results with the ongoing gene therapy experiments on liver 
cancer patients at Århus Municipal Hospital will probably not 
make politicians abandon new projects with gene therapy. The 
largest parties of Århus County still backs the experiments (..) “I 
want to see the report [proving no effect] before I comment on it,” 
says county mayor Johannes Flensted Jensen, “But I have no doubt 
that gene therapy will be a future form of treatment. Therefore it is 
important that we get going again, possibly in combination with 
other forms of treatment like chemotherapy and under more 
controlled conditions.90 
 
In articulations like the previous, it is possible to say that (the lack of) docu-
mented effect is made up for by a faith in some future effect as the argumenta-
tive support. It might be, that the therapy has not yet proved effective but this 
problem is presented as merely a question of time, so the concrete experiment is 
thus one step on a road that will unquestionably lead to the future success. This 
preserved faith in the scientific development is often put forward without refer-
ences to scientific documentation, as in the previous quotes. In other articula-
tions, however, it is explicitly based on scientific knowledge, as in the following 
quote from an opinion piece. The writer has not revealed his professional back-
ground, but from the arguments and language used it seems to be a medically 
trained person:  
 
So far the means of treating widespread liver metastases have been 
limited, but internationally a breakthrough in cancer treatment is 
probably emerging, including treatment with gene-manipulated 
virus. This treatment is based on the fact that many cancer cells 
have a genetic defect in that part of the genome called p53. This 
gene is normally plays a discriminating role in the regulation of 
cell division and the control of natural destruction of cells. In order 
for a tumour to grow it is necessary both that the cells can divide 
                                          
90 ”Continued support of gene therapy” Jyllandsposten 4 October 1999. 
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unrestrained and that they do not disappear again by cell death. By 
injecting a virus, which has had a particular small part of its 
genome removed, directly into tumours or blood vessels that lead 
into tumours, it is possible to induce cell death in those cancer 
cells, which have the mentioned defect in the p53 gene, while 
normal cells are not damaged. This is clearly shown in cell cultures 
and mice with implanted human tumours. In an American 
experiment, where 25 patients with an advanced form of lung 
cancer participated, this form of treatment has demonstrated 
positive response in 8 percent and stabilisation of condition in 64 
percent, while it didn’t have effect in 28 percent. (...) I am sorry for 
Danish cancer patients, because a splendid initiative turned into a 
truly damned Århus-story [equivalent to the wise men of Gotham]. 
Many people will probably profit from treatment with gene-
manipulated virus in the future. (...) If there is a scandal in this 
story from Århus, it primarily consists of destroying a necessary 
clinical experiment in this country.91 
 
The reason for quoting this at length is that it is a clear-cut example of the great 
expectations towards gene therapy where the poor results in Århus is disre-
garded as an indication of general problems in gene therapy. Rather, great ex-
pectations are articulated as resting on scientific evidence, but it should not go 
unnoticed that from a scientific viewpoint it is possible to be somewhat critical 
of the statistical evidence that seems rather narrow. In the mass mediated con-
text, however, it has the function of establishing the great expectations on scien-
tific authority, so that the high hopes can be articulated as based on preliminary 
scientific results. Science has brought us this far, so it is only natural to expect a 
genuine break through in the near future. These inscriptions of gene therapy as 
the continued source of hope for a cure for cancer can be seen as the most obvi-
ous continuation of the pre-script fostering great expectations. They articulate 
gene therapy as an unquestioned solution to the problem of cancer (and disease 
in general), and the problems with lack of effect is articulated as technical prob-
lems that must be expected to disappear shortly. On this background I have cho-
sen to term this the script of great expectations. In this script, problems, both in 
terms of technical problems and problems of disease in general, stem from the 
fact that scientific progress has not yet come to its fulfilment, but if we just wait 
                                          
91 ”A truly damned story from Århus” Jyllandsposten 4 September 1999. 
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and see, science will satisfy our expectations and bring effective solutions to 
problems of disease and suffering. 
 
The script of scientific comportment  
It might be expected that the use of scientific knowledge in order to sustain un-
fettered hopes for the future would often be articulated in association with actors 
like researchers and members of the medical scientific community. But many of 
these sources seem to put a lot more emphasis on the necessity of hard work and 
conditioned expectations, instead of an unconditioned faith in science:  
 
Genetic material will probably be the drug of the future for all 
types of conditions. But realistically one should not expect an 
immediate miracle cure. It is more likely going to be a long and 
laborious process, which will only gradually begin to bear fruit,” 
says one of the country’s leading geneticists, professor and dr.med. 
Lars Bolund.92  
 
The notion of a miracle is used several times as an articulation of what medical 
science is not about and what researchers do not do: They are not miracle work-
ers. Quite on the contrary, as seen in the above quote, it is hard work to make the 
gene therapy effective. On this account it is necessary that patients do not expect 
too much, too soon. Rather, as shown earlier in the script of comportment, can-
cer patients must endure and accept that a miraculous cure is not the immediate 
consequence of this research:  
 
[Jens Astrup] has not lost faith in the idea that gene therapy will 
one day be used against brain cancer. “But first the methods must 
be developed, and the treatment must become more effective. 
Maybe it will take 10 years before we can expect a proper 
breakthrough,” says Jens Astrup. The other experts that 
Jyllandsposten has spoken to also maintain that we shouldn’t use 
the poor results to disregard gene therapy: “You have to take into 
consideration, that only desperately ill patients can participate in 
gene therapeutic experiments like the ones in Århus,” says Claus 
Nerlov from Rigshospitalet. “The medical-ethical rules are so strict 
that you cannot give patients an experimental treatment with 
unknown effect, if you have another well tested treatment that 
works. The criterion to be included in the experiments is simply 
                                          
92 ”Doctors under severe pressure from patients” Jyllandsposten 25 July 1999 
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that all other forms of treatment have been given up. This means 
that it actually takes a miracle for the gene therapy to lead to full 
recovery. And it is always hard to launch a new treatment by 
producing a miracle.93 
 
These articulations of the necessity of moderating expectations all seem to sub-
scribe to a general sense of hope and progress brought about by medical science. 
Gene therapy is expected to be a future solution to the problem of cancer, but in 
these articulations, this solution will not just come about by itself. The develop-
ment of effective solutions depends on hard work and the right attitude – and 
therefore ‘we’ have to be realistic about the rate of progress and discuss this new 
technology with due respect to its problems and shortcomings.  
 
As already mentioned, this call for moderation seems to be prevalent in many 
articulations associated with medical researchers. Generally it seems to be 
linked to an idea of responsibility in the conduct of scientific research. Precisely 
because gene therapy is at a very early stage, is it important that all parties in-
volved act responsibly and follow central prescriptions of the ‘proper’ scientific 
production of knowledge. Just like the call for patients to be responsible, medi-
cal researchers also have to behave properly. Following this argument, the ex-
periment in Århus is seen as problematic because it violates the rules of conduct 
in proper scientific research. In this way it almost seems that it was medical sci-
ence that was a victim in the experiments in Århus:  
 
The idea behind the disputed experiment is so good, that it should 
be tested in clinical experiments, but the course of events has been 
so messy and unprofessional, that it almost does more harm than 
good. We are in a preliminary phase with gene therapy, where we 
have to do all to make sure, that all results are documented in a 
correct fashion, so that we will get a clear answer to whether they 
work or not. By allowing experimental treatment outside the 
scientific protocols, the door to quackery in the health care service 
is opened,” says Lars Bolund.94  
 
The quote implies an expectation that gene therapy will become an effective so-
lution in the future. But rather than presenting this expectation unconditionally, 
                                          
93 ”The quest for geniality” Jyllandsposten 25 July 1999. 
94 ”Doctors under severe pressure from patients” Jyllandsposten 25 July 1999. 
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it is presented as conditional on an ability to behave properly. Gene therapy will 
not work just because we keep experimenting with it. Rather it will only work if 
researchers behave properly and follow rules of conduct for the proper and re-
sponsible scientific production of knowledge. In this way these articulations ap-
pear very similar to the earlier identified script of comportment. The solution to 
cancer is dependent on all actors behaving according to their predefined rules. 
Researchers have to follow rules of conduct for research. Patients have to be 
prepared to wait and submit themselves to research experiments; the rest of us 
have to respect the hard work of researchers, rather than expecting miracles. I 
have therefore also identified the pattern in these inscriptions as a script of com-
portment, where the ‘proper’ rule-following behaviour, according to an appro-
priate code of conduct, is central for the great expectations to come true. 
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Summarising the patterns in the inscriptions of the technical aspects, it has been 
possible to identify three different scripts articulating different problems and 
solutions as I have summarised in the following table. They are similar in that 
they all expect gene therapy to be a possible future solution to the problem of 
cancer and other deadly diseases. But they differ in the way they present the 
problems in reaching this solution. 
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Regulatory aspects  
The second set of articulations of the experiment as a problematic research ex-
periment focuses on the regulatory aspects. It questions whether the experiment 
was violating existing regulation and also whether present regulation of research 
experiments is sufficient in order to avoid a similar case. After the first few 
weeks of interest in the emergency plan, many of the articles turn toward more 
general issues of legality and control in medical experiments including human 
patients. Central are the questions of whether it was illegal and who should be 
blamed, and these articulations reach a dramaturgical culmination in the begin-
ning of September, with the publication of a report by five university professors, 
examining the scientific and regulatory aspects of the conduct of the experiment:  
 
The disputed experiments involving a gene manipulated virus for 
patients with advanced liver cancer will never be resumed at Århus 
Municipal Hospital. This is made clear by University of Aarhus 
and Århus County after the committee on health care service in 
Århus County Wednesday put an end to the case by accepting the 
newly published report about the case. “The experiment in 
question will never be resumed. If a similar project should be 
undertaken in the future, it will be with completely new protocols 
and on a quite different and more qualified basis,” says head of 
Institute for Experimental Clinical Research at Aarhus University, 
professor Jens Christian Djurhuus, who is responsible for all health 
care research at the Århus Hospitals.95 
 
Apart from the previously mentioned counter narrative in Ekstra Bladet, most of 
the articulations of the regulatory aspects subscribe to an interpretation of the 
experiments as more or less illegal and certainly on the edge of current regula-
tion regarding research on humans. The legal problems are primarily articulated 
by stressing the necessity to conduct future research with much higher quality 
standards. There are, however, different conceptions of the way to ensure this 
higher standard. Whereas some point to a need to change the rules in order to 
prevent similar problems in the future, others articulate the current system of 
regulation as sufficient.  
 
 
                                          
95 ”Cancer experiments will never be resumed” Jyllandsposten 9 September 1999. 
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The script of consumer protection 
Many of the articles take as a point of departure the actual course of events in 
Århus, and subsequently articulate more general implications regarding the issue 
of control and regulation of medical experiments on patients in the health care 
system in general:  
 
The experiments with gene therapy at Århus Municipal Hospital 
were never controlled by the Research Ethical Committee in Århus 
County, which has approved the project. This became clear under a 
hearing in the committee for research in parliament, where minister 
of research Birte Weiss (of the Social Democrats) explained the 
suspended experiments with injections of gene manipulated virus 
in cancer patients. The government is prepared to change the rules, 
so that medical experiments with humans in the future will be 
subject to intensified regulation. “We must seize the opportunity to 
build confidence. Maybe it takes a change in legislation, maybe 
just a clarification. But it is a problem we have to solve,” said Birte 
Weiss after the hearing. She is now expecting an initiative from the 
Central Research Ethical Committee on how to improve control of 
research.96  
 
The question of building confidence is a common theme and it is articulated as 
important in order to secure patients’ trust in researchers and medical research. 
The experiments conducted by Lindkær Jensen are seen as endangering the pub-
lic’s trust in science and scientific researchers, hereby creating difficulties for 
research itself in a very direct sense. If people do not trust scientific research, 
they will not partake in scientific experiments and this will be devastating to the 
future development of new therapies and scientific knowledge in general, since 
such development is dependent on the willingness of patients to volunteer for 
these research projects. On this account action has to be taken in order to re-
establish the public trust in science: 
 
If we are to maintain the peoples’ trust in scientific experiments we 
have to give the research ethical committees a practical way of 
following up on the licences they issue to the researchers. It would 
also be appreciated if it were complemented with random controls. 
As long as researchers know it can happen they will have a 
preventive effect. The ministers of health care and of research have 
                                          
96 ”Intensified control with gene research” Jyllandsposten 10 august 1999. 
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to do something about this. Otherwise we, the opposition, will 
press for action,” says Ester Larsen.97 
 
This quote illustrates a kind of articulation, where researchers are presented as 
subjects that have to be controlled in order to behave properly. In order for the 
patient to be treated fairly and decently it is necessary for an external agent to 
control the actions of researchers. Otherwise they might act in their own interest 
and in disregard of the interests of the patients. Patients seem to be viewed as 
consumers in a health care system, consumers, which have to be protected 
against unwarranted actions by the providers of the service, i.e. medical doctors 
and researchers. In this way, control of research in the health care sector is ar-
ticulated as a kind of consumer protection. This interpretation is explicit in the 
following quote where the actor has a reputation (at least in medical circles) for 
being very critical of the lack of protection for participants in medical research:  
 
Lone Scocozza has been a member of a research ethical committee 
for six years. Here she got the impression, that many doctors view 
the committees as an irritating encroachment in their freedom of 
research. They find the control difficult, bureaucratic and costly. 
“But in reality the control ought to be intensified. An ethics patrol 
could be set up to make unannounced inspections at the hospitals. 
Restaurants have to submit to this kind of inspection by the Food 
Safety Agency. As it is today far too much goes on in hiding in the 
hospitals. Only what the press discovers by chance comes out.”98 
 
In this quote government regulation is suggested as a means to defend the con-
sumer rights of the patients, just as regulation protects the consumer rights of 
customers in restaurants. It is necessary to have an external guarantor, who will 
make sure that doctors are not taking advantage of patients in an ‘unfair’ way. 
The articulation of the need to conserve the trust of patients therefore seems to 
be a question of ensuring that patients believe they will get a just and fair treat-
ment when participating in medical research in the health care system. And re-
searchers are articulated as unable to be a guarantor that this belief is justified. 
Thus external regulation can be seen as a remedy for the imperfections of the 
health care system in securing a fair or well functioning relationship between the 
                                          
97 ”Reprimand in cancer research case” Politiken 28 July 1999. 
98 ”Sloppiness stops gene experiment” Politiken 1 July 1999. 
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two parties – patients and doctors/researchers. On this account I have called this 
pattern in inscriptions the script of consumer protection. 
 
It is interesting that this script is often connected to great and unquestioned ex-
pectations of future therapies as presented in the script of great expectations. In 
these cases the argument seems to be that if left to pursue its own logic of in-
quiry, research in gene therapy will undoubtedly lead to a breakthrough. Society 
does, however, need to make sure that researchers do not violate the interests of 
patients in this quest and external regulation is therefore needed to protect the 
weaker parties. In this way the argument bears some resemblance to the regula-
tion of market forces undertaken in most welfare states. But in this connection it 
is not the negative consequences of economic market forces but of the logic of 
scientific inquiry, which has to be controlled by the central authority of the state. 
 
The script of self-discipline 
The previously identified script of consumer protection is often associated with 
politicians or other actors outside the medical establishment. In contrast, it is by 
far the most common journalistic practice to present medical professionals as 
actors stating that external regulation is unnecessary or even damaging to the 
scientific production of knowledge. Especially in the latter period of mediated 
coverage many researchers are presented as sources in articulations where it is 
argued that the general lesson from the experiment in Århus should not be more 
external regulation:  
 
The head of research at the three hospitals in Århus now warns the 
politicians and the Central Research Ethical Committee against 
imposing further control of medical research after the case with 
gene therapy in Århus. “I fear that we will end up with much more 
government and more control of research. It is completely 
unnecessary. We already have sufficient possibilities for 
protection,” says Jens Christian Djurhuus, head of the Institute of 
Experimental Clinical Research at Århus University.99 
 
Furthermore, external regulation is articulated as unnecessary since the current 
system is presented as sufficient. The experiment in Århus did not go wrong be-
cause of a lack of regulation, but because Steen Lindkær Jensen was an outsider, 
                                          
99 “Warning against increased control” Jyllandsposten 16 August 1999. 
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who did not act according to the rules. On this background some of the re-
searchers quoted leave a door open to tighten the control of science, like for in-
stance the head of the Central Scientific Ethical Committee, Kamma Bertelsen. 
At the same time, however, it is pointed out that it will be impossible to create a 
system of regulation in which it is not possible to bend the rules or simply cheat:  
 
Kamma Bertelsen consider the system of Research Ethical 
Committees, which has to approve all experiments with humans, as 
well functioning (...) “It is not the fault of the system, that 
researchers in Århus have behaved stupidly. No matter how much 
you check, it will always be possible to cheat,” says Kamma 
Bertelsen.100  
 
Thus it is not the system of regulation, which is articulated as a problem, but the 
occasional outsider, who cheats or otherwise does not respect the current regula-
tion. External regulation is not presented as a solution since it will not have the 
intended effect of stopping the outsiders from behaving wrongly. Rather exter-
nal regulation is presented as a problem. It will only make research more diffi-
cult, since the jurisdiction of researchers conducting scientific research will be 
curtailed. Thus more external regulation is articulated as nothing but an extra 
burden on the well-behaved researchers, without having any intended effect on 
the outsiders. Consequently, strengthening internal self-discipline within the re-
search community is the most effective remedy for ‘black sheep’. As an exam-
ple of this, the head of the Medical Research Council (SSVF) argues in an opin-
ion piece in Politiken, that the research council will be happy to assist in a pro-
fessional evaluation of research projects, with the explicit purpose of avoiding 
further legislative initiatives. This articulation clearly argues against external 
regulation and presents internal discipline and order as a much better solution:  
 
It is the hope of SSVF that this case will not lead to a tightening of 
legislation or regulations so that clinical research will be 
bureaucratised to a degree that will put obstacles in the way of a 
continued advancement of patient treatment. We do not find 
evidence to support this. The necessary regulation is already in 
place and SSVF would happily take part in a better implementation 
of it. We also have suggestions for a strengthening of the 
regulations. Our proposal is built on recognition that centralised 
                                          
100 ”Hard to control experiments with patients” Politiken 29 July 1999. 
 126 
 
mechanisms of control often become bureaucratic and costly and 
only has preventative effect in those who already adhere to the 
rules. If there are black sheep (and where is it possible to avoid 
this) they will hardly ever be stopped by systems of random 
checks. We are therefore in favour of decentralised self-discipline. 
(...) Let us not be caught up in a panic and introduce restrictions 
that will harm research and hereby the treatment of patients. Let us 
instead use the debate to strengthen clinical research to the benefit 
of the patients, so they can feel secure also in the future, and so 
doctors and other research personnel can take on the task with their 
heads held high. Do not forget we all have a common goal that the 
treatment offered in Danish hospitals are well founded. The only 
way to secure this is through clinical research.101 
 
The argument towards the end of this quote fits well with the above-identified 
script of comportment. We all have to realise that doctors are carrying out a task 
in the interest of the common good, and the successful fulfilment of this task is 
dependent on a respect for the proper conduct of clinical trials. Society should 
not hinder this task by imposing external regulation that might inhibit scientific 
researchers in the performance of their task. In stead it should be left to the sci-
entific system and its internal hierarchy to make researchers behave in the 
proper fashion.  
 
I have called the pattern in these inscriptions the script of self-discipline. In this 
script medical research is presented as a self-disciplinary system, where irre-
sponsible ‘black sheep’ are best dealt with internally. Rather than increasing ex-
ternal regulation, proper conduct should be ensured through internal standards. 
External regulation is presented as unnecessary and bureaucratic measures of 
control, which will only have preventative effects on the already well behaved. 
It will not prohibit black sheep, but only make research more difficult. The prob-
lem of ‘improper conduct’ on behalf of some ‘black sheep’ is not fought by ex-
ternal regulation but by internal self-discipline in accord with the code of con-
duct already existing within scientific practice. 
 
Summarising the inscriptions of gene therapy as an object of regulation, they 
basically follow two opposite scripts. The script of consumer protection articu-
                                          
101 ”Beware of panic decisions” opinion piece by chairman of the Danish Medical Research 
Council, in Politiken, 29 August 1999. 
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lates a need for increased external control in order to ensure that researchers do 
not mistreat patients. This leads to the articulation of a kind of consumer protec-
tion needed in order to regulate the imperfections of the scientific endeavour by 
protecting the weaker parties. Lindkær Jensen is seen as an outsider, but he is 
the expected villain, whom society has responsibility to protect patients against.  
In contrast to this, the script of self-discipline articulates external regulation as a 
problem since it will make scientific research more difficult and bureaucratic. 
This script presents the internal system of order and discipline produced by the 
scientific system as the best solution to problems of misconduct. Increasing the 
internal mechanisms of control and discipline should therefore solve problems 
like Lindkær Jensen. 
 
Figure 4.4 
Focus on regula-
tory aspects 
Evaluation of ex-
periment 
Problem Solution 
Consumer protec-
tion 
The present system 
failed in stopping 
illegitimate experi-
ments of Lindkær 
Jensen  
Researchers unable 
to guarantee the 
consumer rights of 
patients 
External regulation 
of research  
Self-discipline Lindkær Jensen is 
an irresponsible 
black sheep, who 
ought to know better
Preventive measures 
directed at irrespon-
sible black sheep, 
should not compro-
mise scientific free-
dom of research  
Self-discipline and 
responsibility in sci-
entific conduct 
 
 
Three different super-scripts 
Throughout this chapter I have identified eight different scripts. Although it 
seems like a fairly large amount of differences, it is possible to detect an over-
arching pattern. I will argue that there are different super-scripts that can be 
identified on the basis of the way they articulate Lindkær Jensen, the patients, 
the objective of genetic research and the articulated possibilities of finding a 
cure for cancer. Certain similarities make it possible to talk of super-scripts as a 
‘meta-pattern in the eight scripts according to the following scheme: 
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Figure 4.5 Super-script 1 Super-script 2 Super-script 3
Therapeutic aspects Heroic action Patient rights Comportment 
Technical aspects Anti-scientific informa-
tion 
Great expectations Comportment 
Regulatory aspects  Consumer protec-
tion 
Self-discipline 
 
The first super-script is primarily identified on account of the particular articula-
tion of Lindkær Jensen as a misunderstood genius, who was fighting to save his 
patients, but lost a battle against the bureaucracy. The scripts of heroic action 
and anti-scientific information do not present science as a beneficial activity 
leading to the development of a cure of cancer. Rather they articulate the possi-
ble cure as a result of action on behalf of exceptional heroes. In these scripts the 
patients are presented as subjects, who understandably pursue even the smallest 
‘last chance’, if it provides a hope of being cured of cancer. Furthermore, the 
patients are basically ‘on their own’, since the system of the health care sector is 
not articulated as beneficial or even motivated by an intention of helping the pa-
tients. Rather it is bureaucratic and oriented towards political and economic pri-
orities.  
 
The single individuals acting to save concrete patients are therefore heroes in 
these scripts, whereas the health care system in general is presented as problem-
atic or even detrimental, since it lacks the ability or willingness to fight cancer. 
Closely connected to this articulation of the health care system is the rejection of 
any scientific claims to knowledge in what I termed the script of anti-scientific 
information. The core of this script is a rejection of the scientific logic of inquiry 
as a systematic or general means to create a better world. In these scripts, Lind-
kær Jensen is a hero, not because he is a scientist, but because he is a man of 
action who is betting on chance instead of following general rules and proce-
dures. It should be noted that these two scripts seem to be the standard choice of 
script in Ekstra Bladet, but especially the script of heroic action is also articu-
lated in both Jyllandsposten and Politiken. 
 
Presented like this, the division between these two scripts and the others are 
similar to the difference identified in the last chapter between the inscriptions of 
science as a basically beneficial or a problematic social activity. In particular I 
will argue that these two scripts can be seen as closely connected to the script of 
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fatalistic irony identified in the previous chapter, since they present a situation in 
which the individual is basically alone, not able to depend on systems or general 
norms or regulation, but left to fend for itself in a hostile world. Similar to the 
script of fatalistic irony the scripts of Heroic Action and Anti-scientific informa-
tion also portray society in general as uncontrollable or controlled by ‘the oth-
ers’. But rather than detachment, as in the case of cloning, the response in these 
scripts is to focus on the individual hope of surviving a deadly disease by pursu-
ing individual chances created by heroic action.  
 
Figure 4.6 
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villain and 
outsider 
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The second super-script is based on two observations. To begin with, the script 
of patient rights and Consumer Protection seems to be closely connected in that 
they both articulate patients as a kind of users or customers in the health care 
system, which includes medical science. Whereas the first script focuses on the 
right to receive a treatment once it has been promised, the second emphasises 
that, as users of the health care system, patients have to be treated according to a 
certain standard very similar to consumer rights in a market place. Both of these 
scripts seem to articulate the relation between patients and health care system as 
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a contract, where each party has to act according to the contractual standards, 
but where the patients are articulated as the weaker party and the health care sys-
tem as the stronger. On this account a kind of external regulation can be neces-
sary to enforce the contract.  
 
The second important observation in connection to this set of scripts is that the 
scripts of Great expectations and Consumer protection are often associated in 
the articulations. In this case it seems that left to pursue its own goal of produc-
ing scientific knowledge, science will undoubtedly lead to a cure for cancer, but 
precisely because researchers are following scientific goals it is not possible also 
to guarantee the consumer protection of the patients involved in scientific re-
search. Lindkær Jensen is therefore articulated as a kind of ‘inevitable villain’, 
since the search for scientific knowledge must be expected to lead researchers 
inevitably to disregard the interests of the patients. On this account it is neces-
sary to create an external regulation that will guarantee the patients rights.  
 
This set of scripts articulates medical science as a kind of sub-contractor to the 
health care system. As a subcontractor science is expected to deliver the cure for 
cancer, but this relation is not the main focus in these scripts. Rather, the most 
important relation is that between patients and the health care system. And the 
important problem is to secure that patients’ rights are not violated, which 
means that external regulation is necessary. The ability of science to create ef-
fective solutions to problems of disease are not questioned, just as the internal 
function and regulation of scientific research is not the issue. But the external 
relations of science, including the relations between medical research and pa-
tients, has to be managed in order to make sure that researchers do not create 
problems for other actors of society, and therefore a pragmatic external regula-
tion is necessary.  
 
The third super-script rests on the fact that two of the included scripts were seen 
to be so closely connected so they were both termed the subscript of Comport-
ment. In these scripts it is presented as fundamental, that researchers and patients 
behave properly according to their pre-defined role. Researchers should ac-
knowledge their responsibility to protect patients from false expectations and 
patients should cooperate as ‘proper’ patients accepting their destiny and realis-
ing that they are mortally ill. An important feature in this script seems to be that 
researchers and patients should pay due respect to the logic of scientific inquiry. 
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They should not have high hopes, or wait for miracles, but realise that the even-
tual cure for cancer by gene therapy is dependent on hard work and the respect 
for designated roles.  
 
The theme of scientific knowledge as the result of hard work and respect of the 
logic of scientific inquiry is important in this connection. Science will not de-
liver results out of thin air, since scientists are not in the business of making 
miracles. Rather scientific knowledge will only be produced, if standards and 
norms are respected, and if actors behave according to their prescribed roles. On 
this account I have found that the script of self-discipline also belongs in this 
association. What is important is the presentation of science as an activity where 
internal rules have to be respected if it is to bear fruit. In this script the problem 
with external regulation is not regulation in itself, but the fact that it is external, 
because external regulation might not respect internal norms and standards and 
therefore it will probably cause more harm than good. Just like in the script of 
comportment, the script of self-discipline also stresses that scientific research 
needs to meet certain standards if it is to result in effective solutions to problems 
of disease. The problem of ‘improper conduct’ on behalf of some ‘black sheep’ 
is not fought by external regulation but by internal self-discipline enforcing the 
code of conduct already existing within scientific practice. Consequently, it can 
be argued that the common feature or these three scripts is to present the main 
problem as a lack of conduct according to prescribed rules and roles. Thus, the 
solution should be to emphasise discipline and comportment in order to 
strengthen the proper conduct of all actors. 
 
This set of scripts consequently resonates with the need for more information 
and education, presented in the script of scientific information in the previous 
chapter. The core of this script was constituted by references to scientific 
knowledge as the basic standard for reactions to cloning. In this context, this 
standard also applies, when science or the logic of scientific inquiry is articu-
lated as the basic means to fight cancer, but success is dependent on scientists 
conducting research according to the rules. Revolutionary results are not a natu-
ral and inevitable outcome, but dependent on the ‘proper conduct’ by research-
ers.  
 
In the above table I have summarised the three super-scripts under the headings 
of chance, external regulation and discipline, since these words seem to summa-
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rise their respective commonalities. In the next chapter I will pursue the discus-
sion of the similarities between the present analysis and that of the articulation 
of human cloning in a general comparison with Douglas’ typology of four cul-
tural forms.  
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Chapter 5 
Articulated collectives 
- Theoretical translations  
 
 
During the analyses certain resonances with the cultural analysis of Mary Doug-
las became more and more intriguing, as the pattern that emerged inductively in 
the previous chapters came to resemble the four cultural types identified by 
Douglas. The last part of the thesis is devoted to explore these similarities. In 
this chapter I will translate the scripts into a typology of four modes of articulat-
ing the collective with the help of Douglas’ cultural analysis. In order to do so, 
the four types of culture will be presented and the different scripts will subse-
quently be related to this typology. By way of conclusion, I will examine the 
link between scripts and arguments in the move from a typology of cosmologies 
to a typology of articulated collectives. 
 
In a recent essay Douglas reformulated the cultural typology in terms of atti-
tudes to power:  
 
I can shorten the introduction to the theory of culture that I wrote 
with the late Aaron Wildavsky by summarizing four kinds of 
competing dialogues about risk in any industrial society. The basic 
discriminator is the attitude to power and authority: There are two 
ways of exerting power, one bureaucratic and hierarchical, and the 
other by bargaining and exchanging; there are two ways of 
resisting the influences from these bases, one by active criticism, 
and the other by withdrawal. The four cultural types that are thus 
distinguished (you can call them hierarchy, market, critical activist, 
and isolate) are always in flux, always open to conversion to one of 
the other positions. (Douglas 1997:129) 
 
Throughout Douglas’s body of work the names for the four types have varied.102 
I have found diverging attitudes to power a very productive discriminator in the 
                                          
102 Originally the four fields were labelled as different types of individuals. This fits with the 
predominant perception in Cultural Bias that an individual can only belong in one culture at a 
given time (Douglas 1978). Naming the inhabitants can thus identify the culture. In the con-
text of this thesis, however, I cannot use this notion of individuals as bearers of particular cul-
tures. In a relational ontology an individual cannot be defined by culture as if it was an intrin-
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following presentation of the four types. Firstly, because the attitude to science 
seems to be important in the different scripts, and this can be seen as adjacent to 
the attitudes to power, since science is generally articulated as a powerful com-
munity, activity or system.103 Secondly, as I argued in Chapter 2, the combina-
tion between Latour and Douglas has had the consequence that the universalis-
tic, structural part of the argument in Douglas’ theory has been left on one side. 
In this dissertation it is not claimed that these four typologies are the result of a 
structural typology with two constituting dimensions of grid and group, but 
rather as possible worldviews in a heuristic typology that has proved productive. 
On this account I have chosen to speak of four ways, or ‘modes’, of articulating 
the collective rather than four cosmologies. 
 
In order to emphasise that the typology is not a classification of individuals, but 
of ways of thinking about social order I have chosen to construct a set of names 
for the four different articulated collectives, which are inspired by Douglas later 
writings,104 but are not completely similar:  
 
Establishment exer-
cising power 
Authoritative Hierarchy Competitive Individualism 
Opposition to exercise 
of power 
Sectarian Egality Fatalistic Isolation 
 
In the following sections I will present these different modes of articulating the 
collective and also illustrate how I see the previously identified scripts as sub-
scribing to these four modes. I should make clear that the following sections are 
not an exhaustive presentation of the four cultural forms and the changes they 
subsequently appear to have undergone at different times in the writings by and 
on Mary Douglas. Rather I have selected elements useful in the particular con-
text of analysing public debate on biotechnology. Thus it will be fair to say that I 
am translating bits and pieces from the large body of theory provided by Doug-
                                                                                                                                   
sic property. Rather the cultural stance will always be an outcome of a particular relational 
context. Douglas herself replaces the word cosmology with thought style (Douglas 1996b), but 
for my purpose it still puts too much emphasis on individual thinking. 
103 It will be a central focus in chapters 6 and 7 to discuss the different attitudes to science as a 
powerful system. 
104 Primarily (Douglas 1996b:43) 
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las into a working framework for the present analysis of the similarities between 
the previously identified scripts and four modes of articulating the collective.  
 
Authoritative hierarchy 
The social order of the Hierarchy is highly structured in separate and graded 
compartments resting on a common notion of authority. In this form, the parts 
are oriented towards the whole, so that hierarchical relations are relations be-
tween ‘larger and smaller or more precisely between that which encompasses 
and that which is encompassed’ (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:90). The unity of 
the hierarchy has precedence over the parts, but this does not mean that the parts 
are neglected. The hierarchy is oriented towards the separate compartments be-
cause they are the building blocks of which the hierarchy is constructed, but 
each separate compartment has to fulfil a special function in order to maintain 
the whole. The individual is thus characterised by an assigned role, more than a 
status as individual actor. The hierarchy operates with a great potential for a 
specialisation of roles, and it may consequently distribute its resources un-
equally between members. The legitimacy of this specialisation and the author-
ity vested in higher positions is based on the common acceptance of the unity 
and precedence of the whole, since each individual fulfils a particular role with 
assigned privileges and obligations.  
 
The hierarchy tends to be deductionist in its style of reasoning and rule follow-
ing in its behaviour (Douglas 1997). In principle, members of the hierarchy 
should be able to deduce a right course of action from the unifying order on 
which the hierarchy is based. Subsequently the identification of a ‘right’ course 
of action can be the basis of common rules and regulations that guide the actions 
of the members of the hierarchy. Since people are normally understood to be 
more fallible than institutions, the appeal to common rules tends to produce 
stronger institutions. It means that controversies are resolvable through an ap-
peal to universal principles or general rules of behaviour. Adversarial positions 
should be reconcilable at a higher level; we just have to make the general order 
to which we belong manifest. Douglas (Douglas 1997) notes that in regard to 
risk assessment, science serves the function of formalising the questions, hereby 
keeping them out of politics. Science is the realm of cool evaluations whereas 
politics is likely to be viewed as an avatar of untimely emotional interference 
and extra-rational influence. Ultimately, it seems that the hierarchical idea of 
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solving controversies over risk is extremely technocratic, but it is also quite ro-
bust:  
 
The hierarchist cannot envisage the continuity of past and present 
being seriously threatened. He expects that the same stable social 
system that has protected his people so well in the past will be able 
to do so in the future. It is not that he is willing to let the future go 
to hell. Just the opposite. By maintaining the advantages of the 
hierarchy in the present, he is, in his view, giving future 
generations the best possible protection. (Douglas & Wildavsky 
1983:99) 
 
Traditions are important in hierarchy as the future is predominantly seen as a 
linear extension of the past. Just as the whole is more important than the parts, 
the longer term seems more important than the shorter. It can be seen as quite 
appropriate to make small sacrifices for the common good in the long run. Sus-
taining the hierarchical order is equivalent to protecting the common good since 
the logic of the system is based on the hierarchical relations that guarantee the 
meaning of each separate entity. In relation to the issue of power, we can say 
that hierarchy is a way of reproducing existing power-relations, but from the 
presentation it should be clear that this reproduction is not primarily a matter of 
protecting privileges – although this is a very obvious consequence. Rather, the 
protection of privileges is a derivative of the need to protect the hierarchical or-
der. It is because the hierarchy should be kept intact that the authority of the 
leading positions is respected, not because the individuals occupying the leading 
positions should be kept in power. As an ideal, power is exercised in the hierar-
chy for the sake of the common good, not in order to privilege certain posi-
tions.105  
 
The focus on responsibility and education in the script of scientific information 
as identified in Chapter 3 makes this script seem to belong in this context. In this 
script problems are seen to be caused by ignorance or neglect of scientific 
knowledge, and therefore public information and edification (‘bildung’) seems 
to be the solution. Seed is a problem because he does not respect the scientific 
code of conduct. He does not accept the obligations connected with his role as 
                                          
105 It is obvious that this ideal of power is in line with the weberian ideal of legitimate bureau-
cratic power, just as the general presentation of the authoritative hierarchy is similar to the 
general notion of bureaucracy within political theory. 
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scientific researcher – for instance that he should not involve himself with hu-
man cloning when it is not scientifically viable. On the other hand, the threat 
Seed poses is not devastating. The fact that he is not behaving properly is pre-
cisely what causes him to be excluded from the institutional settings of science; 
he will therefore not be able to create a human clone. The real problem resides 
with the general public: it is ignorant of scientific knowledge and therefore 
seems to be frightened by the news of Seed, who is really not worth worrying 
about. This problem, however, can be solved by raising the general level of sci-
entific literacy within the public so that it will be brought to see and accept sci-
entific rationality. In this way the public should be brought to accept the institu-
tion of science as a rational system of knowledge creation, in which problems 
are solved by searching for scientific answers. 
 
Secondly, the notion of a need for individual members to realise their prescribed 
role in the super-script of discipline in Chapter 4 also appeared as connected to 
the authoritative hierarchy. Scientists, patients, citizens and politicians have 
roles with duties and obligations. Roles and norms need to be followed since it 
is by respecting the hierarchical institutions, that problems will be solved. If we 
want science to deliver solutions to problems like cancer and other deadly dis-
eases we have to behave properly. Patients should not expect miracle cures, but 
accept the scientific authority of researchers and participate in scientific trials 
conducted according to the general rules of conduct for science. Likewise, re-
searchers should behave with respect for their own scientific authority and not 
violate the rules of the scientific community. The super-script of discipline ar-
ticulates improperly behaving researchers like Lindkær Jensen (and Seed for that 
matter) as irresponsible ‘black sheep’ who should be dealt with internally. In the 
hierarchical order of the institution of science, this kind of un-behaving scien-
tists should be made to behave responsible by enforcing internal discipline and 
rule-following behaviour. External regulation, on the other hand, might destroy 
the order of the hierarchy, and should therefore be avoided.  
 
Summarising the scripts of scientific information, comportment and self-
discipline, they all seem to subscribe to a general notion of an ordered whole, in 
which the decisive issue is for every individual to play their prescribed roles 
with predefined privileges and obligations. Researchers should behave accord-
ing to the scientific code of conduct, patients should accept their situation and 
subject themselves to the rules of the system and the general public should re-
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spect the general authority of scientific rationality. Knowing about one’s pre-
scribed role and acting accordingly seems to be the key issue in terms of solving 
problems in all these scripts. 
 
Competitive individualism 
In contrast to this focus on roles and rules, competitive individualism (market) is 
characterised by individual autonomy and strongly competitive conditions. Con-
sequently the exchange mechanism of the market is the means of co-ordinating 
activities, rather than a central authority prescribing the right course of action. In 
this social context the individual is not constrained by any external boundary or 
by any essential status or formal rules connected to particular roles. This does 
not mean, that there is no classification or stratification, but just that all ‘the ex-
isting classifications are only provisional negotiable boundaries’ (Douglas 
1978:21). 
 
This mode of articulating the collective tends to be sceptical of master plans and 
grand theories from which ‘right’ decisions should be deduced. Instead, it claims 
that decisions about preferences should be an individual matter. This, however, 
does not mean that nothing is sacred in competitive individualism. The auton-
omy of the individual is a staunchly defended notion in this articulated collec-
tive, since it is an essential condition of negotiation and bargaining: 
 
In such an environment [the individual entrepreneur] cannot claim 
autonomy for himself without setting it up as universally valuable, 
a right of his fellow citizens, too. He will claim for everyone the 
rights freely to contract and freely to withdraw from contractual 
obligations, so long as the procedures for contracting and 
withdrawing are publicly accepted. For his kind of society, by 
definition, refuses to give some individuals a hereditary or other 
right to exact privileges or to turn the free market into monopoly. 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:95) 
 
The system of exchange is also held sacred as the general principle of co-
ordination, which must be protected for social order to be sustained. Following 
this, a basic faith in quantification is important, since this constitutes the ma-
chinery of choice, the medium in which one decides among several options. The 
more allies an individual is able to muster in comparison with competitors, the 
merrier. Consequently, competitive individualism is characterised by a prag-
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matic style of reasoning. Douglas and Wildavsky state that utilitarianism is ex-
actly the theory to explain the behaviour of individuals operating in an entirely 
individualist society: ‘the ideas of human rationality conform to the classic as-
sumptions of utility theory – to rank objectives, choose the one with the highest 
value, and go for it’ (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:97). Stability, on the other 
hand, is not important in this mode of articulating the collective. Decisions are 
negotiated in order to maximise utility, but they can always be changed if new 
possibilities emerge or hitherto unknown aspects can be claimed significant. 
Contrary to the authoritative hierarchy, the time-span incorporated in these deci-
sions seems to be extremely short.  
 
Uncertainty and risk are not seen as unfortunate circumstances to be regretted or 
ignored, but on the contrary as opportunities to be exploited. The world is 
changing constantly; uncertainty is just another word for the hope of a better 
tomorrow. If allowed to operate freely, the exchange mechanism of the market 
will make sure that all resources are put to their best uses. ‘With his evolution-
ary faith that the market will select the best and reject the worst, the individualist 
feels confident that his activities will leave the future better off. In a sense, he is 
future oriented; he places his bets on guessing right’ (Douglas & Wildavsky 
1983:99). Whereas the authoritative hierarchy is oriented towards the future as a 
continuation of the past, competitive individualism sees the future as the result 
of the pursuit of individual interests in the present. 
 
Like hierarchy, in which power is exercised in order to protect the authoritative 
order, the exercise of power via the market is seen as a common good, since it 
fulfils the utilitarian dictum. On the whole and in the long run we will be better 
off if decisions are left to the market. Contrary to hierarchy, however, the indi-
vidual’s struggle for power positions is acknowledged as an important part of 
the process. It is precisely because every individual actor tries to pursue his own 
interests and strengthen his individual power-base that the common good is ob-
tained.106 This is obviously built on a different pre-conception of the individual. 
Rather than fulfilling a role with predefined obligations and privileges as in an 
authoritative hierarchy, actors working under conditions of competitive indi-
vidualism are defined as individuals by their interests and resources. 
                                          
106 Just as authoritative hierarchy is in line with notions of weberian bureaucracy, this notion 
of power is completely in line with the way power is exercised through the invisible hand of 
classical economical theory. 
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In the script of pragmatic regulation, identified in Chapter 3, the key issue is to 
generate an evaluation of different kinds of regulation with respect to their bene-
fits and drawbacks. The aim of creating the most effective regulation of cloning, 
which would prohibit cloning, but permit beneficial, ‘good’ research, makes this 
script very similar to competitive individualism. Central here is the pragmatic 
evaluation of pros and cons and the image of science as a beneficial activity, 
which is expected to lead to positive outcomes, but where the boundaries have to 
be negotiated with the rest of society.  
 
In the scripts of patient rights, great expectations and consumer protection, 
which were presented in Chapter 4, the notion of science as a beneficial activity 
in need of external regulation is also articulated. Central in this super-script of 
external regulation is that, if it is left to pursue its own goals, medical science 
can be expected to produce effective cures of disease, but this pursuit makes sci-
ence and scientists blind to the interests of other actors. In this way, Seed and 
Lindkær Jensen are seen as villains, but villains who are only behaving as we 
could have expected, because it is in the nature of scientists in pursuit of the goal 
of knowledge to try to reach it with any available means. As an external media-
tor it is therefore necessary for politics to define the borders of what is accept-
able behaviour within medical science. And as the weaker parties, patients have 
to be protected against undue exploitation, that destroys their status as independ-
ent actors. On this account patients are not constituted as objects subject to an 
authoritative hierarchy of medical science, but as consumers with rights that 
have to be respected in their relation to the health care system. As is the case 
with competitive individualism, actors are articulated as autonomous, pursuing 
their own interests in negotiations with other autonomous actors. This is ex-
pected to lead to positive outcomes at a general level, but in order to mediate 
between what may be enormously asymmetrical positions of power it can be 
necessary to impose external regulation.  
 
Summarising these scripts, medical progress is seen as beneficial, but it has to 
be conducted with respect of the autonomy of other actors – for instance pa-
tients. What is essential is the establishment of actors as independent individuals 
with a personal make up of resources, preferences and interests. And it is the 
pursuit of these preferences and interests that will result in the most prosperous 
use of resources and the attainment of a utilitarian common good, although some 
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regulations might be necessary in order to foster and maintain free negotiations 
between actors. 
 
Some remarks on the relation between authoritative hierarchy and competitive 
individualism are in order at this point. I have earlier quoted a recent statement 
by Douglas of these positions as the two ways of exercising power. It should 
now be clearer what is meant by this claim. Despite their differences, they are 
both concerned with upholding the present social system as it is. Neither is en-
visaging a future that differs substantially from an extension of the present (and 
past). Douglas and Wildavsky write that both ‘have imperialist tendencies, since 
both can solve their organizational problems by expanding the field of opera-
tions – bigger markets, larger collectives’ (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:97). 
They both enforce universalistic rules, but where the hierarchist prefers rules of 
instruction, the competitive individualist prefers rules of fair play that do not 
stipulate what is to be done. We can say that while hierarchical rules ideally pre-
scribe the right thing to do, the rules of competitive individualism should be 
procedural, prescribing how autonomous individuals can reach a pragmatic deci-
sion in a concrete situation.  
  
Sectarian egality 
The two other modes of articulating the collective, sectarian egality and fatalistic 
isolation are, by contrast to the foregoing, ways of opposing rather than of exer-
cising power. In these modes it is not possible to articulate the exercise of power 
as being in the interest of the common good of society. Rather power is in all 
cases seen as oppression that has to be opposed. But it is only in the mode of 
sectarian egality that this opposition is made explicit. Whereas fatalistic isola-
tion involves withdrawal, as I will demonstrate in the following, sectarian egal-
ity is explicit in its dissociation from present social order. The critique is formu-
lated around an expected disaster in the surrounding world and the imminent 
need to try to avoid it: 
 
[The sect] is not confident that the disaster can be averted. There 
may be no time left. But it knows how the disaster has been 
caused: corrupt worldliness, that is, ambition for big organization 
has endangered mankind and new technology represents all that is 
most reprehensible – social distinctions, the division of labor, 
materialist values, unfeelingness for individual suffering. Its mode 
of articulating the collective is characterized by dichotomized 
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values: good and bad are severely contrasted, compromise is bad, 
purity is good. Paradoxically, given the alert detection of betrayers 
in their ranks, the sectarians supplement their mistrust in human 
organization with trust in the goodness of human individuals.  
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:127). 
 
The identification of sectarian egality is modelled on small voluntary groups or-
ganised around a common interest in the protection of public goods. Douglas 
claims that these groups are characterised by their efforts to solve the fundamen-
tal problem of keeping the group together, since the absence of formal hierarchy 
makes it difficult to sustain solidarity in the group.  Membership in the group is 
voluntary, and with no system of incentives, members will tend to evade obliga-
tions. Furthermore, the lack of formal regulation with regard to reward and pun-
ishment (as available in the hierarchy) is leaving the group without adequate in-
struments for solving conflicts. Only the drastic sanction of withdrawing the 
privilege of membership or the dissolution of the group can be effectively ap-
plied. This will produce two tendencies. First, in order to strengthen group soli-
darity and avoid defection or dissolution, the boundary around the group will be 
strongly demarcated and the difference between the good of inside and the bad 
of outside will be emphasised. Second, without the ability to take recourse to 
coercion or overt leadership, due to the lack of formal regulation, there will be a 
strong tendency towards factions, and mutual allegations of treason or corrup-
tion will be common, as these are the only available sanctions in the organisa-
tion. The issue of risk is perfect for satisfying this need: 
 
The first difference between the border [sect and isolate] and 
center [hierarchy and market] views is about what the future will 
be like. The center takes it to be an extension of the present. 
Sectarians expect discontinuity. They expect a different future and 
they expect it will be bad. Established society is incorrigibly evil, 
being both coercive and hierarchical. It must not be imitated and it 
cannot continue. They have a vested interest in bad news that 
shows the society outside is polluted and also shows that the sect 
inside is pure. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:121-22) 
 
The expectation of future life to undergo radical changes for the worse is a 
means of keeping the group together. The argument in Risk and Culture is there-
fore a basically materialist one when they state that it ‘is not smallness that is 
first loved nor a passion for equality that brings the fraternal sect to pursue its 
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characteristic ends but the reverse. A losing battle against the difficulties for 
voluntary organization presses its members into rejecting increase of scale, pre-
ferring egalitarian rulings, and attempting closure against the rest of the world’ 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:121). On this account sectarian egality has three 
positive commitments: human goodness, equality, and purity of heart and mind. 
It is worldliness, i.e. power and money, which has lead humans astray and cor-
rupted their innate goodness. If only equality could be enforced, and heart and 
mind purified then the good life could be restored. Unfortunately there are con-
spiracies lurking everywhere, corruption is the normal state of affairs and the 
world, essentially a good world, has thus been polluted by the evils of money 
and power. 107 
 
Douglas later seems to have untied the connection to the problems of voluntary 
organisation in a group and begins to articulate this cultural form more generally 
as a social tendency (Douglas 2001). It is in this way that she can identify a po-
litical discourse in which radical critics, who have emancipation and radical po-
litical change as their program, find the context of risk a convenient arena for 
showing, that ‘dangers have been concealed and the public misled’ (Douglas 
1997). For the present purpose it is interesting to note that this enlargement 
keeps the perspective of a kind of ‘reverse causality’ in which the focus on any 
public danger is guided by a general need to find an issue which serves to rein-
force a basic view of power as oppression, and systems and institutions of soci-
ety as corrupted.  
 
On this background I found close affinities between the script of absolute resis-
tance, identified in Chapter 3, and the articulation of sectarian egality. The no-
tion of a maverick science and an immediate need to impose limitations in the 
form of absolute regulations and restrictions bore much resemblance to the iden-
tification of the sectarian resistance towards pollution in America. Both portray 
the world as an endangered place, and the need for reformist action to be ex-
treme. And both portray the dangers of corruption by the worldliness of money 
and power – in the Danish case it is the pure search for knowledge that has been 
                                          
107 As it might be evident, Douglas and Wildavsky draw heavily on different analyses of reli-
gious sects in the characterisation, and they explicitly compare environmental interest groups 
with religious sects. ‘Either God will punish or nature will punish; the jeremiad is the same 
and the sins are the same: Worldly ambition, lust after material things, large organization’ 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:122-23). 
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corrupted by the wish to become master of reproduction. Cloning is articulated 
as a major threat in a society described as a battlefield where science is one of 
the systems of power that threatens to corrupt the community, because it follows 
its own systemic rationality. Furthermore the crucial distinction in connection to 
the definition of actors is whether they belong to the corrupt systems or the en-
claves of resistance.108  
 
Fatalistic isolation 
The fourth mode of articulating the collective is dominated by insulation in the 
form of an experience of minimal autonomy and no sense of group belonging. 
The inhabitants of this kind of articulated collective are articulated as heavily 
restricted by the classifications of the social system, but since they are not mem-
bers of any groups there is no reward for accepting this slot as in the hierarchy, 
where the role comes with privileges as well as obligations (Douglas 1978). Fa-
talistic isolation was left out of the analysis in Risk and Culture and several of 
the later analyses of risk debate, probably because it is not an explicitly formu-
lated position, but more of a residual category. Withdrawal, which is central to 
the description of this mode, is a refusal to engage in a normative debate about 
the condition of the social order, and therefore it does not produce a coherent 
pattern of views on risk or other overtly politicised issues. Later in an essay on 
the ‘Prospects for Asceticism’, Douglas deliberates on this cultural form:  
 
By definition the fourth type is politically mute: it is a social 
environment, which separates individuals, cuts down their 
communication with one another, and limits their options. Such a 
social environment with a high degree of regimentation and no 
clear group affiliation is quite common in complex societies. On 
the fringe of markets are individuals who have little scope for 
trading; on the fringe of hierarchies are other individuals who are 
very weakly enfranchised. They may indeed speculate, but it is 
hardly realistic for such individuals, whose autonomy is severely 
                                          
108 In contrast to chapter 3, I have not found any of the scripts in chapter 4 as fitting with this 
mode of articulating the collective, although I did identify one single article that seemed to 
present the gene therapeutic experiment in this context, see note 33 in chapter 6. In general, 
however, I have found the scripts of anti-scientific information and heroic action to be more 
closely aligned with the fatalistic mode of articulating the collective, as it will appear shortly. 
They criticise science, but they do not present it as a corrupt system that should be fought. 
Rather fatalism with respect to the general trends of society seems to be prevailing. 
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limited, to be conducting a normative debate about how their 
society should be constituted. (Douglas 1996b:45) 
 
Douglas states that just like all the other positions, isolation is a matter of de-
gree, where the decisive question is the experience of restriction of choice.109 In 
the present context I will abstain from talking about isolates as a group of clearly 
defined individuals. Rather we should view withdrawal as the second way of 
resisting the exercise of power. Withdrawing is to refuse to take part in the posi-
tive exercise of power through hierarchy or market. This is the silent resistance, 
but whether it is adopted by choice or forced upon individuals is not the issue in 
this context – analytically both positions exist. 
 
On this account, it is by means of the structural analysis that Douglas can claim 
any coherence in the mode of articulating the collective of isolation. As a matter 
of fact she takes this lack of coherence as the decisive point in the identification 
of the mode of articulating the collective and claims that, individually, isolates 
must be expected to think idiosyncratically (Douglas 1996b:186). The heavier 
the isolation, the more eccentricity can bloom. The mode of articulating the col-
lective of isolation is thus as likely to include witchcraft, vampires or UFO’s as 
modern science and medicine, global warming and carcinogenics:  
 
Their far-out eclecticism has become a protective barrier against 
pressure. Uncommited to persuading anyone to do anything, they 
are not trying to persuade or organize. If they once did such things, 
they have learnt the uselessness of it in their present position. 
Along with being accommodated to isolation comes relief that no 
one expects very much from them. Another experience which they 
all may have, though it would be going too far to call it a shared 
experience, is the sense of pressure lifted. There is less scope for 
disappointment. As to hopes, a dose of fatalism is a good 
adaptation: then there will be no bad surprises. It is not surprising 
                                          
109 The most obvious inhabitants of this corner are the social outcasts, beggars, tramps, poor 
and so on, but also people in the other end of the welfare scale can be said to inhabit this cor-
ner if they do not combine high restriction of choice with a sense of group belonging. She 
even suggests that some ‘choose this cultural niche for personal preference, and live there 
happily, with or without a sufficiency of means. Though others may see their presence as 
proof of victimage, it is not obvious that the inhabitants of the isolates’ quadrant are all there 
unwillingly.’ (Douglas 1996b:184) 
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that the long-term inhabitants of the isolates’ corner have in 
common a tendency to apathy. (Douglas 1996b:187) 
 
This idiosyncrasy is not a result of a failure of education or deficient intellectual 
abilities. Rather it is a result of the social constraints of the isolation. The mode 
of articulating the collective of fatalistic isolation is the mode of articulating the 
collective of the marginalized. It is voiced from an un-accountable position in 
the political struggle over social order. It tends to emerge in sociological ac-
counts as the unpredictable element, and is often articulated as alienated or in-
different. In discussions on environmental risks, accounts subscribing to this 
mode of articulating the collective are often characterised as ‘apathetic’ or ’pas-
sive’ (Douglas 1996b:184). Since these are all de-legitimising terms for this par-
ticular cultural bias, it tends to become confirmed in its marginalized bias. 
Douglas therefore warns us, that trying to evaporate this mode of articulating the 
collective with rational information or incentive systems constructed on values 
from the other articulated collectives would probably have very little effect. As 
response to the perceived lack of autonomy, the mode of articulating the collec-
tive is basically fatalistic about the nature of the universe and its future: ‘True 
isolates live in a state of eclectic openness where anything might be expected to 
happen. Their main freedom is one that other people fight for: freedom to be-
lieve what they like, whenever they like.’ (Douglas 1996b:187) 
 
The second form of opposing the exercise of power must therefore be expected 
to be rather silent. It is the withdrawal from official rationalities – both in terms 
of bureaucratic systems and bartering exchange relations. Fatalism and with-
drawal is the response to the perception of a situation with no possibility of con-
trol or deliberate change for the better. Accepting Douglas’ argument, that iso-
lates will hardly engage in a normative debate about the social order of the good 
society, I found it particularly interesting, that a kind of fatalist stance is easily 
detected in the inscriptions of the concrete cases in Chapters 3 and 4. The fatal-
istic irony deployed in the cloning story has its counterpoint in the articulation 
of chance and heroic action in connection with gene therapy. These inscriptions 
do not formulate a stringent, universal way of doing things right. Rather they 
articulate society and universal institutions like science as completely outside of 
control.  
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In the script of fatalistic irony nothing can be done about Seed. Although clon-
ing is articulated as deeply reprehensible, the only possible action is to laugh at 
him. Science and scientists are mad and perceived as completely beyond control. 
The same can be said of the script of heroic action and anti-scientific informa-
tion in chapter 4, where science is completely disregarded as the way towards a 
cure for cancer. In the super-script of chance every individual is left to try to 
fend for himself in an unpredictable world, where he might be lucky and be 
cured of cancer or other deadly diseases. But this will in no case be due to the 
workings of the system, rather, it will be owed to a lonely hero acting on his 
own accord to try to rescue concrete patients.  
 
Summarising these scripts they articulate society as an anarchic chaos with no 
overarching rules and no mechanism that secures order or justice. Rather, fatal-
ism prevails and every person is left to try to fend for himself, but outcomes are 
basically determined by chance. Furthermore there is no regularity in the defini-
tion of actors, one day’s hero can be the next day’s villain, although there seems 
to be a preference for heroic action, and there is definitely a rejection of the ra-
tionality of systems and authorities defined by systems such as hierarchies and 
markets.   
 
Controversies as cultural dialogue 
Cultural analysis derives its strength from placing controversies at the centre of 
cultural dialogue, which in this theory is equivalent to competing notions of ar-
ticulated collectives. Citing Schwarz and Thompson, Douglas notes that ‘the 
motto for cultural survival is “divided we stand”. Culture thrives on opposition. 
This is such a vital insight for the way that culture generates political debate, 
and so relevant to the environmental issues, that it needs emphasis’ (Douglas 
1996b:175). The fruitful perspective in Douglas’ cultural theory is that it empha-
sises that the dialogue on culture in any given society is inherently adversarial. 
Controversy is part of the normal way of things, and the assignment of blame is 
a central means for culture to express its own logical structure: 
 
Casting blame is one of the quotidian tests of cultural affiliation. It 
follows from the adversarial nature of cultural definition that each 
type of culture has its distinctive pattern of blaming. Who gets 
blamed, and for what? Hierarchy lays blame on weak definition of 
responsibilities, that is, on inadequate organization. Individualists 
blame hierarchists for blocking freedom of action and enclavists 
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[sectarians] for attacking their profits. Dissenting groups are 
essentially organized for moral criticism, their blame tends to be 
cast against the whole system and the badness of people’s hearts.” 
(Douglas 1996b:177) 
 
It is important to remember that in my translation of this approach the articu-
lated collectives are not mysteriously imposed upon individuals from the out-
side. A collective is produced to the extent that articulations keep subscribing to 
it in actual practice. It is a notion about how the world works and it emerges 
from the particular practices of the members of society. Following this line of 
argument, the number of sustainable collectives cannot be determined in ad-
vance. It should rather be regarded as an empirical question. 
 
The typology constructed in this dissertation, however, can be seen as four dis-
tinct ways of constructing arguments in the controversies about biotechnology. 
As mentioned in the introduction to the dissertation, the establishment of a rela-
tion between problems and solutions in an argument can be seen as the applica-
tion of a general notion of how to restore order and reach closure and this in turn 
is the same as articulating the collective in a particular way. After the previous 
presentation of the typology of articulated collectives, I can now be much more 
precise in the identification of these possible ways of creating arguments by in-
voking a particular ideal of restoring the collective order. The idea is that argu-
ments can be classified according to the way they articulate the possibility of 
reaching closure, that is, of solving problems and restoring order, as presented in 
the following list. It should in this context be noticed that although the two ways 
of opposing power are not as oriented towards re-storing order as the first two, 
they still have a distinct way of discussing how problems ideally should be 
solved: 
 
 In hierarchy order is restored by recognising the ordering principle for the 
hierarchy, for instance the knowledge hierarchy of scientific truths or the 
stratified power-positions of a bureaucracy. If a hierarchical order is pre-
sented with a problem it can ideally invoke a general principle from which 
a ‘right’ solution can be deduced, which will close the controversy. Gener-
ally this solution should focus on respect of the hierarchical order and the 
obligation of actors in the hierarchy to assume their prescribed role with 
individual privileges and obligations.  
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 In competitive individualism, reaching closure is equivalent to co-
ordinating different interests and preferences, and this is done through the 
market. The ‘right’ solution will be the one that gains the highest amount 
of backing, for instance as citations, alliances, or even votes, through the 
exchange taking place in the market. 
 In sectarian egality problems are equivalent to corruption or pollution, and 
are ideally solved by identifying the cause and subsequently purifying the 
community by expulsion of this cause. If, for example, scientific truths 
have been taken hostage by worldly considerations, it is important to pu-
rify and expel the corrupting influence, in order to restore the scientific 
ideal of pure knowledge in the interest of the community and the good of 
the people.  
 Finally fatalistic isolation is special because it makes arbitrary or ad-hoc 
connections between problem identifications and ways of solving prob-
lems. Problems occur from somewhere else, as does fortune. Since there is 
no way to change that, the only option is withdrawal. Science might pro-
duce evils, but we might also be lucky: in any case, it is uncontrollable by 
general regulation. 
 
Each mode of articulating the collective defines the social order in a particular 
way. Integrated in this articulation is a distinct way of reaching closure and re-
storing order. And it is also evident that reaching closure is a fundamentally dif-
ferent concept in each of the four modes. What counts as legitimate closure un-
der competitive individualism – the majority decision – is not accepted as le-
gitimate in hierarchy, where there is normally only one ‘right’ solution that 
should be deduced from the hierarchical order. The central feature in political 
controversies, as they are defined in this context, is precisely this kind of dis-
agreement about solving problems and reaching closure and it is fundamental in 
the analytical discrimination between the four modes of articulating the collec-
tive.  
 
It should be emphasised that the analyses are not efforts to show that the contro-
versies are a mere extension of an underlying structure of conflicting articulated 
collectives. They exist, because they are invoked in articulations – not the other 
way around. Therefore I could not say, that these four modes are the only possi-
ble ways of producing or imagining social order, just as I am not able to claim 
that there could not be different scripts implying different articulated collectives. 
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Instead, I view the cultural typology as a conceptual toolbox that I have applied 
because the inductively identified scripts showed significant similarities with the 
four-fold typology.110  
 
At this point I would like to return to the introductory remarks about the prob-
lematisation of science, ethics and public debate. At that point I dismissed using 
a particular definition of these concept and the relation between them, since the 
very definitions of these phenomena were seen as integrated parts of the contro-
versies about biotechnology. Now I am able to present this proposition in a 
much more articulated way. In so far as arguments articulate the collective dif-
ferently they also articulate the phenomena of science, ethics and public debate 
differently. Analysing the arguments in the controversies it should be possible to 
identify patterns in the way these phenomena are defined by following the sub-
scriptions to the articulated collectives. This is what I intend to do in the follow-
ing chapter. Instead of letting the inscription of events guide the analysis, I now 
want to follow the patterns of articulation of arguments according to their sub-
scription to articulated collectives. 
                                          
110 Rather than taking this as any form of proof that I have access to an underlying structure 
that guides the actions of actors engaged in controversies, I take this as a result of constraints 
on social analysis. I had to follow the line of least resistance. Cultural theory provided a short 
cut. 
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Chapter 6 
Regulation of biotechnological research 
- Articulations of science, ethics and public debate 
 
 
In order to understand what follows it may be useful to summarise some of what 
has gone before.  Any newspaper article can be read as both a description of 
events—a story—and as a prescription for action—an argument111.  Many arti-
cles explicitly exhibit one of these aspects, while the other must be considered 
implicit in them.  On my analysis, telling a story is the inscription of an event in 
the articulation of a script, and making an argument is the subscription of an ac-
tion to the articulation of a collective.  (One should perhaps qualify the terms 
‘event’ and ‘action’, with the words ‘purported’ and ‘proposed’, in order to indi-
cate that we are dealing in all cases with mediated representations of realities 
that are not themselves determined by this inquiry.)  The term script here desig-
nates the particular application of those more general cosmologies, which I call 
collectives.  Read as a story, a newspaper article articulates a script, while when 
we read it as an argument, it will come to articulate a collective (or several dif-
ferent collectives).  So far, I have been analysing primarily how events are in-
scribed in newspaper articles as stories.  I will now turn to the question of how 
arguments subscribe to collectives in their articulation. 
 
The analytical direction of the previous three chapters has been one of reduction. 
There, I went from the inscription of events in newspaper articles, through the 
scripts they articulate, to a typology of articulated collectives, which is to say, I 
reduced the multiplicity of differences between the articles to the four fields of 
the typology. In this chapter, I want to change the direction of the analysis and 
use the typology as a structured perspective, one which has been structured pre-
cisely by the stories told in the newspaper articles, in order to look for patterns 
in the way the same articles articulate science, ethics and public debate in the 
mediation of arguments for action.  These phenomena are central to the identifi-
cation of the discursive possibilities for the regulation of biotechnological re-
search. In order to make this move the status of the typology is changed. 
                                          
111 It is of course natural to map this distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive as-
pects of newspaper articles onto the empirical/normative distinction.  It should be kept in 
mind, however, that the standards of journalism offer little guidance in the way of justifying 
empirical claims (as in science) or of legitimating normative ones (as in politics).  
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Whereas it emerged as the result of my investigations in the previous chapters, it 
will here be employed as a point of departure in the form of a structured per-
spective classifying mediated arguments. I am going to propose that such argu-
ments subscribe to particular modes of articulating the collectives, and that this 
subscription can be usefully classified according to the typology that has been 
produced in the previous chapters. 
 
The objective of this analytical change of direction is to explore how the phe-
nomena of science, ethics and public debate are articulated differently in differ-
ent arguments about the regulation of biotechnological research, not how events 
are articulated as stories. It should be mentioned that I have chosen to look at 
regulation of biotechnological research, because this term signifies the intersec-
tion of science and biotechnology. The objective, moreover, is not to try to 
prove the typology of the four forms of articulating the collective right. Since I 
am going to use it as a structured perspective, I will find it in some form or an-
other. But its ontological status, or, more precisely, the ontological status of the 
events and actions articulated, and the structure of the conditions of their possi-
bility, is not the issue in this chapter. Rather than aiming at producing proof that 
the typology is right I am going to use it as an analytical tool for classifying ar-
guments in order to explore the discursive possibilities of regulation.  It is not 
the possibility of the actions and events themselves, but the possibility of their 
articulation that interests us in this dissertation.  And in this chapter the focus 
shifts from purported events to proposed actions, from the telling of stories to 
the making of arguments. From this chapter and onward I am restricted to the 
typology as it is constructed in the previous chapters.  This is not, however, be-
cause the inscription of events is somehow prior to the subscription of actions.  
One has to begin somewhere; but it is important to keep in mind that whatever 
accounts for the commonalities between scripts and collectives is necessarily 
produced simultaneously in the process of mediating the news—the mediation of 
current events and imminent actions. 
 
With regard to the present analysis, the typology of articulated collectives can be 
summarised in the following way, particularly emphasising the specific way ac-
tors are articulated, which is to say, the collectives to which each action must 
subscribe in order to attain articulation: 
 
 154 
 
 Authoritative hierarchy: The collective is organised in hierarchical rela-
tions where every individual person or system has a defined role with re-
sponsibilities, privileges and obligations. Actors are defined according to 
their role or position in the hierarchical order of the whole. 
 Competitive individualism: The collective is a market of bartering rela-
tions where every individual actor is free to negotiate exchange relations 
with all other actors. Actors are defined according to their individual re-
sources, interests, and preferences.  
 Sectarian egality: The collective is a battlefield where systems of power, 
including science, corrupt the community of people, because each system 
follows its own systemic rationality. Crucial in defining actors is whether 
they belong to the systems or to the enclaves of resistance. 
 Fatalistic isolation: The collective is an anarchic chaos with no overarch-
ing rules and no mechanism that secures order or justice. There is no regu-
larity in the definition of actors, although actors perceived as authorities or 
executives of power are rejected. 
 
As mentioned I will now use this typology as a structured perspective, when I 
look for patterns in the arguments about regulation of research. In order to make 
this analysis as transparent as possible it is necessary with some introductory 
remarks about method. They are concerned with the analytical tool of structured 
perspective (how to see) and the identification of ‘arguments about regulation of 
research’ (what to look at). Using the typology to explore how the phenomena of 
science, ethics and public debate are articulated differently, means that the dif-
ferent modes of articulating the collective are employed as four perspectives that 
let the phenomena become visible in different ways. The typology is the set of 
analytical distinctions and each type is seen as a particular perspective that ar-
ticulates the collective in a particular way. Making the typology operational is 
therefore done by treating each form as a perspective according to the defini-
tions presented above. When I employ the perspective of hierarchy I look for 
arguments that subscribe to hierarchical notions of social and natural order. For 
instance I look for arguments where the definition of problems and solutions are 
deduced from an overarching rule, or arguments where the phenomena are pre-
sented as compartments in a larger hierarchy, one, which produces a particular 
set of privileges and obligations on each compartment.  
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This type of analysis can only be conducted on a relational level. Therefore I am 
not classifying arguments as intrinsically or universally hierarchical. Rather, I 
am classifying them as hierarchical in relation to other types of arguments. Fur-
thermore it should be clearly stated that the classification is a matter of degree. 
Some arguments are clearly hierarchical, whereas other arguments are much 
more resistant to classification. This also means that the arguments cannot be 
reduced to the classification. Rather, the meaning of every single argument al-
ways exceeds what can be captured by this classification.  
 
The sample of articles that has been selected for this analysis consists of 104 
opinion pieces (including editorials, essays and letters) about the regulation of 
biotechnological research as described in Chapter 2. Each of these articles has 
been characterised according to the predominant mode of articulating the collec-
tive. Some fall in several categories as they employ different types of arguments. 
As a guide for classification I have formulated the following questions: 
 
 What is it, in the social and natural order, i.e. ‘the collective’ that has to be 
protected?  
 What should it be protected from? 
 How are different entities framed as actors in that order? 
 What are the justificatory arguments put forward on issues concerning 
regulation of biotechnological research. 
 
The following table contains a quantitative description of the distribution of arti-
cles according to these guidelines. Although the figures appear to reveal clear 
differences between the papers, one should be hesitant about putting too much 
emphasis on this, since this categorisation was not conducted with this objective, 
but rather aimed at exploring qualitative differences between the arguments em-
ployed. I will, however, return to this issue in chapter 7.  
 
Figure 6.1 Total Authoritative 
Hierarchy 
Competitive 
Individualism 
Sectarian 
Egality 
Fatalistic 
Isolation 
Politiken 34 (15) 22 (13) 10 (5) 8 (1) 0 
Jyllandsposten 31 (4) 12 (1) 13 (2) 8 (1) 0 
Information 33 (12) 16 (6) 1 (0) 20 (9) 1 
Ekstra Bladet 6 (3) 0 0 2 (1) 4 (2) 
The figures in parenthesis show the number of editorials that has been included in the overall figure. 
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The provisional categorisation of articles according to their predominant type of 
argument, however, is not the main purpose of the analysis in this chapter – 
rather it has been a heuristic device to identify a group of arguments that should 
be further analysed when applying each perspective. What matters in this con-
text, is the qualitative pattern in inscriptions of the phenomena. I have therefore 
proposed that arguments about the regulation of biotechnological research sub-
scribe to different articulations of the collective, and I identify patterns in these 
arguments using the four modes of articulating the collective as analytical per-
spectives.  
 
The following analysis is structured around each perspective. In an effort to en-
hance transparency I begin each section by illustrating how the particular mode 
of articulating the collective can be identified in concrete arguments. On this 
background I explore the inscription of the phenomena of science, ethics and 
public debate in three subsequent sections. I have included a number of exem-
plary quotes, which serves the purpose of illustrating and explicating the analy-
ses, as well as making the presentation more vivid. I have, however, also in-
cluded some quotes that pose problems for the distinctions between perspec-
tives. The reason for this is primarily to enhance transparency of the relational 
analysis, but also to draw attention to its complexity. 
 
Authoritative hierarchies 
The arguments classified as subscribing to the hierarchical mode of articulating 
the collective all emphasise the need to establish or respect a social order of dif-
ferentiation. In this context differentiation means that different actors have dif-
ferent rights and duties according to their societal role. A keyword is responsi-
bility, which implies that the responsible actor is responsible according to a pre-
defined set of rules and practices, to which the actor subscribes, and as result 
acts accordingly. Researchers have to behave properly with respect to the rules 
of conduct for researchers, just as politicians have to behave properly in follow-
ing their prescribed role. In these arguments, regulation of biotechnological re-
search has to be founded or based upon some sort of overarching principle or 
order. Once this order is identified or established it will prescribe a procedure 
for finding the ‘right’ answer to problems, also with regards to how genetic re-
search should be conducted and regulated. The following quote is taken from a 
discussion of the ethical problems connected to the use of human embryos for 
stem cell research: 
 157 
 
 
Up until the 19. Century, Christian philosophers and theologians 
have followed the interpretation put forward by ancient 
philosopher Aristotle and the great theologian of the middle ages 
Thomas Aquinas, that there is a tight connection, a 
complementarity, between material and mental development. On 
this basis it was agreed that the foetus does not have a soul, and 
consequently is not a complete human being, until after 40-80 days 
of development. Foetal stem cells can therefore not in themselves 
be ascribed status and rights as a human being, and it would not be 
an atrocity towards another human being, if these cells were 
exclusively used for cloning and therapy as described above. If, on 
the other hand, the foetus were allowed to develop further beyond 
the first 14 days, where organs have also begun to take shape, it 
would be more alarming to use the foetus or its parts for instance 
as organ transplants.112 
 
With reference to the theological tradition, an overarching principle – the com-
plementarity between material and mental development – is invoked. From this 
principle an ethical stance towards the embryo can be deduced according to 
which, it is not ‘an atrocity’ to use foetal stem cells for research. The interesting 
thing about this quote is, of course, that Christian theology is often invoked with 
precisely the opposite result – the insistence that embryos should not be used for 
research since they constitute the start of a human life. This tension is very im-
portant. Although it is a general assumption in hierarchical arguments that some 
closures in terms of solutions are objectively better than others, there is no 
unanimous agreement about which basic principle, or which interpretation of 
such principles, should be employed to identify the right closure. The common 
feature of these arguments is the notion of a fundamental social and moral order, 
connected to the natural one that constructs the hierarchy and renders it possible 
to discriminate between solutions. The moral order organises social relations, 
but the content of this social and moral order and how it should be established is 
not generally agreed upon, as I will demonstrate in the following.   
 
Many of the quotes present a tension between market forces and freedom of re-
search. Often they do not reject the market forces as a principle for economic 
organisation in companies, but claim that the use of market exchanges should be 
                                          
112 Medical doctor in Information, 5 September 2000: ”Embryos in reserve”. 
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restricted to some areas of society. The regulation of biotechnological research 
especially should be kept outside economic considerations, as it is seen as im-
proper to let economic considerations influence the realm of ‘pure’ science. Also 
knowledge in the form of genetic information about individuals is often articu-
lated as something that should not be treated as a commodity:  
 
Within genetic research a current tightening of conditions which, if 
it is allowed to continue, will have paralysing effects on the 
successive exchange of preliminary results, which is commonly 
regarded a precondition for all serious research. 
Icelandic authorities have granted a company monopoly to the 
mapping of the population’s genome. Considered in terms of the 
ethics of public records, it is a very worrying affair. But also in 
other respects the Icelanders are on the wrong track. A society 
ought not to treat information about the genome of its citizens as a 
commodity that can be sold to the highest bidder. Also it ought not 
to issue monopolies that push research further down the slippery 
slope towards secrecy and enclosure.113 
 
The implied understanding of society is a system of discrete spheres working 
according to their own set of rules and the overarching objective of regulation 
must be to secure these internal systems of norms and regulations. Science (and 
the rights of humans) is placed outside the province of bargaining, since free-
dom of research (understood as an important rule of conduct within the scientific 
system) must not be infringed or contaminated by the market forces and their 
tendencies toward secrecy and closure. Instead science should be regarded as a 
system with an order of its own and specific rules of conduct. Thus we might 
speak of science as a social activity guided by a set of principles establishing an 
authoritative hierarchy.  
 
 
                                          
113 Editorial in Politiken, 26 July 1998: ”The genetic road” (In Danish ’gen-vej’ which also 
means shortcut). As a parenthesis the almost sacred status ascribed to knowledge about the 
human genome is an interesting feature in this quote. It is found in many articles and should 
be object of an analysis in itself. Rabinow argues that a similar feature in French controversies 
should be understood as a distinct cultural trait shaping policy formulations about access to 
genetic information (Rabinow 1999). Here it suffices to say that the sacred status of genetic 
knowledge (as product of genetic technoscience) can be viewed as an extra argument stressing 
the need to deal with genetic knowledge creation in a ‘responsible way’.  
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Science as hierarchy 
Freedom of research is defended in the article quoted above, because it serves a 
purpose of securing ‘serious research’. It is articulated as a necessary precondi-
tion of a properly functioning scientific system. According to this argument the 
dangers that society has to deal with, are external influences on research and 
thus the independence of science has to be secured - if necessary through socie-
tal regulation that restrict market forces. Along these lines, several arguments 
stress the independent nature of the knowledge producing activity of research: 
 
The technological principles of cloning domestic animals are 
almost defined, even though the basic biology in a great many 
details are not yet illuminated or realised. There is still much 
research left to do! But what is the point of this long story? The 
importance of cloning should be viewed as both product and 
process. The product of the technique of cloning is the ability to 
create clones of animals, that is, genetically identical individuals. 
The process on the other side is constituted by the biological 
recognition, which spring from the exploration of the biology of 
cloning. (...) 
The research in cloning has opened the gate to biological cognition 
that will reach far into the next millennium. The exploration of the 
possibilities in this should not be curbed. But the application 
should be debated.114 
 
Here we are presented with a clear-cut division between different domains – a 
principle is established according to which the scientific exploration of possibili-
ties is a matter internal to research, whereas the decision about application is a 
matter of public discussion. As pure cognition, knowledge is articulated as an 
absolute goal in itself, subject only to the internal rules of conduct as prescribed 
by the scientific community. In general, it is not possible from the data in this 
analysis to be very precise about these internal rules of conduct in the scientific 
system. Several arguments hint at the need to respect this kind of rule, for in-
stance in the above mentioned quote about freedom of research, but the rules 
themselves are usually not explicitly identified. I have found it useful to use the 
phrase logic of scientific inquiry as a proxy for an identification of these rules. 
While they are not very clearly stated, the occasional reference to rules of this 
                                          
114 Three clone researchers in Politiken, 25 March 1999: ”Cloning – a new world”. 
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kind could be interpreted as bearing much resemblance to the CUDOS norms as 
put forward by Merton (Kjørup 1987).  
 
It should be noted, that the logic of the argument is dependent on the enforce-
ment of the ideal of a social contract or arrangement, one that allows the scien-
tific community freedom of research in order to produce true knowledge. In this 
connection, freedom of research does not imply complete societal independence 
of the scientific system. Science has a function to serve as the knowledge creat-
ing system of society. Within the limits of this societal role science can be said 
to enjoy the privilege of freedom, but only as far as the obligations connected to 
the privilege are respected. Science has an obligation to create true knowledge 
that can serve as the basis of ‘right’ decisions, and in order to fulfil this obliga-
tion it has the privilege of being free from external interference in the form of 
either money or power. By invoking this notion of a previous societal decision 
of freedom of research, the argument therefore becomes an argument of preserv-
ing the established order. 
 
It should also be noted, that even though the rules of scientific inquiry seems to 
imply freedom of the researcher, it is a very restrained freedom placed within a 
hierarchy. The logic of scientific inquiry can be seen to operate with a distinct 
notion of the better argument. The lesson of various forms of epistemology is 
that in principle, it will always be possible to identify the better argument, and 
thus the most ‘true’ knowledge. Furthermore, viewed as a social practice, re-
search is organised as a very hierarchical system with peer reviews and asym-
metrical roles of responsibility. Therefore it should be noted that it is science, 
and the scientist as an occupational role, that enjoy the privileges of freedom, 
not the individual person occupying the role as scientist. 
 
The argument in favour of the social arrangement that secures the freedom of 
research is often justified in a claim, that if the scientific logic of inquiry is dis-
torted by external influences, science will not live up to its obligations. Only by 
following its own independent hierarchical rules of conduct will it create ‘true’ 
knowledge for the benefit of society. On the other hand, if society accepts this 
division of labour, problems might be solved by biotechnological research itself, 
as it generates better and better knowledge: 
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The use of cloning to produce spare parts for humans raises many 
ethical challenges as previously described. My last point, however, 
is that continued research in the biology of cloning can render the 
use of egg cells and cloned human eggs superfluous. (...) Seen 
through the mist, the horizon research can render cloning as such 
superfluous in favour of the virtual clones; clones that only exist as 
cells and not as individuals. In this light, the use of egg cells and 
cloned human eggs will only be a passing phenomenon, which 
paves the way for the future.115 
 
As this quote illustrates, a problem can be regarded as simply a lack of scientific 
knowledge, and the way to solve such a problem is to allow researchers to do 
their job according to the internal rules for scientific conduct. In this way, crea-
tion of scientific knowledge is central to the possibility of reaching closure, be-
cause it has the ability to eradicate moral dilemmas by creating new knowledge. 
Presented like this, science (as provider of scientific knowledge) is accordingly 
placed in a central position in the hierarchical order of society. Perhaps it is not 
strange that this particular articulation of science is often associated to research-
ers. By this observation I do not imply that researchers are trying to manipulate 
public opinion or acting in an inappropriately strategic manner. Researchers liv-
ing in the world of knowledge hierarchies probably extend this social organisa-
tion to the rest of society, hereby enforcing an ideal of scientific knowledge as a 
general solution to problems. But this is not a necessary pattern, let alone a 
causal explanation. Other researchers or other conditions might lead to other pat-
terns. In this context, however, no researchers argue explicitly against the use of 
scientific knowledge as an important part of reaching closure about questions 
posed by new gene technology.  
 
Ethics as hierarchy 
As I hinted in the beginning of this analysis, there is no unanimous agreement 
on which hierarchical order should be the organising principle. Next to science 
ethics seem to play a common role in establishing a moral order that will pre-
scribe solutions to problems with biotechnological research.  
 
The biotechnological development has led to an increased need for 
judicial protection of the human body. The question is what kind of 
human beings we want to be and whether we use biotechnology for 
                                          
115 Cloning researcher in Jyllandsposten, 25 April 2000: ”The clones are coming”. 
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the benefit of society. It is important to avoid genetic 
manipulations, which driven by an utopian dream of creating 
improved human beings, lead to greater suffering because of the 
unintended consequences of biotechnological interventions. In this 
connection and as a scientific observer on a EU-financed research 
project about bioethics at the Centre for Ethics and Law, 
University of Copenhagen (1995-98), I have been involved in the 
development of a proposal of common ethical principles, which 
will encourage the use of biotechnology for the benefit of human 
kind. We have just published the book Basic Ethical Principles in 
European Bioethics and bio law, Vol I-II (2000) (Ed. Jacob Dahl 
Rendtorff & Peter Kemp), which argues for the principles of 
respect of human autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability as 
basic values for a common European legislation of bioethics.116  
 
The argument points to ethics as a means to reach agreement on the right kind of 
regulation of biotechnological research. It should be stressed at this point, that 
this analysis is not occupied with the ontological status of ethics. Rather, what is 
interesting is to focus on the way ethics is presented as an object in these argu-
ments. It is perhaps not surprising that the previous quote is taken from an ar-
gument made by a person trained in ethics as an academic discipline. Taken at 
face value ethics is portrayed as a set of principles from which the morally right 
regulation can be deduced in this quote. This also seems to imply that clarifica-
tion of ethical principles is a task best left to academics trained in the discipline. 
Identification of the relevant ethical principles and their interpretation thus 
seems to be a task for experts. In this way ethics becomes a hierarchical system 
of statements just as the system of scientific knowledge was presented earlier. 
Again we have a hierarchy, but instead of scientific knowledge claims at the top, 
we now have ethical principles. It should be emphasised that the previous quote 
is extraordinarily explicit in formulating this hierarchy. Most other arguments 
about ethics are less direct in their advocacy for the position that morally right 
regulation can be deduced from ethical principles, but many imply that ethics 
somehow holds the solution to the new challenges posed by gene technology:  
 
In the ethical debate the difference between good and bad is often 
attached to the concepts of natural and artificial. But when the 
boundary between natural and artificial grows diffuse, it becomes 
                                          
116 Social scientist in Jyllandsposten, 24 October 2000: ”Towards a European bio ethic”. 
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difficult to differentiate between good and bad. On the surface it is 
technical progress in the form of gene therapy and cloning that sets 
the agenda, but internally it is just as much a question of new 
points of orientation to latch human existence onto. Ethics, 
therefore, ought to have a central place in public debate about 
technological progress, and we are very happy that The Council of 
Ethics has backed the project [an exhibition at the Science 
Museum on the Future Body] in every possible way, because the 
council, if anybody, has worked to put ethics and technology on 
the agenda.117 
 
This way of understanding the function of ethics is apparently less hierarchical. 
Since ethics should play a part in public debate there are apparently issues to 
debate, but the argumentation is rather vague on this point, as many of the ar-
guments about ethics are. Ethics seems to be taken for granted as a means to 
solve problems in many arguments. But whether it can be viewed as a set of 
principles that can prescribe a clear moral order, or whether it is a set of proce-
dural rules that prescribe a particular type of considerations or reflections, is of-
ten unclear. I will argue, however, that both types can be viewed as hierarchical 
modes of articulating the collective. In the first instance it is obviously a hierar-
chical order that prescribe solutions to problems. In the second instance it is not 
treated as an order that is defined a priori but as a reflexive procedure. The key 
assumption seems to be that through ethical deliberation it will be possible to 
identify the ‘right’ way to act and regulate biotechnological research. In so far as 
this type of argument seems to imply that, although the ‘right’ choices cannot be 
deduced from pre-existing principles, it is still possible to identify a universally 
‘right’ way to act, I have classified it as a hierarchical mode of articulating the 
collective. In the next quote, this is exemplified with the articulation of ethics as 
universal, not just an aggregation of individual preferences on morals:  
 
The ethical challenge has come to stay. We will therefore 
experience that the ethical questioning of progress and rosy 
pictures will continue. The fact that something that is ethically 
contestable is initiated evidently does not mean that the 
contestation will cease. Of course, there is always a tendency for 
human beings to get used to the existence of something, even 
though they strongly opposed its introduction. But, on the other 
                                          
117 External editor in Jyllandsposten, 25 March 2000: ”Future Body” 
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hand, although little resistance towards current legislation on 
abortion can be noticed in the population, the ethical problems 
associated with abortion have not been dispelled – one might even 
say: far from it. (...) Even if the colour turns black, when it should 
have been white, there is no reason to call black ‘white’? There is a 
reason to stick to ethics, because otherwise one will end up losing 
both one’s senses of direction and of colour. As it is known, taking 
an ethical stand is not an unambiguous phenomenon. Everybody 
will probably agree that not everything, which is possible, should 
also be done. But there is no unanimity about where the specific 
limit between ought and ought-not should be put in the concrete 
context. Still everybody ought to agree that a limit has to be set 
somewhere – unless, as mentioned, ethics should be abandoned 
completely.118 
 
Although the quote presents some tensions in terms of whether or not the spe-
cific line can be drawn between black and white, the general implication of this 
argument is that ethics is a guide that can prevent white from turning into black. 
Without ethics, society is left with no means of securing a morally ‘right’ regu-
lation of biotechnological research. Ethics can thus be viewed as a defence 
against the threat of immorality. If ‘we’ as a society do not act ethically respon-
sibly, that is, acknowledge black as black and white as white, we will lose direc-
tion and the ability to distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong.  
 
It should be noted that the quote is taken from an opinion piece by the chairman 
of the Council of Ethics. I do not, however, mean to suggest anything about in-
trinsic motives. Still, explicating the connection between the position as chair-
man and the argument can stress an important part of my understanding of the 
articulated collectives. When the chairman is arguing in favour of ethics as a 
guiding principle it can be viewed as a general statement about the ought of so-
ciety as a whole, but it could also be read as a defence of the function of the 
council. In this connection I want to make the same argument as with research-
ers and the interests of biotechnological research. The fact that the chairman of 
the Council of Ethics is arguing in favour of ethical reflections in society should 
not necessarily be interpreted as an argument designed to serve a particular in-
terest. In fact, if we take the perspective of hierarchy seriously, the causal expla-
                                          
118 Chairman of The Ethical Council in Politiken, 30 December 2000: ”The spread of the eth-
ics of resigning”. 
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nation would be the other way. It is because ‘we’ believe in ethics as a guiding 
principle of moral order, that it makes sense to have a council of ethics employ-
ing ethical principles. As I will show in the section about the perspective of 
competitive individualism, talking about interests is part of a different articula-
tion of the collective. Therefore, if we as readers of the chairman’s argument 
talk about interests we are no longer accepting his articulation of the collective 
as a hierarchy where The Council of Ethics play a role as mediator of ethical 
principles.119 
 
Public debate as vehicle for enlightenment 
In arguments articulating the collective as a hierarchy it is very common to pre-
sent ‘society’ as a ‘we’. It is ‘us’ who have to face the new challenges posed by 
biotechnology and act accordingly. Whether the social order is based on science 
or ethics, the realisation of this order is important for the ability to reach closure 
in controversies, since it is possible to deduce ‘right’ answers from the unifying 
order. For instance, as demonstrated in the section about science as hierarchy, 
closure can be obtained in the form of a solution that initiates120 a search for 
‘true’ knowledge according to the rules of conduct for scientific research. Corre-
spondingly, when ethics is articulated as the guiding order, answers will be pro-
vided if ‘we’ follow prescribed rules of conduct for ethical deliberation as illus-
trated in the previous quotes.  
 
In its full consequence this means that no problems are unsolvable. If they ap-
pear as such, it is because the fundamental guiding order or principle is not clear 
to, or acknowledged by, all members of society. Thus, the fundamental tension 
in a hierarchical order would not be clashes of interests as in the market, but 
rather a question of whether all the parts of the whole are familiar with, and ac-
cept the precedence granted to the whole and the guiding principle that sustains 
the social order. From the hierarchical perspective dissent must be understood as 
a lack of recognition of the fundamental guiding order. In situations of contro-
versy, therefore, the individual elements should be made to see, understand 
                                          
119 Although as we will see, The Ethical Council can also be articulated as an important me-
diator between interests. 
120 This is an important qualification.  Ethical issues are ’closed’ not by solving the original 
ethical problem, but by getting that research underway which will eventually render it obso-
lete.  
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and/or accept this order because this will make them able to recognise the deci-
sions or answers deduced from this order as universally ‘right’.  
 
Can we say that the new knowledge of genetics is a bad 
knowledge? 
Of course not. Genetic knowledge will influence our everyday life, 
our economy, and our culture to same degree as the electronic 
knowledge has done in the last twenty years. We might as well 
realise this. Whether we like it or not; by virtue of genetics we will 
have the possibility of being endowed with a whole new dimension 
of knowledge about life, about our bodies and the risks that might 
threaten it from the inside. 
Society has to take a stand on which kind of knowledge is good 
and which is not from case to case. The individual citizen cannot 
decide on this alone, since genetic knowledge affects just a single 
individual only in extreme cases, and normally also the family of 
the individual. Solely for that reason we must evolve ethical norms 
about the access to knowledge on a societal level. (...) It is an 
important task for experts within the health care sector to pose – 
and possibly answer – the questions, which will make all of us 
wiser. FDB [an association of cooperative grocery stores] will 
initiate general meetings on genetically engineered food. The 
health care authorities have a gigantic responsibility to guide and 
inform the people about the significance of this new knowledge.121 
 
As this quote signifies, social order is not built solely on the aggregation of indi-
vidual preferences, but on a general principle. Decisions on regulation of bio-
technology cannot be left to individuals since they will have an influence on 
more than the individual. Decisions on genetic knowledge affect the whole, not 
just the parts, and therefore societal institutions like ethical norms should regu-
late the use, rather than leaving it to individual preferences. In this case the de-
mand of ‘facing the challenge’ seems to lead to closure in the form of a combi-
nation of expert knowledge and public information. The problem is to a large 
degree constructed as a lack of information and the solution is found in the dis-
semination of expert knowledge, with responsibility for this dissemination proc-
ess assigned to the authorities. 
 
                                          
121 Editorial in Politiken, 2 October 1999: ”Genetically seen”. 
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This quote hereby subscribes to a highly hierarchical notion of science commu-
nication, with ‘knowledge’ or experts at the top and ignorance at the bottom. 
The necessity of accepting this hierarchical order is stressed by the insistence, 
that we cannot escape this new knowledge. Thus being a responsible citizen re-
quires understanding and knowledge of genetics as well as awareness of knowl-
edge hierarchies. And correspondingly: developing proper regulation of bio-
technological research is primarily a question of following expert advice. Ac-
cording to this quote the dangers that society has to deal with is predominantly 
ignorance. Biotechnological research has the capacity of transforming society, 
and as experts and citizens we must take part in a general process of science 
communication in order to fight ignorance. Not being part of this enlightening 
communication, either as sender or receiver, is irresponsible, since it might lead 
to in-correct and therefore ‘wrong’ perceptions of genetics. As it is put in an-
other editorial in Politiken that warns against genetic determinism: ‘If we are not 
very careful, the genetic discourse will install itself where myth and fairy tales 
hang out’122. In this way genetic knowledge is not something to take lightly. It is 
serious business and has to be handled with care. 
 
Public debate is seen as a central mechanism for this process of information that 
is expected to lead to closure in the controversies about biotechnology. It is 
through communication in a public sphere that the members of society can be 
generally educated and cultured as particular elements in the social order and 
hereby become aware of the connection between their particular role and the 
unity of social order. Rather than using force to enforce the hierarchical order, it 
seems that the hierarchical order is supposed to be persuasive by nature. If indi-
viduals are just made aware of the reigning order they will accept it and behave 
accordingly. Consequently, neglect of this order is presented as a result of igno-
rance. Problems arise because people do not have sufficient knowledge about 
the hierarchical order, whether in the form of science or ethics. Therefore 
enlightenment seems to hold the key to reach closure in controversies. If ‘we’ 
(inside the hierarchical order) just inform and communicate the hierarchical 
principle clearly enough then ‘they’ will understand and accept the ‘right’ an-
swers as deduced from this principle.  
 
                                          
122 Editorial in Politiken, 27 June 2000: ”Book of Life”. 
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In this way enlightenment, as a process of ‘bildung’ or general education (some-
times also translated as ‘edification’), is to ensure that individuals in society can 
and will conduct themselves in a proper way, just like experts and individuals 
occupying other hierarchical positions should behave properly. Public debate is 
thus a means of diffusing knowledge about the hierarchical order with the pur-
pose of shaping the individuals as virtuous members of society, so that contro-
versies can be solved in an amicable fashion. On this background it is possible 
to construct the following scheme for the inscription of science, ethics and pub-
lic debate. 
 
Figure 6.2 Science Ethics Public debate 
Hierarchical  
Authority 
Institution prescrib-
ing a logic of scien-
tific inquiry for es-
tablishing true an-
swers 
Institution of ethical 
principles or proce-
dural rules for iden-
tifying morally 
‘right’ answers 
Vehicle for inform-
ing and enlightening 
the public about the 
hierarchical order 
 
 
Competitive individualism  
The change of perspective from hierarchy to competitive individualism makes 
other patterns in the analysed arguments come to the fore. The crucial feature for 
classifying arguments as subscribing to the competitive perspective is that they 
articulate the collective as an exchange mechanism where closure is reached by 
mediating between the preferences of the individual actors. Actors do not oc-
cupy roles as they do in the hierarchical perspective, rather they are seen as 
autonomous individuals characterised by a unique set of interests, preferences 
and resources. As a mechanism of co-ordination, it is the market that makes the 
individual actors negotiate with each other in order to pursue their own interests 
for mutual benefit. All actors are free to negotiate or withdraw, so the shared 
agreement has to hold more benefits than risks. This evaluation, however, is 
changing all the time depending on the immediate identification of risks and 
benefits, as demonstrated in the following quote taken from an editorial about 
the birth of five cloned pigs:  
 
In the wake of Dolly, all the bio-ethical committees of the world 
were mobilised, EU considered if grounds existed for an overall 
legislative reform on cloning, and German opinion, loaded as it 
was with the memory of the nazi’s eugenics, was horrified. The 
commotion was understandable and inevitable, but three years and 
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so many words later, more sober considerations in the debate on 
cloning, are required. The immediate prospects of this week’s pig 
clones is not airy, but very tangible, as it was instantly experienced 
by the company behind the clones in the form of pronounced stock 
increase. The company hopes to be able to introduce genetically 
modified organs of pigs designed for human beings within just four 
years. Everywhere in the world there is a shortage of human organs 
for transplants. This shortage could be remedied if organs can be 
‘grown’ in pigs. The prospect is frightening for most people, but 
difficult to argue rationally against, if the alternative to the 
transplant of pig’s organs is to let people in need of organs die.123 
 
Several aspects seem important in this quote. As a starting point it is interesting 
to note the ease with which the economic aspects for the company involved are 
presented. In contrast to the arguments subscribing to the hierarchical perspec-
tive, this argument treats it as a ‘normal’ and perfectly acceptable strategy of a 
private company to pursue this technology. The main justification is the hope of 
producing a useful and working solution to the problem of organ transplants. In 
this way research is defined as a way of creating solutions to problems just as 
we have seen in the previous section. Here, however, there is no mention of spe-
cific rules that has to be observed if science is to bear fruit, as it was the case 
with the logic of scientific inquiry identified in the hierarchical mode or articu-
lating the collective. Quite on the contrary the fact that research is taking place 
within a private setting, does not seem to make any difference to the outcome. 
The only thing that seems to matter in the end is whether or not a solution to the 
shortage of organs is provided. Secondly it is interesting to notice, how resis-
tance to cloning is presented as an initial ‘commotion’, which is now to be su-
perseded as we ‘sober up’ and see the real possibilities. It is not because it is 
‘right’ in any universal way to use the organs of pigs for transplantation, but be-
cause it is useful. Thus, fear must be succeeded by a utilitarian contemplation of 
the great prospects in the technology.  
 
                                          
123 Editorial in Politiken, 20. March 2000: ”Five small pigs”. Reading through this quote, the 
references to the German public should be noticed, since it is not more than a couple of chap-
ters ago that I showed how the editorials in Politiken also explored the connections between 
eugenics and the prospect of human cloning brought about by Dolly. The fact that the same 
newspaper articulates several contradictory statements is, however, not a central issue in this 
dissertation, but could be interesting to pursue in further research. 
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Central in this perspective is that it is not universal norms or hierarchical orders 
that have to be protected through regulation of biotechnological research. Rather 
it is the autonomy of the individual that has to be protected from attacks, but 
since the autonomy of some, however, can infringe the autonomy of others, 
some regulation can be necessary. This is exemplified in many calls for prohibi-
tion of reproductive human cloning as a result of the public announcement made 
by Antinori and his team of researchers of their efforts to clone humans for re-
productive reasons:  
 
 An uncomfortable consequence of the mad scientists’ 
misanthropic experiments with human individuals can be that 
politicians overreact and also prohibit therapeutic cloning, which 
will cure illnesses and ease suffering. There is an urgent need for 
political systems all over the world to manifest the inviolability of 
the human individual without putting unjust obstacles in the way of 
responsible research, which in spite of everything, is by far the 
most all-encompassing. The boundary runs between individual and 
non-individual.124 
 
This quote is characteristic because it seems to incorporate some of the elements 
from the hierarchical mode as illustrated in the previous section. Talking about 
responsible research and about making the inviolability of the human individual 
manifest seems to imply a hierarchical order of an absolute limit, from which a 
moral can be deduced. I have, however, classified this as subscribing to a per-
spective of competitive individualism because of the pragmatism it also articu-
lates. Reproductive cloning is articulated as wrong because it has no benefits 
(but poses many risks such as disabilities and abortions), whereas therapeutic 
cloning is seen as beneficial and therefore should be permitted. In addition it is 
explicitly stated that it is important not to ‘overreact’, hereby prohibiting a po-
tentially beneficial type of research, just because some villains take ‘unjust’ ad-
vantage of the individual right to pursue private goals.  
 
In this connection, two things must be considered. First of all, even though the 
prohibition of human cloning is often discussed as a major manifestation of a 
limit, it can be viewed as mere gesture from a utilitarian point of view, since it is 
not an actual impediment to any established kind of research in Europe. It is not 
that the prohibition actually restrains any Danish researchers from following 
                                          
124 Editorial in Jyllandsposten, 10 August 2001: ”Crazy research”. 
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their research interests. Actually, the unquestioned positive assessment of thera-
peutic cloning also put forward in this quote underlines this point. Only a couple 
of years earlier the same newspaper gave editorial space to arguments against 
human cloning as such. In the meantime, however, it seems that therapeutic 
cloning has crossed the line of estimated benefits, and is now unquestionably 
valued as a technology holding great prospects for the future. Seen in this light, 
the prohibition could be understood as a case of prohibiting what no one really 
wants anyway, hereby leaving another door open for the pursuit of therapeutic 
cloning.125 
 
Secondly the marking of the ‘individual’ as setting a limit should be noticed. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 human cloning can be seen as touching upon some cen-
tral values of individuality in the western world. In line with the presentation in 
the previous chapter, it is possible to argue that the notion of individuality has a 
special function in arguments articulating the collective as competitive individu-
alism. Markets presuppose individual preferences, interests, resources, and ac-
tors that are able to negotiate freely with each other. On this basis it is not just an 
empty gesture for arguments subscribing to this mode of articulating the collec-
tive to hold individuality sacred. It has a much more central position in this per-
spective, than in the hierarchical mode of articulating the collective, where roles 
seem to be more important than the actors occupying them.  
 
The invisible hand of scientific progress 
During the analysis I have found it difficult to establish clear-cut distinctions 
between the way science is inscribed in the competitive mode versus the hierar-
chical mode of articulating the collective. I will return to the similarities later, 
but in this section I have employed a distinction between actor and institution as 
discriminator, and I have used very distinct definitions of the two. In the hierar-
chical mode science is an institution of rules and norms of behaviour. In the 
competitive mode science is constituted as an actor with interests and prefer-
ences, able to mature and provide solutions to problems:   
 
Gene technology is maturing within two important areas – health 
care and food. In just a few years it will be possible to treat 
                                          
125 Priest makes same kind of argument when she argues that cloning gets so much attention 
because it is less important for influential actors and that media coverage tends to follow the 
path of least resistance (Priest 2001c). Ascribing this tendency to particular intentional sub-
jects, however, cannot be sustained in this dissertation. 
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diseases and make diagnoses in a completely new way. (...) This 
will also contribute to the creation of an impression that everything 
is possible – that anything can be done. These technologies will be 
the ‘iron horse’ of the future just like the steam locomotives at the 
turn of the last century were the symbol of progress and new times. 
These technologies will be part of sustaining the idea that the 
world can change for the better. We will recover a belief in the 
future for two reasons. First of all because it is a very long time 
since we last believed in the future, and secondly because the new 
technological possibilities make us able to believe in progress and 
a better future.126 
 
Here it is very clear that the hope for the future is based on a un-problematised 
expectation that biotechnological research will provide solutions to problems. 
Science is a resource in the creation of the ‘better world of the future’ and there-
fore it is an important part of society. But it should be noted that it is not a de-
fence of the institution of science as a knowledge hierarchy. Science is not im-
portant as a system in itself, but as a means, a resource, it is a central activity in 
society. Another version of this future optimism is found in the following quote, 
where the author is arguing in favour of a concept of trans-humanism as a suc-
cessor of traditional humanism:  
 
Many traditional humanists feel that human dignity is threatened 
by these new possibilities because if our DNA is as easy to change 
as that of a banana fly, and if our personality can be changed by 
Prozac, what is it that separates us from animals and dead objects? 
But they overlook that human dignity does not have to be based on 
an argument that humans are better than other things. It can instead 
be based on our unique ability to choose what we will become. We 
do not get our dignity because we accept our limitations but 
because we evolve. That, which impedes our progress, is the real 
threat to human dignity. Many people fear the future, because it is 
unknown and insecure. Many feel an urge to stop and control 
progress. One would rather say no thanks to new possibilities in 
order to avoid new threats or new moral problems. (...) [But] in the 
perspective of trans-humanism it is only now that human beings 
have the possibility of really becoming free. We can free ourselves 
from the limitations put on us by evolution, and become what we 
                                          
126 Future researcher in Jyllandsposten, 3 January 1999: ”The novel times and the novel time-
spirit”. 
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really want. It is not easy, and there will always be risks. But we 
can use our rational senses to find good solutions, both individually 
and in common. It is better to be tolerant and let people be at 
liberty to try different methods, than to try to force everybody to do 
the same; partly because we are individuals with different goals 
and partly because it could easily have disastrous results to force a 
bad solution on everybody.127 
 
In this quote hope for the future is explicitly connected to a view of society as 
consisting of individuals pursuing different goals with different means. It is 
worth noticing how the common good is reached by letting people follow their 
own individual interests, rather than seeking a common principle or rule accord-
ing to which everybody should act. In this way the development of biotechnol-
ogy is articulated as following a similar logic to the invisible hand of the market. 
If we all pursue our individual goals unhindered, the result in terms of new solu-
tions will be most beneficial to all. The quote explicitly argues against hierar-
chies of knowledge claims by claiming that the real impediment to human dig-
nity is restraints of all kinds. In making this argument, a general notion of pro-
gress is invoked, one in which progress is defined in terms of human ambition to 
break free of unspecified constraints imposed by nature or origin. Evolution 
rather than confinement is the central feature of human dignity and evolution 
equals progress in this context. 
 
This goes directly against the claims made in the previous section where human 
dignity had to be protected by rules or principles. In competitive individualism, 
the social order is not constructed around a norm prescribing the ‘right way’ to 
act. Rather than establishing a set of roles with corresponding privileges and ob-
ligations, this notion of social order depicts a lot of individual actors (which can 
also be research groups, organisations and so on) pursuing their own interest. 
What is central is that this pursuit of individual interests is seen as resulting in 
the general prosperity of society as such. Thus freedom of research can also be 
defended in this type of argument. It is, however, not a rule of conduct but a 
question of autonomy based upon the notion of an invisible hand of scientific 
progress. In this perspective science (or a group of researchers) is constructed as 
a social actor with particular interests and characterised by its potential as a 
knowledge producing resource.  
                                          
127 Scientist in Jyllandsposten, 5 December 2000: ”Human kind 2.0”. 
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Ethics and the regulation of market imperfections 
In the quote above it seems to be a consequence of this perception of society that 
regulation should be minimised or even abandoned completely in order to let all 
actors pursue their individual preferences for the common good. As mentioned 
above, however, most of the arguments articulating the collective as composed 
of actors with interests and preferences that need to be co-ordinated through 
some kind of market, do not explicitly argue in favour of no regulation at all. It 
seems that in order to let individuals pursue their own interests, it is necessary to 
have some general regulation that will sustain or secure freedom of the individ-
ual. In the following quote the call for regulation is put forward by a chairman of 
the association of laboratory technicians arguing for the right of technicians to 
refuse work that transgresses a personal ethical limit: 
 
We all have our individual ethical politics of limitation, and for 
most of us it becomes particularly clear when it pertains to the 
beginning and end of human life. (...) Some – probably many – 
welcome the new technologies and seek jobs within avant-garde 
areas like fertility and gene technology. For others the almost 
surprising pace of scientific progress implies that they feel 
pressured into a dilemma of “quit” or “transgress your limits”. I do 
not consider this a fair choice. Although an employer always 
should be able to presuppose a certain professional flexibility of an 
employee, it must be possible to draw a line between what is just a 
new, different, and perhaps unpleasant, professional method, and a 
technique which touches upon our most fundamental perceptions 
of creation, life, and death. (...) The limit ought to be drawn once 
and for all in parliament with a legislation, that protects health care 
personnel against the pressure to participate in those parts of 
modern research and treatment, that it is against their personal 
ethics, especially on the subjects of life and death.128 
 
In this argument ethics has become an individual question of personal limits, 
and regulation is necessary to secure this right to choose. Everybody is entitled 
to his or her own personal ethic, but in order for this right to be safeguarded, the 
collective should protect it through legislation. In juridical terms one could 
speak of a negative right – the right to be free to choose for your self. It is inter-
esting how this argument, which is advanced by a union leader in favour of the 
                                          
128 Chairman of laboratory technicians in Jyllandsposten, 19 September 1997: ”But mice are 
squashed”. 
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protection of union members, in this way becomes very similar to traditional 
liberal perceptions of personal freedom.  
 
In this way, a positive association between a pragmatic evaluation of risks and 
benefits, and regulation in order to protect individual freedom can be identified. 
I will argue that this association is constructed around the particular articulation 
of science as an actor constituted by its resources and interests. As discussed 
above it is central to let all actors utilise their resources and follow their inter-
ests, since on a collective level, this is seen as leading to prosperity. Thus a key 
issue proves to be the protection of the individual freedom of different actors 
that might have conflicting interests. Science should pursue its own interests in 
terms of the search for true knowledge, but this pursuit should not impede the 
freedom of other actors to pursue their interests. Legitimate closure, is therefore 
a pragmatic regulation that can balance interests for the common benefit of all 
parties in society. Private interests can thus become a problem if they go directly 
against public interests or interests of other parties. This can be compared to the 
way the state can be seen to regulate market imperfections in the capitalist econ-
omy. Throughout the history of political theory it has often been argued that in 
the capitalist state it is necessary to regulate in order for the market mechanism 
to function in the most rational way, as well as prohibit stronger parties (or vil-
lains) from taking unjust advantage of the honest and/or weaker parties.  
 
Another example of this protection of the weaker parties is found in the follow-
ing quote. It is taken from an argument about the possible legalisation of re-
search in stem cells, where the ethical question put forward is the status of the 
foetus: 
 
What is a human being really? Should a lump of cells be allocated 
human worth, merely because it contains human DNA or does it 
take more than that? 
Personally I would like to set the limit at the ability to perceive 
pain. The precondition of the perception of pain is a primitive, but 
organised central nervous system. A newly fertilised egg is not 
able to perceive pain. The foetus is probably not able to feel pain 
until the twentieth week of pregnancy.129 
 
                                          
129 Medical doctor in Politiken, 22 April 2000: ”What is human life”. 
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Following this line of argument it is the foetus as individual that should be pro-
tected, not the universal idea of the fertilised egg as the beginning of human life. 
A foetus able to feel pain should be protected because individuals should not 
purposely be subjected to pain. But the foetus does not represent a general prin-
ciple of life that should be protected as such. The quote illustrates ethics as a 
concrete consideration protecting the weaker parties, which again, can be com-
pared to the state protecting the weaker parties in the capitalist economy. Con-
cerning the stem cells, however, the argument leads to the following presenta-
tion of the ethical problem: ‘Should blind life in the form of stem cells be allo-
cated worth in such a way so this “human worth” prohibits cultivation of stem 
cells, which could save lives and prevent severe suffering?’130 Put in this way 
the argument is strictly utilitarian, as the way to reach closure is to find a way of 
exploiting biotechnology, so that it brings the largest amount of benefit at the 
smallest amount of costs or risks. In this context it becomes difficult to distin-
guish between perspectives, because if utilitarianism becomes an overarching 
ethical principle, then it turns out as a hierarchical system of rules for producing 
the ‘right choices’ like in the following quote:  
 
In short, it is a consideration of the quality of human life that calls 
for correction, the prevention of disease, the manipulation of 
genes. But this consideration also speaks in favour of gene 
manipulation for enhancement. It is of course true that we never 
with certainty will know if a given genetic measure will actually 
advance the quality of life of future generations. In short, there are 
risks connected to the use of gene technology on humans. 
Naturally, this is not something special pertaining to the use of 
gene technology. Any new technology implies risk. So when we 
ask ourselves whether it is morally defensible to introduce a new 
technology we ought to weigh estimated positive consequences 
against estimated negative consequences. (...) To prohibit gene 
manipulation seems to be the same irrational reaction as that of the 
absolute monarch when he orders the killing of the messenger of 
bad news. None of the described arguments against enhancing 
eugenics seems valid. Most of us have a certain emotional 
dissociation to eugenics. Since this dissociation cannot be backed 
by arguments, we ought to free ourselves from it.131 
                                          
130 Medical doctor in Politiken, 22 April 2000: ”What is human life” 
131 Assistant professor in Philosophy in Jyllandsposten, 10 October 2000: ”Future Body: 
Would it be bad, if we were improved?” 
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In this quote utilitarianism, in terms of the weighing of positive and negative 
consequences, is articulated as a general principle that can provide a universal 
answer to questions of right and wrong, and in this way it must be classified as 
hierarchical. On this basis, it can be argued that utilitarianism in its pure form 
should not be classified as competitive individualism, because it gives prece-
dence to a hierarchical norm from which ‘right’ answers can be deduced. In the 
actual classification of arguments, however, this ambiguity has been treated as a 
question of the context of the argument. Is the point to argue for the existence of 
utilitarianism as a general argument or is it to use the utilitarian notion as basis 
for a pragmatic evaluation of pros and cons? In competitive individualism the 
essential characteristics are pragmatism, the concrete, contextualisation in time 
and space, and the evaluation of risks and benefits by individual and autono-
mous actors operating to pursue their own interests. When regulation is neces-
sary it is in order to remedy concrete imperfections, not in order to protect a uni-
versal norm.  
 
Public debate as a market of opinions 
A second insight clarified by the previous quote is the way in which the aggre-
gation of preferences seems to be the means to reach closure in the controversies 
and to attain co-ordination in society. A reason for considering the previous 
quote as basically hierarchical is that within the perspective of competitive indi-
vidualism it cannot be claimed, that ‘most of us have an emotional opinion, 
which is incorrect’. In classifying an argument as subscribing to competitive in-
dividualism, it is precisely a central element that there is no extrinsic norm, to 
which actors can refer in order to deduce determinate answers. Rather, actors are 
stuck with all the other actors with special preferences and interests, when trying 
to reach co-ordination in society and legitimate closure on questions of regulat-
ing biotechnological research.  
 
On this basis public debate takes on a different function than in the hierarchy. 
There it was a means to diffuse knowledge of hierarchical order. In the competi-
tive mode of articulating the collective, public debate becomes a vehicle for ne-
gotiation or mediation between different interests and preferences. Arguments 
can be voiced and mediated with each other, but how this mediation precisely is 
to result in closure and co-ordination is a matter of less clarity:  
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The Council of Ethics has now expressed its opinion on therapeutic 
cloning, and a majority of its members endorse the idea that it 
should be allowed to clone cells from the early human embryo in 
order to produce stem cells, which – in theory – can be used in the 
treatment of a number of diseases. (...) We are – after careful 
consideration – in almost total agreement with the majority of the 
Council of Ethics. We open the door to organ fabrication – but we 
do not have to let human cloning be the consequence. A vibrant 
debate should be the basis of clear international regulation in the 
field, so that we do not end up with industrial technology, without 
having consulted the public.132 
 
The implications of the last sentence in the quote are that it is justifiable to go 
ahead with industrial implementation if the public agrees. In this context, the 
public and the presence of ‘vibrant debate’ become the ultimate criteria of ac-
ceptability of the technology, not an overarching principle, or rule. It should be 
noted that the phrasing ‘vibrant debate’ (‘levende debat’) rests upon the particu-
lar Danish tradition in discussions on theories of democracy mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis. The Danish theologian Grundtvig used the expression 
of ‘the living word’ (‘det levende ord’) as a phrase designating continuous gen-
eral education within the ‘people’. Later, another theologian, Hal Koch, elabo-
rated this notion further to a particular definition of ‘democracy as dialogue’. In 
this ideal of democracy, closure is ideally created as consensus through media-
tion of arguments. At length the quote can thus be seen to invoke an ideal of the 
public sphere as a means to reach some kind of negotiated settlement, or even 
full consensus, on the regulation of biotechnological research.  
 
Consensus, however, is not a necessity in the present definition of the perspec-
tive of competitive individualism. In principle, closure can be reached through 
voting or other quantitative methods of aggregating individual preferences. 
Rather, the central feature of public debate is the possibility of mediating be-
tween interests and preferences. Co-ordination consists of taking as many things 
as possible into account, and then trying to reach a compromise from these di-
verse considerations: 
 
My wish will be, that you [the youth] will not let yourself be 
directed by misguided despondency that the trend cannot be 
                                          
132 Editorial in Politiken, 1 March 2001: ”The limit”. 
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curbed, but that you will be part of setting the agenda for the path 
that progress should take – therefore, have courage. That you may 
not let yourself be directed by economic considerations alone, but 
that you will also let ethics, environment etc. play a decisive role – 
therefore, take responsibility. That you will question the 
everlasting demand for rapid decisions since your choice touches 
upon fundamental values, including what has been termed the 
wealth of nature and the nature and dignity of human beings – 
therefore, demonstrate humility and caution.133 
 
In this quote the mediation between considerations should be guided by courage, 
responsibility, humility and caution, but it is essential that the process of media-
tion be presented as ‘choices’. In this way social order cannot be deduced from a 
universal, absolute or hierarchical norm, but has to be determined by choice. 
And this is how I have differentiated it from the notion of enlightenment in the 
previous section as means of achieving closure. Whereas arguments subscribing 
to hierarchy conceived of public debate as means to identify the basic principle 
that should be the foundation for closure, arguments subscribing to competitive 
individualism inscribe public debate as a vehicle for continuous negotiation and 
mediation in which closure is always contextual. On this background the inscrip-
tion of science, ethics and public debate in arguments subscribing to an indi-
vidualistic mode of articulating the collective can be summarised in the follow-
ing scheme: 
 
Figure 6.3 Science Ethics Public debate 
Competitive Indi-
vidualism 
Resource in society 
producing solutions 
to present problems 
according to the 
invisible hand of 
scientific progress 
Ethical choices are 
sum of individual 
preferences, some-
times pointing to 
necessity of regulat-
ing market imper-
fections 
Vehicle for prag-
matic and contex-
tual mediation be-
tween different in-
terests and prefer-
ences 
 
 
Sectarian egality 
As mentioned previously, authoritative hierarchy and competitive individualism 
are the two basic ways of exercising power. In the present analysis, no assump-
                                          
133 Chairman for the Council of Ethics in Jyllandsposten, 1 January 2000: “The genetic cock-
tail”. 
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tions are made about the executive power of subjects. Still, it is possible to say 
that the two perspectives seem to subscribe to an ontology that includes some-
thing like beneficial positions of power, since they articulate society as a man-
ageable entity where commonly beneficial closure can be the outcome of con-
troversies. Whether legitimate closure emerges through a universal norm guid-
ing hierarchical order, or through the co-ordination of interests and preferences 
in the market, exercises of power can be based on a commonly accepted order to 
the benefit of the collective.  
 
When we shift the perspective to see the collective in terms of sectarian egality 
and fatalistic isolation, this notion of legitimate closure and exercise of power 
for the common good disappears. These ways of articulating the collective rep-
resent perspectives of counter-power and protest, where society is not articulated 
as a positively ordered entity. Rather, the prevailing social order is articulated as 
the problem, either because it is problematic in itself or because it is non-
existing. The two ways of problematising social order points to two different 
ways of opposing the exercise of power. Whereas opposition in the sectarian 
perspective is shaped as radical activism, the perspective of isolation results in 
fatalism and withdrawal. It should be remembered that this is an analysis of ar-
guments, not of individuals or power structures. I look at the articulation of so-
cial order in the arguments, but I do not thereby claim that the subjects present-
ing these arguments have some kind of essence as critical activists or isolates. 
The reason for using the somewhat uncommon vocabulary of modes of articulat-
ing the collective is precisely to keep the status of these types as articulated col-
lectives not as real-types of individuals firmly and continuously in view.  
 
In the sectarian mode of articulating the collective, society is a battlefield, where 
systems of power corrupt the community of people. When the collective is ar-
ticulated in this mode, the notion of invisible corruption or disguise is central. 
Although science looks like progress the ‘real’ consequences are hidden and 
hideous: 
 
And we have seen them as highlights in the history of civilisation: 
“Edison, Ford, Niels Bohr – only long after their glorious time 
have we realised the unintended consequences: the cities, the cars, 
the bombs. It is actually not until recent years more people start to 
realise that there can be a reason to call it quits. (...) 
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We are saying no, to the trend as it looks today – we fools. 
Because the brave new world is not our world, not the world we 
wish for the future. Think about the whole world ruled by a 
handful of resourceful brains sitting at a round table. Buried in 
curves and calculations. With all the recent stock prices and data 
on the screens around them. With only one criterion for the 
decisions they are going to make: What will they gain in terms of 
money. 
And where do you think you would be in this scenario? Probably 
scrapped with all the other underprivileged. Like Jeppe. And then 
Klods-Hans comes riding his goat – with mud in his pocket. I wish 
for a world with humour. With life and with humanity. I want birds 
around me. Mates, who thrive. Forests. Meadows. Pure water. 
Fertile land. Solidarity with people of other countries. Buddhists. 
Bushmen. Bolivians.134 
 
Several things should be noticed in this quote. Of interest is first of all, the way 
the scientists and their innovations are articulated as apparent high points of 
civilization, but lead to a terrible form of capitalist oligarchy. The conspiratorial 
form of this argument unambiguously place science in cahoots with the enemy, 
around the same table, which in this case organises a mixture of capitalism, uni-
fication, industrialisation and exploitation.  
 
Secondly the implied difference between surface and ‘reality’ should be noticed.  
It is only on the surface that science looks like progress, and that opposition 
looks foolish. Just like it is at the surface that the rivals of Klods-Hans look 
smarter than him. But when reality is unveiled it becomes obvious that the 
pleasant looking surface is mere appearance, disguising a radically different and 
hideous reality. Biotechnological research does not bring real progress, but 
rather domination. Fools are not idiots, but rather freedom fighters and so on. In 
this line of argument the crucial issue is to become aware of this discrepancy 
between surface and reality. To realise, that even if a technology presents itself 
as progress, it is not necessarily so. On a general level it can be noticed, that this 
                                          
134 Member of an NGO in Information, 24 February 1998: ”Genes are not Lego blocks”. 
Jeppe is a famous Danish literary figure, a drunk who is treated as baron for a day and then 
thrown back on the dunghill to the amusement of the baron and his friends. Klods-Hans is 
taken from the fairy tales of H.C.Andersen and can in this context be seen as exemplifying the 
ordinary person with no respect of hierarchies or people of larger resources, who wins the 
princess and half the kingdom on this account. 
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line of argumentation rests upon an emphasis of uncertainty as justifying precau-
tion. Because the scientific progress has also included negative consequences in 
the past, this should lead to more precaution in the future. In this way the criti-
cism of progress rests upon the establishment of an ideal of progress as some-
thing that ought to be unconditionally good.  
 
Science on the slippery slope of corruption 
Sectarian modes of articulating the collective can be seen to have high expecta-
tions of what science hypothetically is able to provide. As mentioned above, 
‘real’ scientific progress is supposed to provide benefits without drawbacks in 
terms of risks and side effects. In this way they often present an ideal about 
‘true’ scientific knowledge that will be beneficial to everybody in society and 
support the common life of people in an entirely positive fashion. This, how-
ever, is the ideal of science, whereas the articulation of the tangible scientific 
activity is presented as an ambiguous phenomenon. In the following quote the 
present stage of biotechnological development is articulated as a dilemma that 
can be solved only by realising that there is a discrepancy between surface and 
reality. Even though scientific growth looks like progress we have to realise that 
it really is degradation:  
 
For many years now, the ethical debates that follow any new 
biomedical initiative has been in a dilemma. Techniques have been 
developed, which on one hand sound like good aids, for example in 
fulfilling adults dream of the enrichment in life that children are, 
but on the other hand these techniques are an expression of the 
degradation of the human being. (...) Every time a new method is 
introduced as a step towards the future land of milk and honey, it is 
a dilemma to say no. We are stuck on a slippery slope where every 
medical conquest is only a small step. It is tough to have to say no, 
because then you are a bad person, who does not grant other people 
the quality of life that you have yourself!135  
 
The slippery slope is a commonly used metaphor in the arguments classified as 
sectarian in this analysis. It covers the idea that doing the thing A might be inno-
cent, but the natural continuation of A is B or even C, which might be appalling. 
So even if A is not a problem in itself, it should be shunned because it will un-
avoidably lead to B and C. The argument about a slippery slope thus portrays 
                                          
135 Two priests in Jyllandsposten, 31 May 1998: ”The biomedical slippery slope”. 
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change as a kind of unidirectional motion leading from A directly to disaster. In 
this way it is parallel to the notion of the invisible hand of scientific progress, 
only with the reverse direction. Whereas the invisible hand of scientific progress 
automatically leads to utopia, the slippery slope automatically leads to dystopia. 
Sometimes the notion of slippery slope is articulated as an invisible or impercep-
tible phenomenon. The implications seems to be that one day, society will have 
become inhuman or in other ways estranged, without having realised the danger 
from the scientific development in time:  
 
The question is whether we will be able to control the continued 
trend if we cross this qualitative limit – even if it is only a tiny 
step. The slippery slope is right ahead with all its medical 
temptations to take just another little step, again and again. Until a 
strange humanity eventually stands out, struck by oblivion and 
unable to weigh dignity against personal utility.136 
 
One reason to fear the slippery slope, it appears, is the element of temptation 
that leads to perdition. Society will loose the ability to distinguish between right 
and wrong, if it lets itself be tempted by the progress of biotechnological re-
search. These arguments bear some familiarity with the hierarchical mode of 
articulating the collective, in that they seem to imply a need to find an overarch-
ing principle that can serve to ward off this trend. The many references to temp-
tation, perdition, oblivion, however, indicate a different line of reasoning. 
Whereas the temporal perspective in the hierarchy seems to focus on the past 
(we have to follow traditionally established social order) or the present (we have 
to identify the immanent principle of order), the sectarian articulations focus on 
the future. It is the threat towards the future that is the key issue. There is no sta-
ble hierarchical principle of order that serves as basis for the argument, but 
rather a threat is identified. This threat on the other hand constitutes the present 
as fragile – as humans, we are in danger of loosing our true selves. Biotechno-
logical research is threatening to corrupt core values of society, but it seems that 
this threat is not yet properly realised. Therefore a main task for these arguments 
seems to be a call for attention to or publicity for this threat. Society is endan-
gered by science and has to become aware of the seriousness of this situation. 
Although technical change looks like an improvement, it has to be realised as a 
fundamental change, which touches upon the essence of humanity:  
                                          
136 Editorial in Jyllandsposten, 9 April 2000: ”Lord of the creature” 
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Technology has characterised the last 100 years and since then our 
immediate world and conditions of life have been strikingly 
improved, why stop now and break with the trend? The problem is 
that today the changes are far more fundamental and extensive, and 
they will change our lives so strikingly that we inevitably will have 
to define new values. The problem is that in these years the 
changes do not just alter the way we live, but the conditions for life 
itself. And the oddity is that the smaller the changes, the more 
basic they become. Science will soon reach into the core of the 
human being. When we are in there, no more limits will be left.137 
 
The air of inexorable destiny, or at least exceptional importance of protecting 
the present social order in this quote is noticeable. The implications of biotech-
nological research are articulated as vast, and therefore the actions of the present 
seem to be extremely important. When the core of the human being is at stake, it 
is of vital importance to realise the potential threats and act accordingly. The 
sectarian perspective thus seems to imply a fragility and importance of the con-
temporary, as noted in chapter 3. If the slippery slope is not resisted, perdition is 
lurking at the end. And since the first step down the slippery slope might be de-
cisive, contemporary actions are crucial. Furthermore, members of society might 
not even be aware of this change. They might be corrupted by the slippery slope 
of scientific progress without even noticing the corruption it implies and then 
they are forever doomed: ‘when we are at the core of the human being, no more 
limits will be left’. On this background it seems to be important to sound the 
general alarm against this all-encompassing threat from science.138  
 
The sense of fragility and fear of corruption supports the articulation of the sci-
entific trend as a universal threat to the current social situation in this perspec-
tive. Although this content is never really specified it is still articulated as in 
                                          
137 Opinion piece in Politiken, 23 October 1999: ”The day ethics died”. 
138 Before I move on to a discussion of the way this ‘resistance’ is articulated, however, a lit-
tle clarification is necessary. In the analysis I have made references to a rather religious vo-
cabulary. In the way I have defined these four perspectives, however, there are no reason to 
view the sectarian form as in any way ‘closer’ to religion than the other forms of articulating 
the collective. Rather, I will argue that it is a core feature of the sectarian way of articulating 
the collective to see the world as a system where the chosen few form an enclave of insight in 
a society on the road to perdition. Consequently, when I describe how the articulations focus 
on corruption and perdition, it is not a result, but origin. It is not an outcome of the analysis, 
but the distinction I have used to identify the arguments. 
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need of protection. It is therefore possible to say that it is the threat of corruption 
that construes the current situation as worthy of protection. It is not because 
there are positive reasons to articulate present conditions of society and human 
life as glorious, but in light of what might come, it is essential to protect life-as-
we-know-it. Thus, the argument has a similar structure to the future optimism 
sometimes presented within the competitive individualism, just in the reverse 
direction. There it is the notion of progress that makes the future seem to be a 
better place than the present. Here it is the notion of the slippery slope as a 
downward movement that makes current conditions seem to be worthy of pro-
tection. It is the notion of a threat that constitutes that, which has to be protected. 
 
Ethical institutions as legitimating lackeys 
A tension is thus presented between ‘the good life’ that has to be protected and 
the systems of power, which have to be resisted because they corrupt or extort 
this ‘good life’. Arguments classified as subscribing to the sectarian mode of 
articulating the collective often employ words like ‘humanity’, dignity’, ‘vari-
ety’, ‘diversity’, ‘spirituality’, ‘independence’, to cover the positive formulation 
of what should be protected. As shorthand for this list we might use words like 
life-world or civil society, because they signal opposition to the world of sys-
tems, like those of the market or bureaucracy.139 On the other hand resistance 
should be directed towards ‘reification’, ‘utilitarianism’, ‘unification’, ‘industri-
alisation’, ‘capitalism’, ‘scientism’, ‘exploitation’, and so on. It is quite com-
mon, to view the combination of science and capitalism as the ultimate unifica-
tion of evil forces in society. Especially in relation to the discussion about legis-
lation on biotechnological patents140, this connection between capitalism and 
science has been problematised as an unholy alliance: 
                                          
139 While I stress that these concepts serve only as shorthand for the particular articulations 
here investigated, and not as references to the strict theoretical concepts of Jürgen Habermas 
or other theoreticians, it is possible, as John Law (Law 1986) has also proposed, to read 
Habermasian concepts as a sectarian articulation of the collective, a proposition that is also 
sustained by many of the writings on public accountability and science in the public sphere, as 
mentioned in chapter 1. 
140 The controversy on patents concentrate on a European Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions from 1998, which should be implemented in national legislation 
in year 2000 at the latest (http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus 
!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=da&numdoc=398L0044). The European regulation of biotechno-
logical patents has been object of discussion in Denmark throughout the 1990’s, but particu-
larly in the spring of 2000 – just before Danish legislation was confirmed, the discussions 
peaked. 
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A lot of people are very concerned about whether this unholy 
alliance between the logic of profit and the uncontrollable urge to 
create new knowledge can lead to anything but misery. Will 
manipulation of genes lead to the infliction of irreversible damage 
on nature? Will our bodies, our children, and our genes, become a 
commodity like tables and chairs? How are we to interpret life, 
now that it can be patented? On this account it is only natural, 
although humorous, that in the wake of this newly rich discipline 
of science an abundance of sympathetic bio-ethicists have 
emerged. Many of them were gathered in governmental institutions 
such as the Council of Ethics. But where did they come from? 
Were there really this many dismissed priests and rabbis, former 
TV hosts, actors, retired sirens and county mayors? Nobody 
knows, but since they are there, one must think they were needed. 
Now, we can discuss, whether the objective of the bio-ethicists has 
been to intensify or direct attention to the brave new world of 
biotechnology and the contracting out of previously untouchable 
areas of life to private firms. Although it is not possible to directly 
accuse the Council of Ethics of being on the advertising budget of 
biotechnology, the repressive tolerance with which the public has 
been held at bay in the case of the EU patent legislation is worthy 
of a study in itself.141 
 
Compared to the hierarchical perspective it is interesting to notice how the 
Council of Ethics and other ethical committees are not seen as defenders of eth-
ics, but rather as belonging to the system of power. It is apparently not from this 
kind of institution that resistance, or even salvation, should be expected. Rather, 
the members of these institutions are presented as lackeys, much in the same 
way as assorted Marxists have spoken of the lackeys of capitalism. In contrast to 
these hired hands, the public is articulated as the locus of resistance, when it is 
argued, that it is the public, who has been held at bay. Thus, it is from the public 
that resistance to the unholy alliance of capitalism and science should be ex-
pected – not from an institutionalised board of ethics, which only serves the pur-
pose of legitimising the corrupt systems of power.  
 
It is important to notice that it is not necessarily ethics as general phenomenon, 
which is disregarded in these quotes. Rather it is institutionalised ethics, such as 
                                          
141 Editorial in Information, 31 March 2000: ”Life is a patent law”. 
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that of the Council of Ethics, whereas ethics in general are often presented in a 
very positive manner:142  
 
What is actually wrong in trying to cure disease and helping 
childless couple reproduce? Can such good causes be criminal? It 
is an old saying, that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
And this is precisely the case with the issue of cloning. The good 
intentions originated from researcher’s imagination. It is alive and 
kicking when money and support for their projects has to be 
attracted. It is necessary for all researchers to develop this 
imagination when they are writing applications. Otherwise most of 
them would not receive any grants. (...) 
Human cloning is the dream of our time of a new form of slaves 
that some of us can have power over. And the perfection of the 
technique that leads to cloning, which is based on intervention in 
the reproductive process (for instance in so called therapeutic 
cloning) is already the beginning of the crime. No technology that 
interferes decisively in our social life can be neutral, and this is 
particularly true for a technique, which by manipulating 
reproduction is a step towards the surveillance society. A 
metaphysical idea of the uniqueness of every human being is not 
enough to damn human cloning in any form. It is also necessary to 
have an ethical critique of technology, which can warn us against 
those techniques that cannot be used without leading us closer to a 
new separation of humans into masters and slaves.143 
 
In this quote, the slippery slope of biotechnology leads to a new form of the 
separation into masters and slaves and a society of surveillance. The means 
identified to warn us against this slippery slope is an ethical assessment of tech-
nology that can serve as the basis for resistance. In this way the quote illustrates 
how a diagnosis of the present as threatened by negative outcomes of the imagi-
nation of researchers can also lead to arguments in favour of some kind of hier-
archical norm, from which order can be deduced. There is an implication of ba-
sic collective order and essential human qualities in the way genetic technolo-
                                          
142 In order to make sense of this observation it is important to remember that ethics is an ob-
ject of analysis, not a pre-defined concept. As such the definition of ethics changes with the 
different ways of articulating the collective. What is relevant then, is to identify the way eth-
ics is articulated in this perspective. 
143 Professor of philosophy in Politiken, 18 March 2001: ”Ethics: cloned humans are slaves”. 
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gies are presented as entities that can be sifted through ethical assessments and 
be judged to be either acceptable or non-acceptable.  
 
This quote hereby also highlights the difficulties in making these classifications 
discrete. Rather than trying to argue that this quote is only sectarian I have clas-
sified it as a combination. It can be viewed as sectarian in so far as it presents a 
society on the road to hell, lead by the corrupting forces of science, money and 
power. But it can also be classified as hierarchical when it argues that ethical 
technology assessment can save the world if employed as a universal norm of 
exercising power. The combination of a sectarian diagnosis of present condi-
tions with a hierarchical search for solutions is not uncommon. Still, as shown 
earlier there are also many arguments in which the reference to ethics is more 
vague and seems to imply a kind of procedure for critique. The focus is then on 
ethics as a dialogical procedure as opposed to hierarchical rules or market 
forces. 
 
Public debate as egalitarian resistance 
In sectarian arguments, ethics is often used as a term to denote the possibility of 
using moral or ethical arguments in the resistance to technology. But it is in no 
way an institution of resistance with a particular essence or hierarchical order. 
Rather, it is usually democracy, the public or the ‘we’ of ordinary people that 
seems to be the central social condition for the possibility of voicing resistance 
towards the systems of power and the power elite, as in this quote on the gene 
therapy case covered in chapter 4:  
 
It is neither the first nor the last time that researchers and medical 
doctors take ethics as a hostage in their play for money and 
prestige. There ought not to be a moments doubt that, of all 
professionals, it is precisely doctors and biotechnological 
researchers who are permanently in a moral and legal grey area, 
which they constantly transgress, whereupon the legislature 
follows closely on its heels, almost always legalising what the 
transgressors have committed. (...) We should not let ethics and 
legislation is lead by the nose of doctors and researchers, who are 
positioned in a borderland, and have many times transgressed the 
limit, set by legislators. We should set the limits, because there 
ought not to be any doubt, that yours and my bike-mender, 
carpenter or dustman are just as good judges of ethics, as the 
doctors, lawyers, and priests that are usually asked about ethics and 
 189 
 
morals, and which always make up the ethical councils and 
committees that seem to have appointed themselves keepers of 
good morals. Not even the most cocksure professor can take 
responsibility for the possible consequences of the almost daily 
new gene technological initiatives. So there are weighty reasons 
for putting the brakes on those researchers who (...) fill their 
wallets every time they find a new gene therapeutic treatment.144 
 
Again it is interesting to note, how the ethical institutions are placed in cahoots 
with the corrupt systems of the rest of society. Here a distinction is made be-
tween ethics as a procedure for finding limits, and ethical institutions as keepers 
of good moral. Whereas the first is seen as positive and should be in the hand of 
‘ordinary people’ like craftsmen and garbage collectors, the ethical institutions 
are a sign that representatives of the system, like priests, lawyers, and doctors, 
have taken ethics hostage. In this way institutionalised ethics serves the purpose 
of the systems of power, and can thus be viewed as a mere legitimising function.  
 
Secondly, it is worth noticing, that the references to ‘we’ in the quote are not a 
general ‘we’ of society, as in the hierarchical or market modes of articulating the 
collective. Rather, in this context, ‘we’ denotes ordinary people – the ones who 
do not belong to the systems of power – at least not the medical profession or 
the ethical (including the legal) institutions. In this argument there can be said to 
be a distinct notion of egalitarianism. It is not only the chosen few, who are the 
freedom fighters. All the bike-menders and garbage collectors of the world, who 
do not accept the rule of the system, should be involved in a regulatory process 
with the aim of setting limits for the systems of power. It is the ordinary people 
in the general public, who should decide on regulation and closure of controver-
sies, and not the elite in any form. In this way, the argument also bears some re-
semblance to the Marxist’ discourse, where the proletariat should revolt against 
the power structures of capitalism. Here, however, it is not capitalism alone that 
is the main villain, but the general combination of power structures of science, 
capitalism, state and hierarchical positions.  
 
                                          
144 Opinion piece in Jyllandsposten, 20 July 1999: ”Doctors take ethics hostage”. It should be 
observed that this is the only article that articulates the Århus experiment with gene therapy 
with a focus on wider social aspects and can be said to employ the script of absolute resis-
tance. 
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 The dis-interested, self-effacing, and service minded sciences have 
entered an intimate alliance with political interests of power and 
economic interests of the market. Examples of this cannot only be 
drawn from the military industry, but also in the pharmaceutical 
industry’s interest in medical experiments on patients, and – more 
covertly – in the interest of maintaining sick lives in unhealthy 
environments.  
At last, the blind ideology of growth has groped its way far into 
natural science, with climate distortion and exploitation of natural 
resources as (un)foreseen consequences in the service of the 
mastery of nature. A narrow caste of powerful experts, the 
technocratic elite, is apparently determining the development of 
society – which means maintaining the prevailing madness – and 
defence of the free play of power forces is conducted publicly as a 
fight against all external critique. In this lies the objective reason 
for pessimism – and for criticism: Evading public supervision and 
democratic considerations, this many-headed monster pursues its 
own scientific, power-political, economic goals with dauntless, 
Machiavellian, consistency.145 
 
The connection between pessimism and criticism is interesting because it sus-
tains the interpretation made earlier of the threat as constituting the order in so-
ciety. The world is divided into two opposing sides – the systems of power, lead 
by the narrow caste of the technocratic elite, and the rest. But it is important that 
this ‘rest’ is constituted as the negation of the power structures. It is because of 
the identification of the power structures as corrupt that a critique can find a rai-
son d’être. There is, however, one positive determination of the possibility of 
resistance in the quote. Public supervision and democratic control is construed 
as the means to fight the prevailing madness determined by the systems of 
power. Herein lies the possibility of resistance and of counter-power. Still, there 
is no elaboration of what it is, that has to be protected. Instead the general public 
has to fight systems of power exactly because they are systems of power. By 
their definition as such, they are immanently threatening to corrupt or colonize 
everything – just as natural science has been corrupted by the blind ideology of 
growth.  
 
                                          
145 Opinion piece in Information, 14 September 1998: ”A many-headed monster”. 
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In this way it can be argued that reaching closure is not the important objective 
in the sectarian mode of articulating the collective. Rather, what is important is 
to keep the controversies manifest by resistance and the exercise of counter-
power. Since legitimate closure is primarily perceived as the revolutionary crea-
tion of an ideal community, the possible actual closures are likely to be inter-
preted as illegitimate oppression by power exercised within systems of control. 
On the background of this section, the sectarian modes of inscription can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
Figure 6.4 Science Ethics Public debate 
Sectarian 
Egality 
Ideal about ‘true’ 
knowledge, but as 
social activity, sci-
ence is caught on the 
slippery slope of 
corruption by money 
and power 
As vague ideal ethics can 
pinpoint the fragility of 
contemporary conditions, 
but if institutionalised it 
becomes a lackey of the 
system 
Possibility of warn-
ing and resistance 
and for ordinary 
people to engage in 
egalitarian democ-
ratic dialogue 
 
 
Fatalistic isolation 
The fourth perspective in the employed typology is that of fatalistic isolation, 
where the collective is articulated as an anarchic chaos with no overarching rules 
securing order and justice. Fatalism is an obvious response to this perception of 
society as there are no stable connections between input and output and thus it is 
not possible to act with the purpose of managing society as such. There is no 
systematic way in which it is possible to reach legitimate closure and regulate or 
influence the actions of other parts of society in order to bring about a particular 
kind of social order, and there is no such order to invoke in one’s arguments. 
This negative perception of the possibility of order must be said to be in stark 
contrast to any ambition of regulating biotechnological research in order to in-
fluence its evolution in a particular way. On this account it is not strange that 
almost no articles where placed in this category when I imposed the relative 
classification of the long opinion pieces and editorials as described in Chapter 2 
and at the beginning of this chapter. If the dominant outlook on society is that it 
is an anarchic chaos with no possibility of securing order, it is apparently not of 
much use to discuss how biotechnological research should be regulated as a so-
cial activity. Still, conducting the classification I did identify a couple of argu-
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ments, where fatalism seems to be the prevailing answer to an irrevocable de-
velopment: 
 
It would be most convenient, if it was possible to take a stand on 
every single problem separately – and determine the speed 
accordingly. But so far the transition from problem to problem has 
been gradual. Our culture is less and less prepared to accept pain 
and privation, debilitation, suffering, and death itself as conditions 
of life. Then rather gradually get used to a technique that interferes 
in genesis of our life and paves the way for a new kind of humans, 
which makes use of that which was earlier considered holy and 
inviolable as means to repair and copy themselves. Treatment of 
infertility is already considered an almost inviolable right. And 
who will seriously fight therapeutic cloning if it can lead to a cure 
for otherwise incurable diseases and rejuvenate aging tissue of the 
body – even if it is at the expense of seeds of life in embryos? Most 
people shrink from human cloning. But is it possible to stop those, 
who are determined to do it anyway? There must be limits to 
madness, but where is the limit between pity, arrogance, and crime 
against human dignity?146 
 
Since this quote stresses that there ought to be limits and order, it would seem 
appropriate to classify it as hierarchical. It could also be classified as sectarian 
because of the references to the loss of human dignity and interference in holy 
and inviolable spheres of life. The most consistent feature however, is a distinct 
notion of fatalism in the way scientific change is presented as determined and as 
leading inevitably to new ways of exploitation. In so far as this quote seems to 
lament the impossibility of order, it invokes hierarchical order as utopia, but 
there is apparently nothing to do in order to re-establish this order. Order is lost 
and fatalism seems to be the only option left, as a kind of opposition.  
 
Science as elitist monster of authority 
Anti-authoritarianism plays a prominent role in the fatalistic mode of articulat-
ing the collective. The authorities of science, capital, state and so forth, are seen 
as using power structures to act in their own interest. Thus, science for instance 
is not an institution, or an actor, creating knowledge for the benefit of all, but a 
                                          
146 Editorial in Information, 11 August 2001: ”A matter of life and death”. 
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monster of authoritarianism intertwined with all the other monsters of society – 
living a life of its own and only looking after its own interest: 
 
The holy science does not dream of stopping in the face of in vitro 
fertilisation, human cloning, eugenics or any other possibility. The 
tree of knowledge tastes sweetly of power and money. Science has 
expropriated the workshop of God. And the Christian church. What 
has become of it? (...) Faith or science. It is always about money 
and power over souls. In theory, politicians are the ones who, when 
faced with all of this, should maintain public sense and set the 
limits. But we cannot count on them. They have bureaucratised 
ethics to some administrative councils, with private letterhead, 
office administration and private interests.147 
 
In this way the fatalistic perspective can seem to subscribe to an articulation of 
the collective, where actors are seen to pursue their own interests as is the case 
under competitive individualism. The reason for classifying this argument as 
fatalistic, however, is the impression of anarchic chaos with no overarching way 
of regulating or resisting change. The only thing we can be sure of, is that we 
can’t count on anybody. Although the quote articulates the scientific develop-
ments as horrific, it does not seem like a sectarian argument, as the threat from 
corruption is not presented as important. The collective is not in danger of being 
corrupted – it is corrupt. Evil is the normal order of the day. There is no fragility 
to speak of, nor is any importance attributed to actions in the present, as it is in 
the sectarian perspective. Rather the social (non)order is quite robust. It is 
wrong, to be sure, but robust nonetheless. Therefore detachment in the form of 
fatalism and satire seems to be a relevant response. 
 
Ethics and public debate as high gloss legitimation 
As it was shown in chapters 3 and 4 fatalism is a common feature of the cover-
age in Ekstra Bladet. Here it is often presented in an ironic or even satirical way 
and therefore it seems to be a different kind of fatalism, than that of the disap-
pointed hierarchist. In Ekstra Bladet it seems far more cynical and detached 
from the other perspectives on social order. There is no lament of the loss of or-
der or the utopia of a good society. Rather science, ethics and public debate are 
treated as phenomena that are all somehow incorporated in the project of elites 
or systems that are out of reach. Science is an elitist monster of authority follow-
                                          
147 Editorial in Ekstra Bladet, 25 January 1998: ”The white-coated and the black-gowned. 
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ing its own internal logic and preferences, and both ethics and public debate are 
seen as high gloss, manipulative efforts to legitimate this by the elite. The dif-
ference between this perspective and that of sectarian egality is the lack of fra-
gility, threats or importance in revolting against this project in order to create a 
better society. Where sectarian egality presents a vision of the community of 
people and a road away from perdition, the cynical fatalist detaches via satire, 
but has no vision of utopia. The following quote is taken from a column written 
as a kind of reportage from a conference organised by the Council of Ethics:  
 
She says it herself: We should neither be the clergy of fear nor 
happy, babbling optimists. Who is she? And why is she talking like 
this? Nielsen, Linda. Professor, dr.jur., University of Copenhagen. 
And chairman of the state’s Council of Ethics.  
The remark about the clergy of fear or the babbling optimists 
applies to the Council of Ethics as such, and yesterday’s highly 
academic day of debate about Man-made Man, which was went off 
according to plan in a well-behaved gathering of learned initiates 
of the present academic clergy. A state financed seminar for 
intellectual opinion makers, who daily camp on each other’s 
doorsteps at hospitals and colleges. Yesterday it took place at the 
Radisson SAS-hotel, where they could confirm each other in the 
proper code, and with the particular verbal ground rules that is the 
means by which the elite distinguishes itself from the mob. (...)  
And how far should we go? Towards cloning people, for instance. 
No. Nobody wants to do that anyway. Besides, law prohibits it. But 
it could have been refreshing, if just a single person had had that 
opinion. What is wrong with producing a couple of hundred clones 
of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart? Immediately the bogey of Hitler 
comes up. But he and all the other bastards through the course of 
history could precisely just be prohibited. We have the technology 
to do it. We could use it as a lock on the scoundrels and open the 
floodgates for good, creative, musical geniuses. That would look 
bloody nice!148 
 
These quotes represent some of the only arguments identified in the longer con-
tributions to the mediated debate on biotechnology where the fatalistic view is 
expressed as the main mode of articulating the collective. As argued it is not 
strange that it is difficult to find this perspective in articles that have been se-
                                          
148 Journalistic commentary in Ekstra Bladet, 26 March 1999: ”The clergy of fear”. 
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lected as a sample of general arguments about the regulation of research. When 
arguing in favour of some kind of regulation it is no doubt by far the most com-
mon to have some sort of vision of a way to create a better society in mind. 
Whether this vision is the reinforcement of a hierarchical order, the free ex-
change between individuals or a kind of utopian community of civil society they 
all seem to imply that it is possible to imagine a ‘better’ world and that regula-
tion of research should somehow have effects of advancing this vision. In con-
trast, the perspective of fatalistic isolation is not focused on a positive descrip-
tion of (future) social order, but rather on ironic comments or rejection of pre-
sent power structures.  They detach from society without presenting arguments 
about a coherent beneficial regulation. Thus the inscriptions can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
Figure 6.5 Science Ethics Public debate 
Fatalistic Iso-
lation 
Monster of authority High gloss legitimation 
by monsters of authority 
Sphere for manipu-
lation by monsters 
of authority 
 
Whereas there were only a few articulations subscribe to the fatalistic mode of 
articulating the collective in connection with specific arguments on regulation of 
biotechnological research, it should be observed that this perspective was more 
common in the context of concrete cases of biotechnology. In chapters 3 and 4, 
the perspective of fatalistic isolation was identified as implicit in the scripts of 
fatalistic irony, heroic action and anti-scientific information in connection with 
the coverage of reproductive human cloning and gene therapy. With regard to 
the first, fatalism was shaped in an ironic tone of ‘exotic news of scientific ex-
cesses’. The announcement made by Seed was interesting because it was a sen-
sationalist story about science out of our control. The implicit argument seemed 
to be: ‘look what the researchers are doing – now it is proven again that they are 
completely out of control, as we have argued all along’. In the second case of 
the story about gene therapy, the scripts of heroic action and anti-scientific in-
formation also portrayed a world out of control, but with the chances of positive 
side effects of medical experiments. In this context it should be remembered that 
any shared experience between isolates is by nature only visible as an analytical 
construct. I will argue that these positions can easily be contained within a gen-
eral articulation of the collective as an anarchic chaos, with no overall cause-
effect relationship. You win or you loose, there is no way to tell in advance. And 
there is no overall logic to which you can subscribe in order to regulate research 
 196 
 
or society in general. The outlook on regulation thus seems to be rather oppor-
tunistic.  
 
 
Regulating biotechnological research 
On the basis of these analyses it is possible to sketch discursive possibilities and 
conditions for the regulation of biotechnological research within each of these 
four modes of articulating the collective. In this section I will present the under-
standing of the use of regulation by summarising them. Subsequently, this pres-
entation will function as the basis for a concluding discussion in the last chapter 
by pointing to the main similarities and associations as well as the differences 
between these four modes of articulating the collective.   
 
Hierarchical Authority  
The mass mediated arguments on the regulation of biotechnological research, 
which subscribe to a hierarchical perspective, reveals an inscription of the phe-
nomena of science and ethics as two parallel, but different, hierarchical orders 
that prescribe solutions in terms of ‘the right answer’ in order to reach closure in 
controversies. One is the logic of scientific inquiry connected to the institution 
of science. In this hierarchical order scientific research should not be regulated 
externally, since this is seen as problematic interference in a system that should 
follow its own internal set of rules of behaviour. The second is the institution of 
ethics, in which ethics is inscribed as a hierarchical system of norms and rules 
that make it possible to deduce the morally ‘right’ solution.  
 
What is important is that society is, or should be, organised according to some 
basic principles that provide the means to distinguish between good and bad, 
between right and wrong. Reaching closure becomes equivalent to identifying a 
universal principle according to which ‘the right answer’ or ‘the proper deci-
sion’ can be deduced as solution. Consequently, regulating biotechnological re-
search becomes a question of designing regulation according to these rules in 
order to make sure that social norms are not violated. There is, however, quite a 
span of variance with regard to how these rules are identified. Within the articles 
analysed it is possible to speak of a continuum from conservative to reflexive 
forms of hierarchies.  
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In the most conservative or traditionalist hierarchical form of articulating the 
collective the rules or principles are given, for instance, by God, or Science, and 
the task of contemporary societies is to deduct proper regulations from these 
rules. In this form, public debate is a means of enlightenment and edification, a 
way of disseminating familiarity with the rules, whether they are founded on the 
authority of science or ethics. The communication process is seen as a one-way 
dissemination with recipients being informed by higher levels in the hierarchy. 
Whether guided by science or ethics, ordinary citizens are placed in a hierarchy 
where it is their duty as citizens to let themselves be informed by the elite. 
 
In reflexive forms of hierarchical modes of articulating the collective, the rules 
are not so obvious or evident. Instead it seems that they have to be identified 
first in order to serve as a basis of proper regulation. The reflexive form of hier-
archy presents the possibility of reaching closure through public debate rather 
similar to the perspective of competitive individualism. In so far as arguments 
articulate the possibility of identifying or localising an absolute rule or principle 
according to which proper regulation can be designed, I will speak of a hierar-
chical mode of articulating the collective. It is not necessary that the principle 
can be identified. The important thing is the assumption that there is a principle, 
which, in principle, can be identified.  
 
Competitive Individualism  
In arguments classified within the perspective of competitive individualism, ac-
tors are constituted by their individual interests, preferences and resources. Ac-
cordingly, science is articulated as an actor, with an interest of its own, namely 
the goal of creating knowledge, and with preferences in terms of freedom of re-
search and so forth. Other actors in society do not have to share this interest in 
order to allow the freedom of research. It is enough that they recognise that it is 
beneficial to society as a whole if science is able to pursue its goal in the most 
unhindered way, because it is expected to create solutions to common problems. 
Although this constitution is different than it is within the authoritative hierar-
chy, it also implies a social arrangement, or contract, in which science can be 
left to pursue its own goals in return for the production of scientific knowledge. 
 
The key issue in reaching closure and designing regulation is to secure the most 
beneficial conditions for biotechnological research, without impeding other ac-
tors in society. Many of the arguments subscribing to competitive individualism 
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are found to promote great expectations for science, almost deterministically 
expecting far-reaching solutions to problems of disease and suffering just round 
the corner. I have used the expression the invisible hand of progress about this 
way of portraying science, as a resource that unquestionably will lead to a better 
world. Central to this, is the notion that if actors (including science) are left to 
pursue their own interests, e.g. a search for knowledge, this will lead to greater 
prosperity in society as such. There are, however, several arguments, that point 
to possible unfortunate consequences of this pursuit and a wish to prevent them. 
Just like the capitalist state can be seen to regulate against market imperfections, 
it is articulated as necessary to regulate against unfavourable spin-offs of the 
scientific enterprise. Regulation is thus a question of striking a pragmatic bal-
ance between different interests in order to ensure that the autonomy of individ-
ual actors is respected as much as possible without violating the autonomy of 
other actors. This mode of articulating the collective thus seems to imply two 
different notions of regulation, in which the first seems to be arguing in favour 
of leaving biotechnological research with as few restrictions as possible, and the 
second to imply the need for regulation.  
 
In contrast to the hierarchical perspective, where ethics could be seen as an insti-
tution along the same lines as science, it is not possible here to identify ethics as 
an actor in the same way as science. Rather it seems that ethics is primarily an 
individual matter – a question about personal preferences – and the protection of 
individual autonomy therefore seems to be the major task. I employed the image 
of regulating market imperfections about the need to secure rationality in the 
knowledge market as well as protecting the weaker parties of society against 
‘unjust’ exploitation (where the meaning of the word ‘unjust’ is founded on 
more or less explicit utilitarian considerations). Following this, ethics can gener-
ally be viewed as one among several inputs in the negotiation of closure in the 
form of a pragmatic design of regulation. Ethical considerations thus have to be 
weighed against all the other considerations put forward in the pragmatic proc-
ess of reaching closure on the question of legitimate regulation.  
 
Compared to the hierarchical mode of articulating the collective, the question of 
reaching closure hereby takes on a different form. The search for a universal 
norm, from which ‘right answers’ can be deduced, has been replaced by a neces-
sity to co-ordinate and balance different interests. The questions of right and 
wrong, and of proper behaviour in general, have been substituted with a mecha-
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nism of exchange and negotiation between autonomous actors. There is, how-
ever, a rather large amount of vagueness about this mechanism for co-
ordination. I have found several different inscriptions that can suitably be char-
acterised as a continuum stretching from aggregating anonymous preferences to 
complex processes of negotiation. 
 
In the classical model of a market, the aggregation of individual preferences is 
the way of co-ordinating actions. When exported from economics to the field of 
politics or regulation, co-ordination in the form of closure of controversies be-
comes a question of counting heads in favour of political preferences as de-
scribed in many liberal theories of democracy and public opinion. At this end of 
the continuum, public debate is thus a possibility for voicing interests, and clo-
sure is reached by majority decisions – ultimately in the form of voting. From 
the arguments classified as competitive, however, it seems that closure can also 
be envisaged as a result of processes of negotiation, where mediation between 
interests and preferences somehow replaces the quantitative aggregation of indi-
vidual preferences. The reason for viewing these processes of negotiation as be-
longing to the perspective of competitive individualism is that they articulate 
actors as individual utility-maximising agents. Processes of negotiation can thus 
be seen as one way of safeguarding interests. At this end of the continuum, pub-
lic debate becomes a field where these mediations and negotiations to take 
place. 
 
Sectarian egality 
Sectarian modes of articulating the collective perceive society as a battlefield, 
where the chosen few are fighting against corrupt systems of power. In these 
articulations dualistic oppositions come to the fore: The deceptive surface of 
progress versus the ‘true’ depth showing corruption. The systems of power run 
by an elite versus democratic resistance against their rule of corruption. As a 
social institution or actor, science is depicted as belonging to the system of 
power, although utopian glimpses of a different notion of science, in the ‘service 
of mankind’, are established now and then. It is not the search for knowledge in 
itself that is wicked, but the unholy alliance between the institution of science 
and the forces of power and capitalism. Since science has been corrupted by this 
alliance it no longer creates knowledge to the common benefit of all, but only in 
the service of particular interests. On this account it is necessary to sound the 
alarm and enforce severe external regulation on biotechnological research: this 
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in order to protect human dignity, diversity, life as we know it, etc. from being 
colonised and corrupted by the growth of scientific knowledge. 
  
The notion of disguise plays a conspicuous part, as it is common to articulate the 
apparently invisible hand of progress as concealing the opposite motion: the 
slippery slope of corruption. The idea is connected to a sense of fragility, where 
it becomes of paramount importance what course of action is followed in present 
times. If the ‘we’ of the general public of ordinary people fails to see the danger 
and regulate biotechnological research accordingly, we will somehow be lost or 
corrupted as well. In this context some of the arguments are tinted in a slightly 
religious or otherworldly way, when the slippery slope is seen as leading to 
oblivion or perdition. If we do not react to the threat of corruption, we will be 
forever doomed. In this way it is possible to speak of a ‘purgatorial space’ 
(Rabinow 1999), where the resistance towards biotechnological research be-
comes a trial, in an almost biblical sense, of our ability to withstand temptation. 
What is at stake, in this argument, are thus our own souls – we could loose our 
humanity and human identity, if we do not resist temptation.149 In this context, 
ethics, if this word is taken as a vague term for a set of considerations about ba-
sic values, is presented positively. It should be observed, however, that the 
warning against immediate doom or corruption is seldom followed by concrete 
proposals of action in terms of concrete regulation. Rather, instructions are 
vague, as it seems that the central issue is the call for attention to the threats.  
 
In the sectarian mode of articulating the collective there is, however, also a more 
this-worldly or secular type of argumentation. In this mode it is not our human-
ity or human identity, which is at risk, but the freedom from corrupting systems 
of power. What we have to fight in this connection is the colonialization of hu-
manity, ordinary life, diversity, dignity, independence, etc. – in short, the life 
world. In these arguments, an egalitarian public debate seems to be the central 
means to resist the corruption of the elites and their systems of power. The pub-
lic has to set limits on research in order to preserve areas of freedom, where the 
corrupt influence of the systems of power can be kept out.  
                                          
149 When the argumentation follows this path, it comes close to the hierarchical notion of an 
ethical order instigated by God. It is worth noticing, however, that the Christian comprehen-
sion of social order can be articulated both in a mode of hierarchy and a mode of sect. The 
difference is whether the focus is on a stable society instigated by God or on an imminent 
threat of doom or corruption. 
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Consequently it might be possible to speak of some kind of variation between 
threats toward the human identity and threats towards the life-world of civil so-
ciety. But the central issue in both these arguments, however, is that it is the 
identification of a threat of corruption that seems to be central. Whether it is 
humanity or the life-world that is threatened by corruption, it is the threat itself, 
which seems to constitute that which has to be preserved. It is the fact that the 
slippery slope points downward that constitutes the current situation as being the 
upper point 
 
Fatalistic isolation 
In the articulations subscribing to the fatalistic mode of articulating the collec-
tive, science in general, is presented as un-controllable and out of reach. There-
fore it is of no use to be committed to any stable opinion on regulation. When it 
comes to concrete applications, however, individuals might be so lucky as to be 
cured or have a baby. This, however, is not presented as the product of science, 
but rather as (un)luck in life and the labour of particular people. Science and eth-
ics in general are just some of the monsters of authority, about which we as or-
dinary people know nothing except that we don’t trust them and they don’t 
count on us. Furthermore public debate is no useful mechanism of resistance or 
co-ordination since it is just another platform for the authorities to manipulate 
public opinions. On this account the scarce arguments on regulation can be seen 
to be ironic comments that emphasise that it is of no use to regulate science and 
technology and at the same time as the openly reject of authorities and elites.  
 
As a summary it is possible to construct the following scheme (figure 6.6). The 
next chapter offers a concluding discussion of the differences between these four 
modes as well as the alliances between them in order to identify the discursive 
conditions of possibility for regulating biotechnological research. It appears 
from the scheme that the first three forms can all associate positively to the phe-
nomena of science, ethics and public debate, although sectarian egality only as-
sociates positively to ideals, whereas the concrete observable phenomena are 
primarily disregarded as corrupted forms of the positive ideal. Only the forth 
mode does not associate positively to these phenomena and it also does not sub-
scribe to a notion of the possibility of regulating biotechnological research in 
order to influence social order in a particular way. 
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Figure 6.6 Science Ethics Public debate Regulation 
Hierarchical 
Authority 
Institution pre-
scribing a logic 
of scientific 
inquiry for es-
tablishing true 
answers 
Institution of ethi-
cal principles or 
procedural rules 
for identifying 
morally ‘right’ 
answers 
Vehicle for 
informing and 
enlightening 
the public 
about the hier-
archical order 
Closure in 
terms of solu-
tion identifying 
a universal 
norm guiding 
proper behav-
iour 
Competitive 
Individualism 
Resource in 
society produc-
ing solutions to 
present prob-
lems according 
to the invisible 
hand of scien-
tific progress 
Ethical choices are 
sum of individual 
preferences, 
sometimes point-
ing to necessity of 
regulating market 
imperfections 
Vehicle for 
pragmatic and 
contextual me-
diation be-
tween different 
interests and 
preferences 
Closure in 
terms of co-
ordination of 
preferences in 
order to reach 
pragmatic 
regulation  
Sectarian 
Egality 
Ideal about 
‘true’ knowl-
edge, but as 
social activity, 
science is cap-
tured on the 
slippery slope 
of corruption 
by money and 
power 
As vague ideal 
ethics can pinpoint 
the fragility of 
contemporary 
conditions, but if 
institutionalised it 
becomes a lackey 
of the system 
Possibility of 
warning and 
resistance and 
for ordinary 
people to en-
gage in egali-
tarian democ-
ratic dialogue 
Closure in 
terms of revo-
lution and ab-
solute limita-
tions of science 
in order to pro-
tect humanity 
and life-world 
Fatalistic Iso-
lation 
Monster of au-
thority 
Glossy legitima-
tion by monster of 
authority 
Sphere for ma-
nipulation by 
monsters of 
authority 
No closure 
possible apart 
from acts of 
destiny 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has been an effort to use the analytical typology as a structured per-
spective in order to analyse how the four different perspectives articulate the 
phenomena of science, ethics and public debate. As it has been obvious in sev-
eral connections, however, the analytical typology only works at a particular 
level of analysis. As for instance in the case of ethics, where it is possible to find 
different kinds of articulation. Some present ethics as a hierarchical norm. Oth-
ers present ethics as a way of balancing considerations in a public market of 
opinions, and others again present it as a procedure to resist corruption. If the 
arguments are extended, however, towards a search for a basic warrant of the 
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argumentation, it becomes more or less obvious that the perspectives can be 
fused into each other. Pragmatic evaluation of utility becomes a hierarchical 
norm if taken to its full logical consequences, and so does sectarian resistance in 
terms of ethical technology assessment. On the other hand hierarchical orders 
can be seen to be in the interest of privileged positions and thus a way of con-
structing better positions of negotiation on the market, just as hierarchical argu-
ments can turn fatalistic if the implications of development are seen to be that 
the utopian order is inevitably dissolved. This makes it clear that the typology 
for classifying arguments only works at a certain analytical level. As soon as we 
begin to look at the contextual dynamics of actual controversies, rather than arti-
ficially isolated arguments, the relative classifications again appears to be in 
flux. Therefore the analysis in this chapter should be understood as artificially 
static. 
 
Secondly, it has become clear that there are more than four articulated collec-
tives. Each of these four modes presents us with several competing articulations 
of the collective. The hierarchy can be articulated with a scientific or an ethical 
(and possibly also a religious) authority as the general principle from which or-
der and legitimate closure to controversies can be deduced. And these principles 
can be identified very differently, ranging from conservative, where it is a 
‘given’ from the tradition, to reflexive, where it has to be identified in present 
context. In competitive individualism it makes a big difference for the actual 
possibility of closure, whether actors are seen as autonomous per se, or whether 
this status has to be actively established through regulation protecting the 
weaker parties. Furthermore, the exchange mechanism can also be articulated as 
either anonymous aggregation or as complex processes of negotiation. Similarly 
in the articulation of sectarian egality, in which there are competing threats. 
Some warnings focus on the risk of loosing our humanity, whereas others are 
more concerned with the risk of systems colonising the life-world of the com-
munity. The four modes of articulating the collective should therefore precisely 
be seen as modes, which can be filled with content in different ways. They are 
not a final or ultimate analysis of the core or content of the controversies about 
biotechnological research as such. Rather, they are a heuristic tool in the explo-
ration of the thesis that articulating the collective is part of arguments in the con-
troversies—the part I have been calling subscription.  
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Thirdly, the analytical strategy of searching for differences between classes of 
arguments, suspends chronology and connections, hereby presenting the argu-
ments classified as subscribing to each of these modes as a discrete and separate 
network of articulation. But this was a result of the method employed, not an 
empirical result. The groups of arguments subscribing to each of these modes of 
articulating the collective are only as coherent and discrete as they are articu-
lated to be. This is true both with regards to internal diversification, as there are 
many more articulated collectives than the four modes, and with regards to mu-
tual detachment between the four; when we look for differences between these 
four modes, we will find them. 
 
The final chapter will bring chronology and association back to the centre of the 
analysis. Whereas the former chapters focused on differences, I will shift the 
focus back to associations in the concluding discussions. The shift has been pre-
pared by the attention given to similarities, affinities and connections in the pre-
vious analysis. When we shift the focus to associations, the arguments subscrib-
ing to different modes of articulating the collective do not seem completely de-
tached. Instead, the groups of arguments can be viewed as clusters or areas of 
condensation that are partly overlapping, partly connected, partly sharing rela-
tions. Following this line of thought the modes of articulating the collective can 
be understood as analytical condensations of networks of articulation; as sum-
ming up particular densities in the constant flow of articulation. As argued, these 
condensations or densities are distinct from each other, but only as long as they 
are constructed analytically. When we look at the public controversies, the fea-
ture of distinctiveness has to be constructed by explicitly ignoring most of the 
features that pointed towards connections and relations. When the connections 
and associations are taken into account, it seems that the networks of articulation 
cannot be identified as discrete entities, but rather as clusters in the same me-
dium.  
 
All arguments are connected in one way or another. Taken in its full conse-
quences, the networks of articulation can be seen as one large network, with 
some clusters of density and other spaces of scarcity in relations. This is equiva-
lent to the ontological definition of public debate as put forward in chapter 1. 
Nevertheless, in this chapter I do not want to collapse all distinctions into one 
network. Rather I want to keep the notion of networks in the plural form; but 
instead of designating discrete entities, they designate clusters of density or con-
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densations of associations in the constant flow of articulation as illustrated in 
figure 6.7.  
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 Figure 6.7 
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Chapter 7 
Controversies as conflicts and alliances  
in cultural dialogue 
- a concluding discussion 
 
 
Throughout the previous chapters I have analysed controversies about biotech-
nology as political controversies by emphasising that any argument in the con-
troversies imply a particular articulated collective. Each contribution to the de-
bate is a productive articulation not just of biotechnology and technoscience (or 
the world that technoscience knows and masters) but also about nature and soci-
ety, and not just about the local social and natural facts about biotechnology, but 
also about general features of the natural and social order of the collective. We 
cannot articulate stories and arguments about biotechnology without inscribing 
stories in scripts and subscribing arguments to collectives. On this background I 
have analysed the mass mediated articulations of biotechnology in order to iden-
tify the discursive possibilities for regulating biotechnology in Denmark. 
 
In Chapter 1 the work of the dissertation was situated in the context of ‘Public 
Understanding of Science’ and ‘Science Communication’ as relevant academic 
traditions. Through a review of the theoretical literature, three models for the 
communicative relationship between science and public were identified. In the 
diffusion model information is transmitted from science to the public in order to 
improve instrumental decision-making. In the deliberative model dialogue is 
supposed to lead to consensus on how to regulate science, thereby granting le-
gitimacy to scientific exploration. And finally, in the network model communi-
cation is construed as continuous negotiation about the development of tech-
noscience as well as about the very definitions of science and publics with the 
aim of reaching interim closure. The chapter ended with a subscription to the 
last model that has served as the foundation for the analyses in the dissertation. 
 
In Chapter 2 a general framework for a relational ontology was outlined, in 
which newspaper articles can be analysed both as stories and arguments about 
biotechnology. As stories they can be seen as inscriptions of phenomena in par-
ticular ways that articulate one of several scripts, that is, a framing network of 
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relations to other phenomena. As arguments they construct particular relations 
between problems and solutions and hereby they subscribe to articulated collec-
tives, that is, general notions of social and natural (dis)order and how to main-
tain, restore or change this order with the aim of reaching closure. In the contro-
versies about biotechnology, adversarial arguments were defined as subscribing 
to different collectives (just as divergent stories inscribe phenomena in different 
scripts). Furthermore, the connection between arguments and articulated collec-
tives were presented as mutually constitutive. On the one hand the collectives 
exist because they are being continuously articulated, that is, because arguments 
in the controversies about biotechnology subscribe to these general conceptions 
of the social and natural order. On the other hand these conceptions of order 
work as the frame for inscription of problems and solutions in particular ways, 
hereby enabling particular arguments to be articulated.  
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 two empirical cases were investigated. Chapter 3 focused on 
an announcement of efforts to begin trials with reproductive cloning. It was ar-
gued that this announcement constituted an exemplary case for the study of fears 
associated with biotechnology. In Chapter 4 the object of analysis was a set of 
mediated accounts of a suspended experiment with gene therapy. In contrast to 
cloning, it constituted an exemplary case for the study of the high hopes associ-
ated with biotechnology. These analyses were designed as inductive identifica-
tion of scripts as patterns in the inscription of stories through a focus on the as-
sociation of occurrences to other occurrences and phenomena. These analyses 
led to the identification of four scripts in the articulation of human cloning and 
three meta-scripts in the articulation of an experiment with gene therapy.  
 
In Chapter 5 these different scripts were translated into a typology of four modes 
of articulating the collective. In the mode of authoritative hierarchy the collec-
tive is articulated as a hierarchical order of predefined roles with rules prescrib-
ing the obligations and privileges of each of the positions in the hierarchy. In the 
mode of competitive individualism the collective is articulated as a market of 
exchange relations between autonomous actors defined by their individual pro-
files of interests, preferences and resources. In the mode of sectarian egality the 
collective is articulated as a battlefield where systems of power are trying to cor-
rupt humanity as well as the community of people and actors are therefore basi-
cally defined by their belonging to either the systems of power or the enclaves of 
resistance. In the mode of fatalistic isolation the collective is articulated as an 
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arbitrary chaos with no overarching principles securing order or justice and no 
regularity in the definition of actors. 
 
Chapter 6 used this typology to categorise different arguments. The aim was to 
search for patterns in the way various arguments articulate science, ethics and 
public debate. This made it possible to identify different objectives of the regu-
lation of biotechnological research in arguments subscribing to different modes 
of articulating the collective. In this analysis, however, it became clear that there 
are more than four articulated collectives. Hierarchies were seen to be based on 
either science or ethics. Competitive individualism was found to come in both 
an un-regulated and a regulated form. Sectarian egality was seen to be con-
cerned with threats towards humanity and human souls, or towards the systems 
colonising the community of people. By explicating the distinct objectives in 
each of the different modes of articulating the collective it was possible to char-
acterise the discursive conditions for the possibility of regulating biotechnology 
on a generic level, according to figure 6.6 towards the end of Chapter 6. 
 
In order to carry out these analyses, however, some analytical restrictions had to 
be accepted so that arguments were disconnected from their context in order to 
search for patterns. In this final discussion I will move the focus back to the dy-
namics of controversies seen in a dialectical perspective. The chapter is struc-
tured in three parts drawing conclusions about the theoretical, empirical and 
practical aspects of the knowledge produced in this dissertation, respectively. 
The discussion of theoretical implications is a reflection on the combination of 
the theoretical frameworks proposed by Bruno Latour and Mary Douglas. It fur-
thermore considers the ontological status of the articulated collectives as well as 
the question of discursive power. The empirical discussion examines the contro-
versies as networks of conflicts and alliances, and considers the challenges and 
limitations of the use of the typology in future analyses of biotechnological con-
troversies. The final discussion of practical implications focuses on the possibili-
ties of reaching closure in the controversies and particularly on the use of public 
debate as a means to this. 
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Articulated collectives as structure and agency  
In Chapter 2 I argued that the dissolution, as advanced by Latour, of the actor-
structure divide should rather be seen as a construction of two dialectical per-
spectives. They mutually constitute each other as possible ways of observing 
phenomena, and at the same time exclude each other, since it is impossible to 
adopt them both in the same observation. On this account I found it necessary to 
combine two theoretical perspectives that made it possible to oscillate between 
the observation of actor and structure. The combination of the frameworks of 
Douglas and Latour were found to satisfy this need, since they can both be seen 
to incorporate notions of actor and structure, although they differ on the primary 
point of observation. Whereas Latour makes it possible to observe actors and 
lets structure be a derived function, Douglas facilitates the observation of struc-
tures but leaves room for individual action as the agent of change in the struc-
ture. 
 
Translating these two theoretical frameworks into the context of the present dis-
sertation, inscription designates the process in which a phenomenon is framed in 
a network, whereas subscription designates the summing up of the locally 
framed phenomena in terms of a total structure, which is obtained in the same 
movement, namely the articulation, or, more specifically, the newspaper article. 
Although these processes are mutually constitutive it is not possible to make 
both of them the object of observation at the same time. I have therefore devel-
oped two different analytical strategies. Whereas, the framework provided by 
Latour was the primary source of inspiration for the study of inscription in 
Chapters 3 and 4, Douglas’ cultural theory was incorporated in order to study 
subscription in Chapter 6.  
 
The combination of these theoretical frameworks, however, was not possible 
without making some adjustments to the two theoretical perspectives. By includ-
ing the cultural theory in the relational ontology, I closed off any possibility of 
following the processual dynamics of network construction. As soon as the ty-
pology is constructed, heterogeneity is stifled. With regard to the cultural theory, 
on the other hand, I had to disregard the structural matrix and the establishment 
of four clear-cut ideal types. These sacrifices were necessary in order to com-
bine the two theories, but I have not thereby conflated the two theories into one. 
Rather, as dialectical perspectives, each of them reinforces the other.  
 
 210 
 
The Latourian framework provided the basis for my relational ontology – the 
basic assumptions behind the construction of my analytical strategy. Douglas, 
on the other hand, provided the framework for the construction of the analytical 
scheme that made me able to observe a particularly defined set of differences 
rather than an immense production of complexity. Latour displays how the 
chains of translation and association in a medium of infinite possibilities pro-
duce black boxes and he teaches us how to open them. The black boxes I have 
opened in this dissertation are the mediated articulations of ‘science’, ‘ethics’ 
and ‘public debate’150. Not in order to demonstrate that black boxes can be 
opened – that is already given by the ontological foundation – but to analyse 
how they are closed in particular ways that produce a structure. To be able to do 
this, I had to open them from a schematic typology guiding which kinds of dif-
ference to focus on and to this end Douglas provided the concepts. If a general 
conclusion should be drawn from this analytical experience it could be that de-
constructivist analytical strategies, like that of the actor-network theory, need the 
supplement of other kinds of theories and analyses in order to know what to de-
construct.  
 
The dualism between structure and actor also pertains to the outcome of the pre-
sent analyses in that it is an important question how the ontological status of the 
articulated collectives should be understood. Following the relational ontology, 
phenomena can only be identified according to a particular network of relations, 
and I will argue that this also goes for the phenomenon produced in this disserta-
tion: the ‘articulated collectives’. Similar to my understanding of Latour’s no-
tion of institution, which was presented in Chapter 2, I will propose that articu-
lated collectives can be seen both as structures and as actants, depending on the 
angle of observation. We can perceive it as structure if we acknowledge that 
structure only exist as long as actors keep repeating it. We can perceive them as 
actants as long as we admit that actors routinely subscribe to networks that offer 
automated actions, by summing up complexity in suitably black boxes.  
 
In this way articulated collectives can be seen as institutions when observed as 
stable entities – whereas they become actants in concrete chains of translation. 
                                          
150 I emphasise that no anthropological ‘fieldwork’ in the fields of science or media has been 
involved in my research. I have not ‘followed scientists around society’, nor ethicists, nor the 
shapers of public opinion. I have only looked at the articulations of their work as this appears 
in the printed media of four major Danish newspapers. 
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In the concrete production of public articulation of biotechnology they constitute 
only part of the network. Together with a long list of other actants they consti-
tute the discursive possibilities of articulation. In order to make an argument it is 
necessary to imply some general notion of (dis)order as a logic of argumentation 
in the construction of a relation between problems and solutions, and for this, 
the four modes of articulating the collective present themselves as options. This 
conception of actor and structure, however, means that structure can only be de-
scribed in hindsight – as a pattern in actual processes. It is therefore not possible 
to claim universality in the typology of articulated collectives identified in this 
dissertation. Other modes might be identified in other contexts. Consequently, it 
is not possible to conclude that we can only articulate the collective in these four 
modes. But if we do not choose to open these black boxes, they mark the discur-
sive conditions of possibility for the regulation of biotechnology.  
 
 
The discursive conditions for regulating biotechnology 
In chapter 2 the formation of public opinion was defined as an on-going process 
of mediation and articulation. The analysis in chapter 6 pinpoints the fact, that 
not everything is equally well connected to everything. The important objective 
in studies of actual controversies or processes of public opinion formation is 
therefore to map the networks of articulation and indicate stronger and weaker 
relations in the form of alliances and adversaries. It is in the production of 
longer and stronger networks with higher density that can be said to identify 
more stable constructions of public opinion.  
 
On this account it becomes possible to speak of power in the process of public 
opinion formation, albeit in a manner that defines power as the outcome of a 
process, not as a determining input. Power is equivalent to longer and stronger 
networks. In accordance with the Latourian framework,151 I employ the notion 
of ‘power’ as a convenient way to summarise the consequence of collective ac-
tion. It is shorthand for the description of a strategic situation, which is the out-
come of a process, not a cause or effect that originally set the process in motion 
(Latour 1986:265). If we claim that an argument can be seen as powerful in the 
controversies about biotechnology, it is a way of saying that in the course of the 
controversies it has extended its network. It takes more of an actor to be able to 
                                          
151 And also in accordance with the Foucauldian notion of power as presented in The will to 
Knowledge, (Foucault 1976). 
 212 
 
refute the argument, since increasing numbers of allies also has to be fought.  
Powerful arguments are a function of associations, alliances, and all the positive 
connections that make it more difficult to disregard the argument.  
 
Consequently, the relative strength of arguments varies according to the number 
of other arguments that can be aligned. Powerful arguments have more associa-
tions at the cost of fewer substitutions and disconnections than less powerful 
arguments. The outcome of a study of actual processes of public opinion forma-
tion is therefore a general proposition about discursive power. We can say, that 
discursive power is to public opinion formation, what reality is to fabrication of 
scientific facts. It is the outcome of controversies – what was produced in the 
course of action. Claiming that an argument is (or has become) powerful, is 
merely an abbreviated way to describe the outcome of controversies, but in or-
der to be able to speak of this outcome relations in the form of associations and 
inscriptions have to be studied.  
 
What is important is that power in the controversies is not the ability to squash 
one’s opponents’ arguments, but rather to enter into dialogue and association 
with other arguments. Power is exercised in alliances. It is by translating the sa-
cred notions in each of the four modes into a common ground, which can be as-
sociated to other ways of articulating the collective, that power is exercised. It 
should be emphasised that this common ground is not another term for consen-
sus or Habermasian communicative action (Habermas 1987b). I use the term 
‘common ground’ as term for a mediating space, where it is perfectly likely that 
all actions are strategic, but it allows for translations in order to connect argu-
ments in some form or another. A powerful argument is therefore not an argu-
ment where the concrete solution to a problem only makes sense if subscribing 
to a single form of articulating the collective. Rather, the powerful arguments 
suggest solutions that can be inscribed as sensible in more than one way of ar-
ticulating the collective.  
 
It is obvious that this presentation of articulated collectives and discursive power 
raises the question of strategic subjects. Who is doing the inscription and sub-
scription in the controversies about biotechnology? In the context of this disser-
tation the only possible answer is a Foucauldian one: It is the network of articu-
lation that is the strategic subject itself. This answer is a result of choosing the 
analytical strategy of searching for patterns in articulations, rather than follow-
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ing the productive chains of translation creating the articulations. In the future, 
however, it would be extremely interesting to follow this second analytical strat-
egy, for instance by analysing the production of mass mediated news stories by 
following the negotiations between journalists, sources, occurrences, articulated 
collectives and so on. On the basis of the present dissertation, it would also be 
interesting to expand on the difference between the articulations in the four 
newspapers as identified in Chapters 3 and 6. Are these differences so stable that 
it will make sense to characterise them as organised segments in the public dis-
course? Future research, however, will have to investigate these questions, as it 
has been outside the scope of this dissertation to pursue them any further. 
 
The combination of the conceptual frameworks of Latour and Douglas produced 
a way of understanding public opinion formation as a constant process of articu-
lation in conflicting alliances, where both determinism and voluntarism is re-
jected.  Closure is only rarely a final solution to controversies, but can be seen as 
temporary settlements in discursive power struggles, where the outcome of 
processes is not determined.  
 
 
Development of controversies about biotechnology 
In order to strengthen the argument made about discursive power it is illuminat-
ing to summarise the controversies over cloning, gene therapy and regulation of 
research as empirically analysed in the previous chapters. As mentioned above I 
will focus on the dynamic aspects in this concluding discussion, that is, the alli-
ances between arguments as the change over time in each of these cases. Over-
all, it is of interest that the case of cloning seems to display a situation in which 
unanimous rejection gradually evolves into a more pliable form of resistance, as 
articulations of the benefits of therapeutic cloning seem to form a stronger net-
work. In contrast, the case of gene therapy displays the opposite tendency where 
scepticism seems to be adopted in a much broader spectrum of arguments during 
the years analysed. 
 
 
Cloning: From unanimous rejection to a softening of resistance 
As indicated in Chapter 3, it is possible to argue that immediately after Dolly 
was born and at the time of Seed’s announcement all inscriptions rejected hu-
man cloning and thus cultural unanimity could be stressed. As several analysts 
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have pointed out, human cloning in most western cultures is depicted as a fun-
damental threat to notions of individuality and uniqueness (Einsiedel et al. 2002; 
Priest 2001b; Hopkins 1998). In Chapters 3 and 6, however, it became clear, that 
this perceived threat is based on different articulations of the collective. Fur-
thermore, as the controversies on human cloning develop and the distinction be-
tween reproductive and therapeutic cloning is introduced, the differences in ar-
guments become more visible. Stressing cultural unanimity is therefore not 
wrong, but it rests on a particular association in a particular context, where ar-
guments subscribing to all the modes of articulating the collective associated 
positively with a rejection of human cloning as such. I will briefly summarise 
the main points in the arguments subscribing to each of the four modes to make 
it clear, how this alliance is composed and how it is challenged again by the in-
troduction of therapeutic cloning. In the following, I have chosen to simplify the 
language and speak of, for instance, hierarchical arguments rather than ‘argu-
ments subscribing to a hierarchical mode of articulating the collective’, although 
the latter is more precise. 
 
In hierarchical arguments the important thing is to identify the hierarchical 
principle according to which the right use of the cloning technique should be 
determined. In all the hierarchical arguments that I came across in Chapter 3 and 
6, reproductive cloning is seen as a violation of a basic hierarchical order. It is 
against the logic of scientific inquiry because it does not rest on scientifically 
proven knowledge. It is also unethical in, for instance, reducing the individual 
human being to a means rather than an end. Whether based on science or ethics 
as the basic hierarchical set of norms for collective order, a ban on reproductive 
cloning is seen as an appropriate way of sustaining the guiding norms. But 
whether this ban should also cover therapeutic cloning is a matter of divergent 
articulation. It seems that arguments subscribing to scientific authority present 
research trials with therapeutic cloning as squarely within the scope of responsi-
ble science. It is seen as a ‘natural’ new area for responsible scientific explora-
tion and therefore researchers should investigate this technology.152 On the other 
hand, most arguments subscribing to the hierarchical institution of ethics seem 
to imply that regardless of whether a real baby is born or not, cloning the fertil-
                                          
152 This difference can be taken to imply a tension between the need to stay within the limits 
of normal science and a need to go beyond these limits in order to create new discoveries, but 
I will not pursue this difference any further since a full account of this problem within ‘the 
logic of scientific inquiry’ is outside the scope of this project. 
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ised egg is anyhow a matter of transgressing a basic norm that should be held 
sacred precisely because it is a fundamental ethical norm. 
 
In articulations subscribing to competitive individualism, reproductive cloning is 
also rejected. In this case, however, it is not primarily because it violates a rule 
of proper conduct deduced from a hierarchical order, but because it currently 
serves no purpose.  Furthermore, it can be argued that it challenges the notion of 
individuality where every actor is free and autonomous, which is a prerogative 
for the exchange mechanism of the market to work. On this account a ban on 
reproductive cloning also makes sense in competitive arguments. Therapeutic 
cloning, on the other hand, is articulated as holding great promises for the future 
and therefore this technology should not be prohibited, but rather supported. In-
terestingly, the ban on reproductive cloning is seen as beneficial and supportive 
of the ability to explore the possibilities in therapeutic cloning. For instance, one 
of the quotes in Chapter 6 argues that it is important to prevent the ‘anxiety’ 
caused by resistance towards reproductive cloning from interfering negatively 
on the possibilities of therapeutic cloning. A prohibition of reproductive cloning 
can thus be seen as a necessary trade off. It will make the investigation of thera-
peutic cloning more acceptable, at the same time as no real sacrifices are made 
by prohibiting reproductive cloning, since it is seen to hold no current benefits. 
But it is also obvious that if substantial benefits were to appear in connection 
with reproductive cloning, arguments for the ban to be lifted would probably 
also appear since the most important value in this mode of articulating the col-
lective is the pragmatic evaluation of benefits and risks. 
 
In sectarian arguments, human cloning is articulated as a clear example of a 
general, problematic development of science, which should be resisted. Cloning 
is a natural extension of the growth of science so far. It is on the track of corrup-
tion, and will inevitably lead to the loss of any sense of humanity and the de-
struction of the community of people. Prohibiting cloning is thus one step in the 
resistance that should limit science and place it firmly under democratic control, 
in order for the current nature of the collective to be rescued from destruction 
and corruption. When the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic clon-
ing later appears, the sectarian arguments reject the latter as acceptable. Rather 
they treat the efforts to promote this distinction as a sign that corruption is 
threatening again. It is argued that it clearly shows how the instrumental sys-
tems, like science and business, will not stop at anything. Rather than admitting 
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that cloning is reprehensible and realising that therapeutic cloning will probably 
lead to reproductive cloning, these systems will pursue this kind of research at 
any cost. Furthermore, sectarian arguments maintain that the claimed potential 
for revolutionary beneficial outcomes have not been sufficiently substantiated 
and are just put forward as bait in order for these systems to be allowed to con-
tinue with the hideous exploitation of human life.   
 
Finally, fatalistic arguments seem to be the only articulations that do not unam-
biguously back the prohibition of human cloning. Not because they support the 
technology, but because they articulate a lack of trust in the effect of regulation. 
In so far as they articulate arguments about the regulation of research these 
amount to ironic comments suggesting that, no matter what kind of regulation 
the ‘system’, the ‘authorities’ or the ‘actors in control’ claim to be enforcing, it 
is impossible to stop scientific progress from having horrific consequences. On 
the other hand, this is treated with a kind of fatalism, in which the collective is 
presented as out of control. But, since this is a normal state of affairs, we have 
gotten used to it and expect no change. On this account I have not found the in-
troduction of the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning to 
have any consequences for fatalistic argumentation. Rather it seems that these 
arguments – of which there are not many when the issue is general regulation – 
seem to be treating the negotiations over acceptable regulation as a charade 
which does not have any real consequences. 
 
The analysis of the articulations of cloning, therefore, indicates an initial alli-
ance in favour of a general rejection of reproductive cloning. The fact that hier-
archical, competitive and sectarian arguments can associate positively to a pro-
hibition means that it would take a lot of effort to overcome this alliance and 
produce a viable alternative articulation if it is at all possible. The analysis also 
illustrates the dynamic and relative stability of this alliance as it shows how the 
initial agreement on the rejection of human cloning, as described in Chapter 3, is 
developed into new controversies, when the distinction between reproductive 
and therapeutic cloning is introduced, as described in Chapter 6. The alliance 
seems to be broken in two, when competitive and science-hierarchical argu-
ments are in favour of research in therapeutic cloning, whereas most arguments 
subscribing to ethical hierarchy as well as sectarian egality are in opposition. In 
figure 7.1 I have depicted this situation graphically as two different alliances on 
the regulation of human cloning. It should be noticed that the fatalistic argu-
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ments seem to be neither for nor against legislative prohibition of cloning, but 
they are definitely against human cloning and therefore they have been partly 
included in the sceptical alliance. 
 
  
 
 
 Authoritative Competitive 
 Hierarchy Individualism 
Alliance in favour of
permitting therapeutic
cloning 
 
 Sectarian Fatalistic 
 Egality  Isolation 
Alliance in 
favour of total 
ban on cloning 
 
 
  
Figure 7.1. Alliances in the controversy about regulation of human 
cloning after the introduction of therapeutic cloning  
 
 
The difference between these two alliances in the question of therapeutic clon-
ing can be seen as equivalent to the difference identified by Michael Mulkay in 
the British debate over embryo research between the rhetorics of hope and fear 
(Mulkay 1997). The alliance in favour of permitting therapeutic cloning can be 
seen to follow the rhetoric of hope, in which scientific development is basically 
articulated as prosperous and beneficial. In contrast, arguments subscribing to 
ethical hierarchy as well as sectarian arguments employ the rhetoric of fear, in 
which scientific progress threatens to ruin the quality of life enjoyed by the 
community of people. It is interesting to note that these differences must be ex-
pected to continue although greater utility might be ascribed to reproductive 
cloning in the future, since expectations of utility are not likely to be of decisive 
importance in the rhetoric of fear.  
 
On the other hand, although the arguments in this alliance against human clon-
ing all employ the rhetoric of fear, it is still possible to identify an internal dif-
ferentiation between these arguments. It is possible to recognize parallels to the 
distinction between a ‘green’ and a ‘blue’ resistance as identified by Hviid Niel-
sen and colleagues (Nielsen et al. 2002; Nielsen 1997). Most of the hierarchical 
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and fatalistic arguments seem very much in line with a ‘blue’, pre-modern resis-
tance, in which biotechnology runs counter to tradition and national order, and is 
therefore just basically wrong. In contrast, most of the sectarian arguments ar-
ticulate their warning against corruption in a setting of risks and benefits. Thera-
peutic cloning is a threat because it includes a risk of corruption, for instance by 
being a possible back door to reproductive cloning, without really having posi-
tive benefits. In this way it is possible to characterise this kind of argument as a 
‘green’, post-industrial criticism, in which biotechnology is seen to be too risky, 
and should therefore be restricted.  
 
The green resistance has been characterised as based on knowledge and scien-
tifically informed evaluation of risks and benefits, and therefore more ‘rational’ 
than the blue. In the present dissertation, this judgement of more and less ration-
ality cannot be sustained, since all the modes of articulating the collective are 
rational seen from their own perspective. Evaluating biotechnologies as benefi-
cial or dangerous is not a question of evaluating the technical, ethical and social 
implications first, and then deciding upon which opinion to hold. Rather, the 
evaluation is an integrated part of a general notion of social and natural order 
that makes some evaluations appear sensible and others less sensible. On the 
other hand, the distinction between different kinds of rationalities highlights the 
internal differentiation in the resistance to biotechnology. Although the different 
types of argument agree on a rejection of biotechnology, the reasons for this re-
jection might be very diverse, as it is possible to demonstrate with the example 
of gene therapy. 
 
 
Gene therapy:  From sectarian criticism to broader scepticism 
In contrast to the articulation of cloning in which a unanimous rejection was 
transformed into a split between opponents and proponents, so that the rejection 
in 2001 seems to be less comprehensive than the rejection of 1997, the devel-
opment of the articulation of gene therapy has moved in the other direction to-
wards broader resistance. Before the suspension of the experiment in Århus, 
only sectarian arguments seemed to be sceptical towards the general use of gene 
therapy. Although a common scepticism towards the use of gene therapy to en-
hance normality can be traced, hierarchical and competitive arguments were 
generally very optimistic about the future possibilities of curing serious diseases 
with gene therapy. In this way, gene therapeutic experiments are primarily in-
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scribed in settings of great expectations, but this rhetoric of hope seems to have 
been rather dampened after the articulation of the experiment in Århus. 
 
With regards to the criticism raised earlier by sectarian arguments, it is interest-
ing to notice, that I have only found one articulation of the concrete experiment 
in Århus that can be said to be explicitly subscribing to the sectarian mode of 
articulating the collective. In this argument the experiment is articulated as an 
example of medical science run wild, threatening to corrupt humanity and the 
community of people.153 Since it is difficult to present a sustainable analysis of 
missing phenomena, I will not pursue the question of why there are not more of 
these articulations. Yet, it should be noticed that sectarian arguments are com-
mon in general articulation of gene therapy. In these cases it is stressed that al-
though gene therapy is expected to hold great promise of cures, it might prove to 
be very problematic since it holds many risks of both technical and moral kinds.  
 
If we look at the other articulations of the experiment, it seems that hierarchical 
arguments primarily subscribe to scientific authority. They stress that experi-
ments have to be conducted responsibly, but also that it is important to address 
patient treatment concretely, and separate from the scientific exploration of pos-
sible gene therapies. In order for gene therapies to be developed in a distant fu-
ture, it is necessary for researchers to behave themselves with respect for the 
rules of scientific conduct and ‘proper’ research. Meanwhile, cancer patients 
should come to terms with their role as patients, suffering a deadly disease, and 
not go around expecting miracles. They should subject themselves to the scien-
tific research as test cases, but they should do so because it is their duty is to as-
sist in the scientific search for knowledge and cures of cancer, not because it is 
of benefit to themselves. These hierarchical arguments cannot be said to resist 
gene therapy as such, but they do formulate criticism of an undue, disrespectful, 
improper, and unrestricted utilization of biotechnology. The scientific explora-
tion of the field of biotechnology will not bring positive effects if it is not treated 
with due caution.  
 
In competitive arguments, it is possible to detect a division in arguments accord-
ing to different articulations of the need for regulation. Some of the arguments 
treat the experiment in Århus as an unfortunate, but minor, episode, which does 
                                          
153 The quote is mentioned in Chapter 6 in the section about sectarian egality. 
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not have any consequences for the general expectations of scientific research in 
gene therapy to deliver revolutionary results in the future. In this kind of argu-
ment it seems that not much has changed on account of the experiment. The sci-
entific enterprise is still viewed as an unlimited and unproblematic resource in 
society, expected to generate immense benefits in the future. On the other hand, 
many more of the competitive arguments articulate the experiment as pointing to 
a need to regulate biotechnological research, so that researchers will not take 
undue advantage of patients in their pursuit of scientific results. The implication 
in these arguments is that although the invisible hand of scientific progress is 
expected to generate many benefits it also produces problems in the form of a 
possible disregard of the autonomy of patients, since they are the weaker parties 
in the negotiable relation between patients and researchers. Biotechnological 
research should therefore not be allowed to suspend general notions of individ-
ual autonomy in the pursuit of effective solutions, and regulation has to enforce 
this. 
 
On this account a powerful alliance between arguments subscribing to scientific 
hierarchy and a regulated competitive individualism seems to have formed. The 
core of this alliance is the description of biotechnological research as an activity 
that needs to be performed with respect to stated rules of behaviour. If these 
rules are respected, scientific research must be expected to produce positive re-
sults in the form of cures for deadly diseases. On the other hand, this alliance 
does not seem very stable, when it comes to discussing the actual formulation 
and enforcement of regulations. On the one hand, arguments subscribing to 
regulated competitive individualism articulate external regulation as the only 
kind of regulation that will prevent researchers from taking undue advantage of 
their powerful position in the negotiated relation. On the other hand, arguments 
subscribing to scientific authority present internal rules of science as both suffi-
cient and more suitable than external regulation. External regulation is seen as 
an unsuitable and possibly harmful interference in a hierarchical order that 
should be self-regulating rather than controlled from the outside.  
 
On this account arguments subscribing to a scientific authority then seem to 
form an alliance with arguments subscribing to an un-regulated competitive in-
dividualism about resistance towards external regulation of biotechnological re-
search. In contrast, arguments subscribing to a regulated competitive individual-
ism can be seen to associate positively with the previous sectarian arguments 
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calling for external regulation. So after the suspension of the experiment in År-
hus, the articulation of a need for external regulation controlling the exploration 
of biotechnology is formulated in a broader spectrum than before, now also in-
cluding many arguments subscribing to a regulated competitive individualism.  
 
  
 Authoritative Competitive 
 Hierarchy Individualism 
 
 
 Sectarian Fatalistic 
 Egality Isolation 
 
  
 
Alliance in favour of 
external regulation  
Alliance in favour 
of no external 
regulation 
  
Figure 7.2. Alliances on regulation of biotechnological research on 
humans after the experiment in Århus 
 
 
At the same time, however, another interesting trend may also be noted. 
Whereas fatalistic arguments articulated fierce criticism of biotechnological re-
search in connection with cloning, this criticism seems to have vanished in con-
nection with gene therapy, which is described as a working solution. In this con-
text, however, it should be emphasised that it is not the scientific search for 
knowledge, which is praised in fatalistic arguments about the experiment in År-
hus. It is not science, which is seen as the solution, but rather the actions of sin-
gle heroes. Similar to the articulation of cloning, the general activity of science 
and research is rejected and described as outside of control - following an inexo-
rable if inchoate logic. But in the case of gene therapy it is evident that fatalistic 
arguments distinguish between concrete applications of biotechnology and the 
general search for true knowledge as an abstract, generalised ideal. And whereas 
the other three types of arguments all imply that the latter is a precondition to 
the first, fatalistic arguments do not present science as a precondition for bio-
technological solutions to problems of disease. Solutions stem from actions, not 
from general ideals about science. 
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By this criticism of the general rationale behind science, the case of gene ther-
apy hereby pinpoints a broad and fundamental alliance, composed of the argu-
ments subscribing to authoritative hierarchy, competitive individualism and sec-
tarian egality. The fatalistic opposition makes it clear that the other three all sub-
scribe to the notion of systematic knowledge as a positive ideal and a precondi-
tion for effective technological solutions. And this also exemplifies the main 
difference between the sectarian and the fatalistic criticisms of biotechnology. 
Sectarian arguments subscribe to an ideal of scientific truth and the possibility of 
finding solutions through a scientific search for knowledge, but it distinguishes 
between this ideal and the social system of science – the actual organisations 
and practices of science – which is rejected as corrupt and dangerous. Fatalistic 
arguments do not subscribe to the system of science, but it does not subscribe to 
the ideal of scientific truths either. In accordance with the term fatalism, they 
reject the possibility of any systematic search for solutions to problems and this 
seems to be the core difference between the two oppositional logics. 
 
As discussed previously, fatalistic modes of articulating the collective can be 
seen as a kind of ‘blue’ scepticism. It is critical of biotechnology as a general 
societal activity and this criticism is guided by a general opposition to systems 
of power and a disbelief in systematic ways of exercising control and generating 
knowledge. In this way, I will argue that this opposition should not primarily be 
interpreted as an instance of ignorance or lack of knowledge, but rather as the 
rejection of science as a possible way of creating systematic knowledge about 
science. The rejection of the possibility of creating a beneficial collective order 
naturally connects to a view, where technoscientific research is not considered a 
beneficial activity. 
 
Furthermore, the example of gene therapy also points to an apparent contradic-
tion in the fact that fatalistic arguments reject cloning but praise gene therapy as 
means of curing cancer. It is not uncommon between researchers of public opin-
ion on biotechnology to explain differences like this in terms of ‘immaturity’ in 
opinion formation, see for example Midden et al. (2002). Hereby they express 
the view that apparent contradictions will disappear as the publics become more 
familiar with biotechnology in general. In the context of the present dissertation 
I have proposed that this difference between cloning and gene therapy is a mat-
ter of perceived benefits, where it is completely compatible with a fatalistic 
mode of articulating the collective that the chance of curing cancer is sufficient 
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reason to go ahead with genetic experiments, even if biotechnology in general is 
rejected. Fatalistic arguments might fiercely reject biotechnology on an abstract 
level, but this does not lead to a similar rejection of concrete genetic experi-
ments if they are seen to have benefits for subjects who are perceived as worthy 
of help. 
 
In figure 7.3, I present these main alliances. It demonstrates how a major alli-
ance subscribing to an ideal of true scientific knowledge is visible in the light of 
an anti-science opposition articulated in the arguments subscribing to fatalistic 
isolation that refuses to accept this ideal. Although the three types of arguments 
in the former alliance do not agree on the way biotechnology should be regu-
lated, they do all imply that regulation ideally should serve the purpose of sup-
porting the creation of true knowledge for the benefit of society. 
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 Sectarian Fatalistic 
 Egality Isolation 
 
 
Alliance rejecting 
possibility of scien-
tific knowledge as 
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scientifically 
established true 
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Figure 7.3. Alliances on the value of scientific research 
 
From these two examples it is obvious that the lines of conflict in the controver-
sies do not necessarily lie precisely between the two ways of exercising power at 
the top, and the two ways of opposing power at the bottom. Rather different alli-
ances are possible. That the lines of conflict are not always primarily horizontal 
will indeed be even more obvious if we consider the issue of biotechnological 
patents, which has also been causing controversy in the time period considered 
in this dissertation. Although it has not been object of independent analyses, ar-
guments concerning this issue were part of the analysis in Chapter 6 and on this 
basis it is possible to sketch the main alliances and conflicts. The conflict over 
biotechnological patents originated around the effort to implement a special 
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regulation of patents in relation to biotechnology. This issue raised questions 
about acceptability of economic gains, freedom of research, public vs. private 
research and the distribution of profits. From the analysis in Chapter 6, it seems 
that competitive arguments were most favourable towards the new rules stress-
ing that it is of paramount importance that researchers and companies are able to 
take out patents on the valuable knowledge they create, since there will not be 
incentives to produce this kind of knowledge, if it is not possible to protect the 
commercial exploitation. 
 
The sectarian arguments, on the other hand, describe the mixture of economic 
profit and knowledge creation as an extremely problematic combination, which 
demonstrates the corruption of science as well as the imminent need for regula-
tion that will protect genetic knowledge from being infested with impurities 
stemming from economic exploitation. And most of the hierarchical arguments 
seem to share this view that scientific research should not be mixed with eco-
nomic considerations since these extra-scientific considerations might under-
mine freedom of research as well as the collegial system of peer-review, which 
is described as a fundamental norm in the ‘proper’ conduct of research. On this 
account an alliance between sectarian and hierarchical arguments agrees on the 
importance of keeping the activity of science and the economic activity in the 
business market distinct and separated from each other. In contrast to this alli-
ance we find the competitive arguments, which seem to be more worried about 
the possible harm to the invisible hand of scientific progress that is seen as a 
likely result of this separation, than a possible transgression of logics of different 
systems.  
 
In this way it is obvious that both hierarchical and competitive arguments can be 
seen to defend the social activity of knowledge creation in technoscientific set-
tings against harmful restraints and interference. But their definitions of the na-
ture of technoscientific activity as well as the definition of harmful restraints 
vary. Whereas hierarchical arguments want to protect the institution of science 
against undue and improper interference from other institutions of society, for 
instance market forces, competitive arguments want to protect a market logic of 
scientific activity.154 
                                          
154 As mentioned previously this can be seen to illustrate a fundamental tension (or alliance, 
dependent on point of view) in the concepts of science within sociology and the theory of 
science, but a general explication of the difference between conceptualisations of the invisible 
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Discursive conditions for regulating biotechnology 
As the examples of cloning, gene therapy and biotechnological patents show 
there are differences in alliances and lines of conflict between different contro-
versial issues. This dissertation has mapped the controversies over two of the 
major issues in the period between 1997 and 2001, measured in media attention. 
But in order to understand conflicts about genetic determinism, genetic tests, 
stem cell research and so on, it is necessary to conduct in depth analyses of each 
separate case. The present analyses can therefore not deliver a full description of 
Danish controversies over health care related biotechnology in Denmark in the 
period 1997 to 2001, although it does provide a map of some of the more high 
profile controversies.  
 
The most interesting conclusion from the examples is that the alliances formed 
in each case are different from each other. Cloning represents a situation in 
which hierarchical arguments are divided, so that some tend to be associated 
with competitive individualism (benefits in therapeutic cloning should be ex-
plored) and others with sectarian arguments (therapeutic cloning is just as bad as 
reproductive cloning). Gene therapy represents a situation in which competitive 
arguments are split between an alliance with hierarchy (science is best left to its 
own internal regulation) and sectarian egality (science needs to be regulated 
from the outside).  And finally, the sketched example of patents represents a 
situation in which hierarchical and sectarian arguments form an alliance (it is 
wrong to mix economic exploitation with the scientific pursuit of true knowl-
edge) with competitive arguments on the other side of the line of conflict (eco-
nomic exploitation is necessary for scientific progress).  
 
Although the present analyses do not result in a comprehensive description of all 
controversial issues regarding biotechnology in Denmark, they make it possible 
to outline the basic generic criteria for each of the four modes of articulating the 
collective to enter into alliance with each other about closure in the form of 
some kind of regulation of biotechnology.  
 
In hierarchical arguments the vital concern is to respect the general hierarchical 
order from which it is possible to deduce a solution to problems. Therefore it is 
important to identify this order and inform all relevant actors of the rules and 
                                                                                                                                   
hand of scientific progress and the institution of science is outside the scope of this disserta-
tion. 
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roles deducted from this order. In general, regulation of biotechnology can be 
regarded as positive, since it can be seen as a way of putting the hierarchical or-
der into practice. But it is important that the regulation is based on the ‘proper’ 
order, since ‘improper’ orders, for instance external regulation of science, is 
wrong, because it mixes things that ought to be kept apart.  
 
In competitive arguments the important concern is to respect the basic freedom 
of actors to pursue individual preferences and negotiate freely with each other. 
Regulation is therefore only considered beneficial if it sustains the basic free-
dom of individuals. Regulation for the sake of a general hierarchical order is 
considered unacceptable. On the other hand, many of the competitive arguments 
articulate the need to regulate the rules for the exchange relations in the market 
forces in order to protect the some parties and their basic freedom. But in this 
case it is important that regulation is seen to benefit certain pragmatic aims, 
rather than protecting a general privilege or a role. 
  
In sectarian arguments the important concern is to acknowledge that the trend is 
on the wrong track and to sound the alarm in order to raise awareness of the 
imminent disaster. On this account regulation in the form of restriction can be 
viewed positively as a possibility of demarcating an absolute limit. It can be 
seen as the turning point in which corruption will finally be taken seriously and 
a protective fence of prohibition will be erected. On the other hand, regulative 
measures are likely to be deemed insufficient as protection towards the lurking 
disaster. From the sectarian perspective, no restrictions are likely to be satisfac-
tory. 
 
In fatalistic arguments it seems that there is no general notion, which is de-
scribed as sacred and worthy of protection. Rather this perspective is ironic and 
sceptical towards any articulation of a positive collective order. Benefits and 
problems are distributed on a random basis in this world and as individuals we 
might as well just accept this. On this account the systematic production of 
knowledge within science is not accepted as a means to a better world. Similarly 
regulation tends to be disregarded as a means of controlling society in any posi-
tive direction. This perspective seems to have a distinct negative bias towards 
any perceived system of power, whereas positive associations seem to be con-
nected to romantically staged actors in the role of heroes and victims. 
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These outlines are of course highly simplistic, just as they disregard the fact that 
alliances as well as conflicts can also exist between arguments subscribing to the 
same mode of articulating the collective. On a generic level, however, these de-
scriptions make it possible to characterise the similarities and differences be-
tween these four modes of articulating the collective. In this context, it should be 
noticed that I explicitly chose not to follow the four-field typology of Mary 
Douglas with the dimensions of grid and group as described in chapter 2 and 5. 
Rather I have treated the four modes as four different perspectives in the analy-
sis. I will not repeat the discussion behind this choice, but it is obvious that fig-
ure 6.7 and the following figures in this chapter can be regarded as equivalent to 
the grid-group matrix, only stripped of lines separating each compartment. Es-
pecially when I will now point to generic possibilities of alliances it becomes 
obvious that the similarities and dissimilarities between these four perspectives 
can also be interpreted as dimensions in a four-field composed of these four 
modes. But to argue that these dimensions are underlying structures guiding the 
distinctions is not the view adopted here. Rather they are dimensions that point 
to differences as well as possibilities of alliances. 
 
The most obvious generic difference separating two opposite alliances is the 
horizontal division between the two modes of articulating the collective at the 
top and the two modes at the bottom. These alliances are formed around a basic 
outlook on the existing natural and social order. The top positions view the col-
lective order as positive and they also primarily articulate science as a basically 
beneficial activity. Arguments subscribing to an ethical hierarchy are sceptical 
towards science as uncontrolled activity, but they still imply that it is possible to 
control science in order to achieve favourable outcomes. The bottom positions 
on the other hand view the existing social and natural order as problematic or 
non-existing and they articulate science as system or authority as part of this 
problematic order. Whereas the top positions can agree on the need to regulate 
in order to preserve collective order, the bottom positions would be more posi-
tive towards regulation that is seen to change this order.  
 
A different line of conflict deals with the position towards the need for coordi-
nated collective action. Whereas the left positions in the figure both seem to ar-
gue for the need for all members of society to engage in collectively coordinated 
action – everybody should respect the hierarchical rules or be aware of the dan-
ger of corruption – the positions on the right side of the figure do not seem to 
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stress this necessity. In the positions on the right-hand side, collective order 
seems to be perceived as more robust and self-preserving. Although competitive 
arguments can be seen to argue in favour of regulation that protects some parties 
it does not seem to be necessary to actively seek to sustain the market of ex-
change relations. Order will basically come about by itself, if all actors are ca-
pable of pursuing their own goals. Similarly, the fatalistic perspective seems to 
favour the view that collective order is chaotic or at least only beneficial to ‘the 
others’, and that since this situation cannot be changed, it is of no use worrying 
about it. 
 
As the example of gene therapy showed, alliances can also be formed on the di-
agonal. In that case, a possible alliance could be formed between sectarian and 
competitive arguments on the need to create external regulation of science to 
protect patients from being exploited unduly. The core in this alliance is resis-
tance towards a hierarchical logic - in this case that of science - from disregard-
ing the autonomy of the individual human being. Whereas individual freedom is 
important in competitive individualism, the need to protect the human being 
from exploitation by systems of power is important in sectarian egality. And 
since the sectarian notion of a basically good human nature can rather easily be 
made compatible with the competitive ideal of autonomous individuals an alli-
ance between these two can be formed. In contrast to this diagonal, it is possible 
to identify a potential alliance between hierarchy and fatalism in a rejection of 
this focus on the individual person, but I have not come across this kind of ar-
gumentation in the present empirical material.  
 
On a general level it can be concluded that there are probably a lot of insights to 
be gained from further exploration of this model of four modes of articulating 
the collective. It should be probable to use it as a heuristic model for exploration 
of concrete controversies, but it also holds the possibility of generating theses to 
be discussed and explored in empirical analysis. In the present context I will 
stress the conclusion that alliances can be imagined between all four modes of 
articulating the collective, just as it is also probable that arguments subscribing 
to the same mode present diverse arguments about a concrete topic. So contro-
versies are not just a matter of different modes of articulating the collective be-
ing in opposition to each other. Rather, the typology catches some of the differ-
ences – especially with regard to the basic logic of argumentation in favour of 
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particular ways of reaching closure, but other differences will have to be identi-
fied by other analyses.  
 
 
Public debate as a vehicle for political closure? 
In order to discuss the practical conclusions that should be drawn from this dis-
sertation, I want to return to the question of public debate as a vehicle for clo-
sure. As described in the problem statement, the Danish debate about biotech-
nology is characterised by broad subscription to this ideal. In Chapter 6 it be-
came obvious that hierarchical, competitive and sectarian arguments all connect 
positively to an ideal of public debate as a mechanism for co-ordination and 
problem solving, although the argumentative logic in the support of this ideal 
was different in each case. Observing these different arguments, however, it also 
appears that they display some similarities with the three models of the commu-
nicative relationship between science and the public identified in Chapter 1. 
These similarities are important since they display how the model of four articu-
lated collectives can be employed as a heuristic typology. But they also inspire 
to some reflexive conclusions on the practical outcome of this dissertation.  
 
Under authoritative hierarchy, public debate is a means of educating and in-
forming the public about the hierarchical order of society and the ascribed roles 
and rules. Controversies are seen as instances of lack of knowledge about the 
guiding principles and the order they produce in society. The key issue is there-
fore to remedy this lack of knowledge, and it is based on a general assumption 
that if people only know, they will automatically do the right thing. In this way 
this mode of articulating the collective can be said to guide the perspectives of 
traditional PUS discussed in Chapter 1, where the objective is to create scientifi-
cally literate citizens through an asymmetrical communicative process in which 
information is conveyed from the experts to the lay publics. When people are 
sceptical towards science it is because they do not have sufficient information. 
So if they are just presented with the right kind of information, controversy is 
expected to cease. 
 
Under sectarian egality public debate is articulated as a possibility of sounding 
the alarm and for ordinary people to engage in egalitarian and democratic dia-
logue with the aim of restricting the system of science. The perspectives pre-
sented under the common heading of critical PUS can be said to have some af-
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finities with this mode of articulating the collective, when they stress the ideal of 
deliberation in participatory methods and explain controversies as lack of de-
mocratic control over science. It is characteristic for this ideal that the lay public 
should express their criticism of science under the observation of strictly proce-
dural rules of equality in order to arrive at legitimate regulation of tech-
noscience. In accordance with sectarian egality, these accounts can be seen to 
have a tendency to romanticise the public and present lay knowledge as some-
how more genuine than expert knowledge created within the realms of the sys-
tem of science. It is, however, also important to notice that the similarities are 
not as straight forward as between traditional PUS and the authoritative hierar-
chy, since most of the authors cited under the heading of critical PUS do not 
seem to be as radical in the description of immediate danger of corruption 
threatening the community of people as the mass mediated arguments explored 
in this dissertation. 
 
In competitive individualism public debate is a mechanism for pragmatic and 
contextual mediation between different interests and preferences, with the aim 
of reaching a pragmatic solution that can gain the most supporters, because it is 
seen as holding more benefits than risks. The third model identified in Chapter 
1, the network model, in which communication between publics and science is 
seen as the mediation of rational arguments based on pragmatism and credibility 
with the aim of reaching interim closure in political negotiations can likewise be 
seen to be similar to the competitive mode of articulating the collective. To-
wards the end, I will return to this similarity between the network model and 
competitive individualism since it has been the basis for the entire analysis and 
therefore gives rise to some reflexive comments about the ontological perspec-
tive adopted in this dissertation.  
 
Only arguments subscribing to fatalistic isolation do not associate positively to 
the ideal of public debate, but seem to view it as a sphere for manipulation by 
the systems of authority. As argued previously, in Chapter 6, it is awkward for 
arguments about the general constitution of society to subscribe to the fatalistic 
mode of articulating the collective. Therefore, it is not surprising that I did not 
identify a perspective within the academic tradition of public understanding of 
science to be similar to the mode of fatalistic isolation. Rather the arguments 
that I have identified within this perspective must be seen as the kind of argu-
ments that both traditional and critical PUS want to eliminate. In these perspec-
 231 
 
tives ironic detachment and the rejection of scientific knowledge is perceived as 
a kind of argumentation that can be made obsolete by enlightenment in the form 
of either information or participation.  
 
The reason for presenting these similarities between the typology of articulated 
collectives and the three models within PUS is not to portray one of them as on-
tologically more true or better than the other. Rather it serves to make it appar-
ent that each of these models also subscribes to a particular way of representing 
society, science, public, in short, an articulated collective, just like all other ar-
guments presented in the controversies. This is a consequence of the relational 
ontology adopted in this dissertation. There is no articulable place outside the 
network of articulation. No privileged place from which it is possible to observe 
the controversies without being guided by previous observations and associated 
allies.  
 
In this dissertation I subscribed to the network model, but this model has 
strengths and limitations as well as the other models. The force of the network 
model, subscribing to a competitive mode of articulating the collective, is that it 
makes us able to see controversies about biotechnological research as political 
struggles over the social and political order – as a cultural conflict. In this way it 
can be seen to be a second order study of problematisations – an observation of 
how other actors observe a given phenomenon – in this case political regulation 
of biotechnology. The analytical strategy constructed on the basis of this model, 
however, is not able to shed much light on the effect of information, which is the 
main force of traditional PUS, or mechanisms of participation, which is the force 
of critical PUS. The present dissertation is therefore not able to provide conclu-
sions as to what would be an effective way of communicating knowledge about 
biotechnology in order to enhance the public understanding of science. Neither 
is it possible to make explicit recommendations for improving participatory 
methods in order to enhance legitimacy of the technoscientific development. 
What this dissertation can do, is to provide some knowledge that ought to be of 
value in future analyses of the public understanding of science as well as con-
crete efforts to raise the information level and develop participatory methods, as 
I will sketch in the concluding section. And in this context, I will take the liberty 
of speaking about the modes of articulating the collective as actants that can be 
equipped with preferences, interests and resources.  
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Discursive conditions for regulating biotechnology 
It is obvious that although the three modes authoritative hierarchy, competitive 
individualism and sectarian egality all associate positively to an ideal about pub-
lic debate, the rhetoric behind these associations are very different. Conse-
quently, they disagree about the objective of the process of public debate, and 
what it takes for this process to lead to a legitimate closure. Whereas hierarchy 
would like to see properly educated citizens behaving according to their pre-
scribed role, competitive individualism would appreciate a mediation of prefer-
ences and sectarian egality would like members of the community to be aware 
of the danger of corruption and change behaviour. Nevertheless, it is an impor-
tant point that they need not agree on the outcomes in order to agree on the ne-
cessity of public debate. In so far as they each do not see a fulfilment of their 
preferred objective, they can agree on the necessity for more public debate. On 
this account these demands for debate can be seen as a kind of lightning rod, that 
takes the heat off of the unfulfilled expectations. If public debate has not satis-
fied the objectives yet, we just need some more of it.  
 
The alliance on the positive expectations towards public debate is important for 
the understanding of experiments with participatory methods. It seems that all 
modes, except fatalism, can agree on the positive values of these experiments. In 
itself this is ironic since it must be expected that fatalistic arguments are pre-
cisely the kind of arguments that the other three modes are most concerned with 
eliminating by participatory experiments. Precisely the rejection of the possibil-
ity of positive control of the collective, the rejection of science, ethics and public 
debate as means of reaching closure in controversies, are features that the other 
modes cannot associate positively to. Rather, from their perspectives, fatalism is 
seen as an arbitrary reaction due to lack of knowledge or participation that could 
be remedied by participation in a dialogue about biotechnology and the general 
social and natural constitution. In this way it is possible to claim that fatalistic 
isolation is the only mode of articulating the collective that does not buy into 
some notion of enlightenment through public communication. This notion of 
enlightenment can be seen as the basic reason for staging public debates – what I 
earlier referred to as the implied need for artificial life support in order to create 
public discussion. In this broad alliance around the notion of enlightenment, it 
makes sense to orchestrate public debate as initial top-down processes because it 
is expected that it will create bottom-up effects. 
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It should be noticed, however, that of these different objectives, the sectarian 
demand for an egalitarian, deliberative debate is the most difficult to satisfy. 
This, however, is not surprising since it is part of this mode of articulating the 
collective to be in opposition and to raise claims that are characterised precisely 
by idealism. The point of sectarian criticism is not to reach closure, but to keep 
existing as criticism. Taken in their full consequence, the objectives of hierarchy 
and competitive individualism is probably also impossible to satisfy completely, 
but since they are both in favour of sustaining and preserving present social or-
der, it seems to be more acceptable to settle for partial satisfaction. It is not ab-
solutely necessary for all members of society to be ‘properly’ informed and edu-
cated about hierarchical order as long as a majority is protecting this order. 
Similarly, it is not necessary for all preferences to be included in the mediating 
negotiations if only the most important ones are incorporated. 
 
It is therefore important to stress that whereas hierarchy and competitive indi-
vidualism will tend to be more positive towards actual experiments with partici-
patory methods, sectarian egality is likely to be disappointed by the outcomes of 
these experiments. In the two systems-preserving modes it is probably positive 
in any case that participatory experiments were conducted, as they are expected 
to have conveyed at least some knowledge about the hierarchical order or have 
let some preferences be voiced. In these modes, therefore, each experiment with 
participatory methods can be seen as a step in the right direction. Contrary to 
this, sectarian arguments are much more devoted to a fundamental change. If 
this change is not brought about, the participatory experiments will just have 
been another step in the wrong direction, preserving the wrongful collective or-
der as it is.  
 
In this context it is also important that according to the present analyses, it is 
impossible to find a universal measure by which the effect or efficiency of par-
ticipatory methods can be evaluated. This is partly because of conflicts between 
the different articulated collectives and partly because of practical impossibili-
ties. From a hierarchical viewpoint participatory methods are expected to inform 
lay people. But whereas crude information levels can be measured it is difficult 
to establish causal relationships between the development of a controversy and 
these measures. From a competitive viewpoint participatory methods are ex-
pected to lead to negotiation of preferences, but only real time development will 
reveal whether a working compromise has been struck. And finally, from a sec-
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tarian viewpoint participatory methods are supposed to awaken the lay public 
and result in behavioural change and democratic control over technoscience. But 
within this mode of articulating the collective it is impossible to decide whether 
corruption has been overcome or just adopted new forms of disguise. This lack 
of possibility for measurement of effect, however, does not seem to lead to a 
disregard for participatory methods. Rather, it seems that in the logic of most 
arguments, expectations in the positive outcomes of these methods are sufficient 
in order to associate positive to them.  
 
Therefore, it could be tempting to conclude on the basis of this dissertation, that 
participatory methods as well as other efforts to enlighten citizens might not 
have great effects since they will only have intended effects on actors already 
sharing the basic assumptions about social and natural order implied in the dif-
ferent modes of articulating the collective. This however, is taking the conclu-
sion far beyond what has been argued here, since it implies that actors inhabit 
these modes of articulating the collective on a stable basis. This is not the per-
spective of the present dissertation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, they are 
available discursive positions for making arguments, but there is no necessary 
stability in the subscription to these modes. There is no determinism in adopting 
them, and human beings probably take on these positions in various patterns of 
change and stability. Furthermore, my analyses do not suggest that it is possible 
– let alone desirable – to eliminate either of these modes of articulating the col-
lective, as I will argue in the last section. 
 
Proposing that the staging of public debate can function as a lightning rod 
should not be understood to imply that the ideal of public debate is an inade-
quate or inappropriate substitute for a more genuine and effective vehicle for 
reaching closure. The differences in objectives connected to the notion of clo-
sure through debate means that public debate will probably never satisfy one of 
these modes of articulating the collective completely. But this is a matter of a 
fundamental condition in society. We do not live in a harmonious community of 
consensus, rather the dialogue is political as Douglas and Latour both will have 
us agreeing. Each day we engage in confrontations exploring what will hold 
with what – no matter whether it is local details or general discussions on the 
social and natural constitution, both of which are incorporated into each other as 
the notion of articulated collectives have pinpointed. Although public debate is 
unlikely to serve as a means to reach a final solution, so that controversies will 
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cease, it is not a function that modern society can dispense with. Rather it is a 
fundamental feature of society that exists in some form or another, and person-
ally I will side with Douglas and Wildavsky in preferring a civilised version:   
 
Seen in their worst light, all three forms of cultural bias are 
contradictory and self-defeating. Each sees particular dangers and 
fails to see others of its own producing. When the argument about 
risks of technology is locked in stalemate, it is good to know the 
assumptions on which each debating position is grounded. A 
second marriage, Dr. Johnson said, reveals the triumph of hope 
over experience. At the heart of efforts to further the dialogue 
between border and center lies a contradiction between the desire 
for debate and the realization that discussion has proven 
unproductive. It is easy enough to say let there be dialogue, for a 
pluralistic society should work out the accommodation between 
initially rival and hostile views. But our analysis shows why the 
rival perspectives are polarized, each selecting facts to support pre-
existing perceptions of risk. At least we know better now than to 
wish to see the erosion of the center or the suppression of the 
border. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:185) 
 
The underlying argument in this quote is that culture thrives on opposition. Each 
of the four modes of articulating the collective should be seen as justified in 
their own right. In my view it is the combination of oppositional logics that will 
create the healthiest or most stable social climate for technoscientific creation of 
new knowledge and technology. Rather than viewing opposition as wrongful 
obstacles (no matter from which articulated collective one judges opposition), I 
will propose to view it as resource in the creation of long-term solutions. By 
making this argument, however, I have also pinpointed the cultural bias of the 
present dissertation: that legitimate closure is reached through mediation of in-
terests and preferences.  
 
Seen from the perspective of competitive individualism, the other perspectives 
must be doomed to fail in the efforts to create scientific literacy or egalitarian 
participation, but then again this is a choice of perspective. If viewed from the 
other perspectives the network model will err in its lack of prescription of better 
and worse collective action. If authoritative hierarchy and sectarian egality can 
agree on anything it is the need for action in order to ensure that the collective 
will not decay. Seen from their perspective competitive individualism presents a 
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dangerous consumerism that ultimately furthers functional explanations, which 
uphold the present system without offering anything in the way of normative 
judgements.  
 
In the context of the relational ontology presented in Chapter 2, I will argue that 
a choice between these perspectives represent a choice of collective that each of 
us wants to live in. And since I am not sure that I prefer the world to be a collec-
tive shaped according to competitive individualism, the next step must be to dis-
cuss how it is possible to be normative within the perspective of the network 
model. Realising that powerful arguments are created in alliances between the 
four modes of articulating the collective is probably the first step in this explora-
tion, but future research will have to take this further. 
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Danish Summary 
 
Afhandlingen undersøger massemedierede kontroverser om bioteknologi som 
politiske uenigheder ved at analysere argumenters konstruktion af problemer og 
løsninger. Det hævdes at ethvert argument i kontroverserne altid implicit artiku-
lerer en eller anden bestemt forestilling om den sociale (og naturlige) orden og 
om, hvordan denne orden opretholdes eller kritiseres. En sådan forestilling er 
afgørende for at argumentet kan fungere som argument, dvs. som en menings-
fuld sammenkædning af et problem og en mulig problemløsning. Kontroverser-
ne om bioteknologi handler derfor ikke kun om teknologi og forskning, men er 
grundlæggende uenigheder om, hvilken rolle forskningen skal spille i samfun-
det, og om social organisering i al almindelighed. En analyse af mønstre i disse 
argumenter kan derfor belyse de diskursive mulighedsbetingelser for regulering 
af bioteknologi i Danmark. 
 
Afhandlingens teoretiske grundlag er en relationel ontologi formuleret på bag-
grund af den franske filosof og videnssociolog Bruno Latour, der giver anled-
ning til at formulere en forståelse af offentlig meningsdannelse som en konstant 
produktion af italesættelse i netværk. For at kunne analysere denne strøm af ita-
lesættelse inddrager afhandlingen den britisk-amerikanske antropolog Mary 
Douglas’ kulturteori som et analysestrategisk redskab. Det empiriske materiale 
udgøres af dagbladsartikler fra Politiken, Jyllandsposten, Information og Ekstra 
Bladet. På baggrund af en række søgeord er der udvalgt 1575 artikler i perioden 
1. august 1997 – 31. december 2001, der omhandler sundhedsrelateret biotekno-
logi. En foreløbig indholdsanalyse af disse artikler er dokumenteret i et bilag til 
afhandlingen.  
 
Afhandlingens kapitel 3 og 4 er empiriske case-analyser af italesættelsen af hen-
holdsvis human kloning og genterapi. Det undersøges hvordan konkrete hændel-
ser gøres til nyhedsværdige begivenheder ved inskription i forskellige ’scripts’. 
Ved hjælp af inspiration fra Douglas’ kulturteori translateres disse scripts i kapi-
tel 5 til en typologi over fire forskellige måder at artikulere kollektivet – fire for-
skellige forestillinger om den sociale og naturlige orden. På baggrund af denne 
typologi undersøges det i kapitel 6, hvordan forskellige typer af argumenter ita-
lesætter centrale fænomener som ’forskning’, ’etik’ og ’offentlig debat’, og 
hermed identificeres de diskursive mulighedsbetingelser for reguleringen af bio-
teknologi. 
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I det Autoritære hierarki bliver kollektivet artikuleret som en hierarkisk orden af 
forudbestemte roller med regler, der foreskriver pligter og privilegier for hver 
position i hierarkiet. Kontroverser løses ved at deducere den bedste løsning fra 
det overordnede princip, og eventuel regulering skal være en gennemsættelse af 
dette princip. I den Konkurrerende individualisme bliver kollektivet artikuleret 
som et marked af udvekslingsrelationer mellem autonome aktører, der er define-
ret ved deres individuelle profil af interesser, ressourcer og præferencer. Kon-
troverser løses ved forhandling med henblik på at opnå midlertidige og pragma-
tiske kompromisser, og eventuel regulering skal derfor angive procedurelle reg-
ler for denne forhandling, herunder beskytte individets autonomi og frihed til at 
indgå i forhandlende relationer.  
 
I den Sekteriske lighedstænkning bliver kollektivet artikuleret som en kamp-
plads, hvor magtfulde systemer truer med at korrumpere humaniteten og det fol-
kelige fællesskab, og hvor aktører derfor primært defineres ved, om de tilhører 
systemerne eller de kritiske enklaver, der yder modstand. Kontroverser er udtryk 
for modstand og løses kun ved, at truslen om korrumpering afværges ved en 
gennemgribende forandring af samfundet. Regulering er derfor positiv, hvis den 
bidrager hertil. Endelig bliver kollektivet i den fatalistiske isolation artikuleret 
som et tilfældigt kaos, hvor hverken handlinger eller resultater kan forudsiges, 
og hvor aktørerne derfor ikke har nogen mulighed for at styre udviklingen. Kon-
troverser kan derfor heller ikke løses, men de kan give anledning til ironiske 
kommentarer og en satirisk distance, og generelt er synet på regulering skeptisk. 
 
På baggrund af denne typologi er det i kapitel 7 muligt generisk at beskrive de 
dis-kursive mulighedsbetingelser for reguleringen af bioteknologi ved at forstå 
diskursiv magt som evnen til at skabe alliancer mellem forskellige måder at arti-
kulere kollektivet, og det konkluderes at de magtfulde argumenter er dem, der 
skaber flest positive alliancer. I Danmark kan der således iagttages en stærk alli-
ance omkring forestillingen om ’offentlig debat’ som et redskab til at løse kon-
troverserne. Men på baggrund af afhandlingens analyser fremgår det at forvent-
ningerne til dette redskab er meget forskellige, og dermed påpeges en mulig 
grænse for at bruge offentlig og politisk kommunikation som problemløsnings-
redskab.  
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